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Introduction
The conflict on the Korean peninsula has both global and regional 
dimensions, since in its origin lay disagreement between the two Korean 
states and at the same time it has been influenced by the interplay of the 
major powers that landed support to the corresponding allies. Due to its 
specific position in the region between China, Japan and on the border 
with Russia, Korea has been highly attractive as a sphere of influence for 
each  of  the  major  powers.  Thus,  the  developments  on  the  Korean 
peninsula have for decades been reflecting both regional dynamics of its 
direct  parties  and  the  transformation  of  the  global  political  system. 
Moreover, the routs of the Korean division in general lay in the systemic 
confrontation of the Cold war, when the Korean peninsula became one of 
the regional theaters of global political conflict.
The region of North-East Asia has special regional dynamics in the 
Asia-Pacific: the interests of several great powers are tightly intertwined 
there,  including the interests  of  the three nuclear  powers  –  China,  the 
USA and the Russian Federation. The regional structure is determined by 
the  absence  of  institutionalized  regional  mechanisms  of  confidence-
building and cooperation; the relationships between the regional states are 
maintained mainly on bilateral basis. The regional environment carries the 
legacy of historic hostility – the Japanese colonial rule and the following 
Cold war antagonism,  which at  times contribute to shaping a  negative 
political  climate  that  prevent  countries  of  the  region  from  efficient 
cooperation.
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During  the  period  after  the  end  of  the  Cold  war,  with  the  new 
international processes coming to the stage – global transformations that 
occurred in world politics – the Korean problem has acquired new traits. 
After the Cold war the region of North-East Asia continues to remain one 
of the most security rivaled regions. Notwithstanding the fact, that it has 
become one of the powerful economic centers, it continues to represent 
unresolved interstate disputes,  including disputes over territories.  Apart 
from  it,  the  relationships  between  regional  actors  are  troubled  by 
significant political, economic and ideological divergence.
The Korean problem is very multifaceted. It contains a series of the 
most complex issues, which modern world politics has to attend to. First, 
the  problem of  the  weapons  of  mass  destruction  (WMD) proliferation 
control  and  the  question  of  illegal  nuclear  status  are  on  the  agenda. 
Second, the North Korean regime has been referred to as one of the states 
sponsoring international terrorism (one of the so called “rogue states”). 
Third,  the  problem of  democratization  of  the  DPRK and strategies  of 
engaging it into international cooperation are on the agenda. The intricate 
nature of the Korean problem can be comprised only through bringing 
together a complex of factors, causes and controversies.
During the whole  period of  the division the subject  of  the  inter 
Korean conflict  consisted in the competition of  the two Korean states. 
Each of them pretended absolute legitimacy over the whole peninsular. 
Presently,  it  can  be  claimed  that  the  process  of  transformation  of  the 
Korean  problem  has  been  completed  to  the  extent  that  allows  new 
tendencies to be fixed with an elevated grade of confidence.
Thus, the matters of security which concern the situation in Korea 
include  unsanctioned  nuclear  status  of  the  DPRK,  weapons  of  mass 
destruction  (WMD)  proliferation,  military  regroup  in  the  region  (the 
system of bilateral military treaties between the USA and Japan, the USA 
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and the Republic of Korea), together with the threat of a collapse of the 
North  Korean  regime  and  political,  economic  and  social  problems  it 
would inevitably cause.
Geographic frames of the research could be formally limited to the 
Korean peninsular and the region of North-East Asia, but the impact of 
the  situation  comes  further  across  regional  boundaries.  It  seems 
reasonable to approach the Korean problem also in the context of world 
politics. Localizing the Korean conflict exclusively within the frames of 
the Korean peninsular has not been possible geopolitically from the very 
beginning of the division. Specific geographic position of the peninsular 
and interconnection of interests of the third parties made regional powers 
involve  in  the  settlement.  North  Korean  nuclear  weapons  programme 
challenges both regional and global security. Though the capabilities of 
the rogue states could not be compared to those of the nuclear powers – 
the  USA,  Russia,  China,  Great  Britain  and  France  –  the  threat  is 
represented  by  the  very  ambition  to  acquire  nuclear  weapons  by  such 
states as North Korea.
Actuality  of  the  dissertation is  determined  by  the  necessity  of 
concerning Korean problem within the international contest, where both 
regional and world powers are deeply involved. First, the problem has not 
been resolved notwithstanding the end of the Cold war, of which it was 
considered  reminiscence.  Second,  the  issue  has  undergone  through  a 
series of changes in parallel with the post Cold war processes in world 
politics.  Currently  it  is  directly  related  to  the  effectiveness  of  the 
international non-proliferation regime. The North Korean nuclear problem 
has  had  a  major  impact  on  the  international  non-proliferation  regime 
(NPT) development. The restraints and setbacks of the NPT have become 
evident  in  course  of  the  settlement  of  the  DPRK  nuclear  issue  and 
demonstrated the necessity for its revision. The withdrawal of the DPRK 
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from the NPT was conducted in line with the provisions of the Treaty. 
Third,  the  question  is  interesting  from the  point  of  view of  a  conflict 
whose parts are regional and global powers against a minor regional state. 
Finally, the dynamics of the conflict requires constant updates and new 
analytical work.
The purpose of  the dissertation is  to examine the international 
context over the Korean problem after the end of the Cold war. To ensure 
the  analysis  political  processes  within  the  North  Korean  state  are 
considered  and  the  impact  of  the  main  powers  involved  constitutes  a 
subject of analysis.  
The following research questions thus have been formulated:
1. to  highlight  transformations  of  the  North  Korean  political 
system after the end of the Cold war;
2. give  historic  comparative  perspective  of  how  the  nuclear 
problem arose and was solved in course of the first (1993-1994) 
and the second (2002-) nuclear crises;
3. examine  policy  courses  the  main  powers  involved  in  the 
conflict – namely, the USA under the Bush administration, the 
Republic of Korea and Japan as its regional allies, China and 
Russia advocate;
4. outline main strategies to manage and resolve the North Korean 
nuclear issue
Main  concepts  and  theories  relevant  to  the  research  and 
proposed methods of investigation. The main research method implied 
to  the  analysis  of  the  North  Korean  nuclear  problem in  regional  and 
global  context  is  the  systemic  approach.  International  systems  are 
classified  both  as  social  and  political  and  are  characterized  by 
interdependency  of  its  constitutive  parts.  The  studies  of  international 
systems were conducted by R. Aron, M. Kaplan, B. Badie and M. Smouts, 
7
D.  Easton  and  T.  Parsons.  The  empirical  approach  to  the  study  of 
international  systems  focuses  on  examining  the  existing  international 
systems,  such as  regional  ones  and revealing  specifics  of  international 
political situation there, balance of power, socio-cultural realities, etc.
Methodologically,  it  has  been  important  to  dissociate  from 
ideological dogmas in evaluation of events,  especially, in regard of the 
nature of the North Korean political regime and its policies, in order to 
obtain a more realistic picture of the processes that are currently in course 
there.  The  development  of  the  North  Korean  nuclear  crisis  has  been 
determined by general transformation of the international system after the 
Cold war, the reshuffle of power in the region of the North-East Asia, by 
the dynamics of bilateral relations in the region after the collapse of the 
Soviet union, the increasing role of the USA and China in the region and 
by political and economic conditions inside the regional states.
Out of the research methods, the most applicable ones include the 
method of case-study and the method of comparative analysis in historical 
prospective.  The  systemic  and  multidisciplinary  approach  have  been 
applied  for  the  study  of  the  research  questions,  since  the  complicated 
nature of any socio-political event implies analysis at the interdisciplinary 
crossroads.
Bibliography The  North  Korean  nuclear  problem  and  the 
international  crises  that  arise  around  it  have  been  addressed  in  the 
literature from different points of view. A considerable part of research 
suggests  approaching  the  Korean  question  as  a  threat  to  the  regional 
stability and regional processes in the North-East Asia, with a focus at the 
USA  policies  towards  the  DPRK.  Other  part  of  analytical  works  is 
dedicated  to  the  issues  of  domestic  and  international  policies  of  the 
regional states, studies of political system and foreign policy interests of 
the  North  Korean state.  Another  part  of  research  regards  the  issue  of 
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nuclear  proliferation  containment  and  the  future  of  the  nuclear 
proliferation regime.
The nuclear status of the DPRK has become a challenge for the 
USA – both as for the nuclear power and guard of the NPT regime, its 
regional  interests  of stability  in the region and the system of military-
political alliances there. The literature on the US policies towards North 
Korea  is  numerous  and  concentrates  on  several  aspects:  finding  an 
adequate strategy of dealing with the DPRK, nuclear issue and its impact 
on the regional stability and the US dominant role in the region, the future 
of the NPT regime, issues of human rights in the DPRK, the problem of 
refugees, etc.
The study of the North Korean regime and its transformation after 
the  Cold  war  has  been  conducted  in  the  works  of  Samuel  S.  Kim, 
Ruediger Frank, Jin Woong Kang, Asmolov Konstantin, Andrei Lankov, 
Hazel Smith, Han S. Park and others1. One of such complex studies is the 
“The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era”, edited by Samuel 
S.  Kim,  where  different  aspects  of  the  contemporary  North  Korea  are 
reviewed2.
The analysis of the first and the second nuclear crises emerged over 
the problem of nuclearization and international context can be found in 
numerous works by analysts of the Korean affairs: Victor D. Cha, Samore 
G.,  Michael  J.  Mazarr,  Nicholas  Eberstadt,  James  Cotton,  Charles  L. 
1 Lankov A.N. KNDR vchera I segodnya. Neformalnaya istoriya Severnoi Korei (DPRK Yesterday 
and Today.  Informal  History of  North Korea)  -  M.:  Vostok-Zapad,  2005. -  447 pp.;  Ruediger 
Frank. North Korea: Gigantic Change and a Gigantic Chance // Nautilus Institute Forum Online, 
May 9, 2003, http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0331_Frank.html; Asmolov Konstantin. North Korea: 
Stalinism,  Stagnation,  or  Creeping  Reform?  //  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  2005,  No.  3;  Hazel  Smith, 
Hungry for Peace: International Security,  Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North 
Korea. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005. pp. 341; Park H.S. North 
Korea:  the  Politics  of  Unconventional  Wisdom.  -  Boulder:  Lynne  Rienner,  2002.  -  193  pp.; 
Alexandre Y. Mansourov. The Origins, Evolution and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear 
programme // The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1995. 
2 The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era/ ed. by Samuel S. Kim. Palgrave, New York, 
2001 – 264 pp.
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Pritchard,  Mark  P.  Barry,  Robert  S.  Ross,  Mark  E.  Manyin3.  Among 
Russian  experts  on  the  matter  important  contributions  have  been  the 
works of Georgy Toloraya, Vorontsov Aleksander, Alexandr Mansurov, 
Bulychev Georgy, Zhebin Alexandr, Miheev Vasily.
Strategic  approaches  of  dealing  with  the  rogue  states  have  been 
developed in the studies of Robert S Litwak, John G. Ikenberry, Robert A. 
Scalapino,  George Perkovich,  Ashton B. Carter,  Richard N. Haass and 
others4.
The documentary basis of the dissertation includes the UN Security 
Council Resolutions, the International Atomic Energy Agency data and 
factsheets on the DPRK’s nuclear programme development, international 
bilateral  and  multilateral  agreements  regarding  the  Korean  peninsula, 
WMD  proliferation  related  documents  addressing  global  and  regional 
non-proliferation regimes.
The structure of the dissertation is threefold. Substantial changes 
that  occurred in  the DPRK’s domestic  and international  circumstances 
after  the  end of  the  Cold  war  are  analyzed  in  the  first  chapter.  The 
country  found  itself  in  a  profound  economic  crisis,  which  could  be 
overcome  only  through  modernization  and  economic  reform.  North 
Korea’s  positions  were  complicated  by  almost  complete  international 
isolation as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and even before – 
from the year 1990, when the Soviet government established diplomatic 
3 Charles L. Pritchard . Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb. 
Brookings  Institution  Press,  2007,  228  pp.;  Victor  D.  Cha.  Winning  Asia  //  Foreign  Affairs, 
November-December  2007, Vol.  86,  Issue  6,  pp.  98-113;  Victor  D.  Cha,  David C.  Kang.  The 
Debate over North Korea // Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Number 2. 2004; Samore G. 
The Korean Nuclear  Crisis //  Survival, 2003. 45 (1);  Cotton James. The Second North Korean 
Nuclear Crisis //  Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2003. Volume 57, Issue 2;  Mazarr, 
Michael J. The Long Road to Pyongyang //  Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct2007, Vol. 86. Issue 5, pp. 
75-94; Mark P. Barry.  North Korea Requires Long-term Strategic Relationship with the U.S. // 
International Journal on World Peace, Vol. XXIV No. 1 March 2007.
4 George Perkovich. Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation // Foreign 
Affairs, March/April 2003, Vol. 82, Issue 2. pp. 2-8; Ashton B. Carter. How to Counter WMD // 
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2004, Vol. 83 Issue 5; Richard N. Haass. Regime Change and 
Its Limits // Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005, Vol. 84, Issue 4. pp. 66-78; Litwak Robert S. Non-
proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change // Survival, Winter 2003/2004, Vol. 45, Issue 4, 
pp. 7-32. 
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relations with the Republic of Korea. The North Korean regime seemed to 
be  subject  to  dramatic  transformations  due  to  global  democratization 
processes. However, the North Korean regime has survived and managed 
to keep its closed character even after the death of the first leader of the 
country  –  President  Kim  Il  Song  in  1994  –  when  the  power  was 
successfully passed to his son, the current leader Kim Jong Il.
To  analyze  the  question  of  the  etymology  of  the  North  Korean 
nuclear problem an insight into the origins and motivations of the DPRK 
nuclear ambitions, strategies, international/national impact is given. The 
North  Korean  nuclear  problem  is,  in  fact,  the  issue  of  unsanctioned 
nuclear  developments  that  the  country  leads  both  for  peaceful  and,  as 
suspected, also military purposes. Politically the problem manifests itself 
in a conflict  situation,  that  at  times breaks up into international crises. 
Nuclear development started in the DPRK in the 1960s with the Soviet 
assistance.  In  1974 North  Korean joined the  IEAE and on the  12th of 
December 1985 – to the NPT. An overview of the system of international 
agreements relevant to the mater follows.
The 2nd part of the dissertation concerns the situation over North 
Korea nuclear issue in the context of global and regional  politics.  The 
specific  feature  of  the  region  is  the  concentration  of  nuclear  powers 
(Russia,  China, USA) and states potentially capable of creating nuclear 
arms in a short term (Japan, South Korea).
The  chapter  reviews  approaches  to  North  Korea  of  the  main 
international parties concerned, which are the USA, Russia, Japan, China 
and the Republic  of  Korea.  Historically,  the international  context  as  a 
result of interaction of the regional powers – the USA, Russia, China and 
Japan – has been of crucial  importance on the Korean peninsular.  The 
national  division  itself  has  been  the  result  of  global  political  and 
ideological  confrontation  of  the Cold  war  period.  The  situation  of  the 
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Korean peninsular represented one of the regional conflicts, exemplifying 
block confrontation of that period. The changes of political climate of the 
Cold war reflected the situation on the Korean peninsular, where periods 
of political detent were followed by some progress in the inter Korean 
dialogue. 
In the third part the Korean problem is analyzed in the context of 
the new international political situation. Current developments in Korea 
reflect primarily relationship between the minor state – the DPRK – and 
the major power – the USA. In the new international political context the 
problem of North Korean nuclearization came to the agenda. The end of 
the cold was marked by progress in the control over nuclear technologies, 
as the competition between the major powers in this sphere seemed to be 
over.  However, several  years after the problem of horizontal spread of 
nuclear  technologies  came  to  the  global  political  agenda5.  In  the  new 
international  situation  the  role  of  nuclear  technologies  has  seriously 
changed: it can now be used in the conflicts between major powers and 
minor  states,  which are often on the marginal  position in international 
relations,  as  a  containment  instrument.  Such  states  refer  to  nuclear 
leverage  in  order  to  secure  their  international  political  and  economic 
positions6. Regional actors have to address, first of all, the nuclear DPRK. 
The process of elaborating and approbating mechanisms of settlement of 
conflicts where nuclear factor is concerned is currently in course in world 
politics: the existing international law lacks in providing adequate legal 
basis and effective response instruments to resolve such situations7.
5 The USA introduced a term to nominate potential violators of the non-proliferation regime – 
rogue states. Robert Litwak. Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change //  Survival, 
February 2003, Volume 45 No. 4. pp. 7-32.
6 Victor Asal  and Kyle Beardsley.  Proliferation and International  Crisis Behavior  //  Journal of  
Peace  Research, Vol.  44,  No.  2,  2007,  pp.  139-155;  Marianne  Hanson.  Nuclear  Weapons  as 
Obstacles to International Security // International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 3. 2002. pp. 361-380.
7 The situation over the Iraqi presumed nuclear programme has become an example of the use of 
force in nuclear proliferation control activities. North Korean has avoided the same destiny – the 
priority has been (not without hesitations) given to peaceful methods of settlement.
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Bilateral  forms  of  dialogue,  used  during  the  first  nuclear  crisis 
regulation in 1993-1994, showed their general effectiveness. At the same 
time, positions of such international organizations as the UN and he IEIA 
were seriously undermined. With the new spiral of nuclear crisis (2002), 
the Six-party format of negotiating a solution was formed (USA, Russia, 
China,  Japan,  South  Korea,  North  Korea),  which  is  able  to  provide 
multilateral  guaranties  of  fulfillment  of  agreements  negotiated.  The 
difficulties of the negotiation process are attributed to dissent between the 
contracting  parties  that  however,  manages  to  arrive  at  the  agreement. 
However,  it  has  become clear  that  the  prospects  of  settling  the  North 
Korean nuclear problem by the means of diplomacy are in multilateral 
dialogue framework.
In the conclusion main outcomes of the research and the results of 
the analysis of the research questions are formulated.
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Part 1 North Korea and nuclear issue
1.1. Changes in the international and domestic situation in the DPRK 
after the end of the Cold war
1.1.1 Political  situation:  closed character  of  the North Korean political 
regime
One of the distinctive features of the modern political development 
is the problem of the States’ capacity to deal with numerous challenges 
and  difficulties  it  has  to  face.  First  of  all,  there  is  still  a  number  of 
countries,  which  remain  on  the  sideline  of  globalization,  and, 
subsequently,  on  the  sideline  of  modern  International  processes;  the 
situation is aggravated by the attribution of some of these countries to 
rogue states.  The End of the Cold War was marked by the collapse of 
several states and visible dilapidation of the role of State-centric model of 
International Relations. The role of the State in world politics has become 
an  issue  of  top  priority  after  the  end  of  the  Cold  war,  when  analysts 
started discussions over its rivaled role and capacities, passing some of its 
functions to other actors. The capacity of the State to fulfill its functions 
in a situation of dramatic political changes (any critical situation – armed 
conflict, natural disaster, death of a charismatic leader, etc.) is rivaled and 
can lead even to the State’s collapse.
In this light the situation in the region of North East Asia proves the 
opposite – in contradiction to the tendency of the undermined state role, 
political  process  within  the  regional  states  has  major  impact  both  on 
domestic situation and regional system of relations in general. Thus, the 
importance  of  any process  of  political  transformation  enhances,  as  the 
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regional  interaction is directly subjected by the States that  form it  and 
political situation that develops inside them.
The particular situation over the problem of analyzing the actual 
state and developments of the North Korean situation is, first of all, the 
lack of verifiable information, caused by the regime’s strict control over 
the  informational  flows.  As  any  other  totalitarian  state,  the  DPRK 
exercises  its  legacy  and  enjoys  support  inside  the  country  through 
constantly involving the population into logic, different from the ideas of 
human rights, personal freedoms and security guarantees.
Thus,  when  trying  to  deal  with  the  current  situation  inside  the 
DPRK in order to understand its policies and create scenarios of how the 
situation  might  evolve  in  the  future,  it  is  necessary  to  take  into 
consideration  mostly  the  impact  of  its  policies  on  domestic  and 
international situation, in this way drawing conclusions on the decision-
making process,  the difficulties the political elite has to face and even 
political and economic resources available. Obviously, this task appears 
quite hard to deal with and final conclusions might be rather descriptive 
than documented and easily verifiable. In these circumstances would be 
adequate a qualitative analysis, rather than a quantitative.
The term “totalitarianism” is used in political science to describe 
political regimes where the state controls all aspects of social and political 
life,  when  the  government  represses  any  activities  by  individuals  or 
groups  and  maintains  itself  in  power  through  the  use  of  police, 
propaganda  that  excludes  any  criticism  of  the  regime.  Internal  and 
external difficulties are manipulated in order to encourage national unity. 
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The isolationist  tendency is also one of the main traits of a totalitarian 
regime8. 
It is noteworthy, that the ability of the state to exercise its functions 
may  become  subjected  to  weakening  or  failure  in  cases  of  original 
weakness of the state, or because of the adherence to power by the rulers, 
who do not care for the state affluence. The governing capacity of such 
states becomes most vulnerable in periods of political unrest. If the state 
institutions are weak and the existing state legitimacy fails to maintain 
them, there may emerge a cycle of descending state capacity. The case of 
North Korea demonstrates the dangers caused by the loosing of control 
over  the  territory  by  the  totalitarian  leader  (for  example,  in  case  of 
aggravation of the economic disaster). In this situation the regime would 
lack wide popular support and thus will loose its legitimacy. These cases 
have already been registered in North Korea,  especially  in the regions 
close to Korea-Chinese state border, where the control over the movement 
of  population  is  rather  weak.  There  are  also  problems  with  state 
censorship  of  the  media,  which  kept  the  population  in  an  information 
vacuum  for  decades,  leaving  the  population  only  with  information 
provided by state propaganda machine.
A practical long-term goal of North Korea is the maintenance of the 
existing  status-quo,  since  it  permits  to  save  the  foundations  for  the 
existence of the dominating regimes. The situation is aggravated by the 
fact that sustaining the functional capacity of the existing regime in the 
situation  of  isolation  turns  out  to  be  beneficial  for  its  regional 
counteragents.  Moreover,  the current  vector  of  international  migrations 
shows that in case of a humanitarian catastrophe or the abandonment of 
8 Ivo  K.  Feierabend.  Expansionist  and  Isolationist  Tendencies  of  Totalitarian  Political Systems:  A 
Theoretical Note // The Journal of Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4 Nov. 1962. pp. 733-742.
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statehood the burden of refugees will be shifted to the neighboring states, 
as well as to the developed states of the world. In case of state failure and 
the emergence of a military conflict, neighboring states will inevitably be 
involved (willingly or not) into it. This model is quite vibrant in case of 
North Korea, with the destabilization of negotiations on nuclear issues at 
background.  Potential  possibility  of  the  North  Korean  collapse  is 
currently seen as a threat to the regional security9.
The State of  the North East  Asia,  similar  to other  countries,  are 
seriously influenced by the globalization processes, which foster them to a 
constant  “adjustment”  to  the  global  development  level  and  generally 
accepted standards, increasing their competitiveness and through this – 
their  own  sustainable  development.  The  imperative  of  globalization 
inevitably requires openness of political systems, thus regulative functions 
of the State have to be reassessed. In case of North Korea, such challenges 
actually  mean  a  kind  of  enforces  and  hardly  controlled  adaptation, 
dangerous because of its complex nature and also due to the fact that the 
DPRK  for  decades  failed  to  adhere  even  to  global  modernization 
processes.  Indeed, almost complete isolation from global processes and 
global  economy  obviously  has  negative  consequences  for  the 
development of the North Korean State.  However, no political organism 
is static – it exists and develops under the influence of various factors10. 
This  statement  applies  to  the  DPRK  as  well,  though  it  is  seemingly 
immune to reforms, both external and internal.
The phenomenon of non-transparency of North Korea is at  large 
explained by the need to sustain the existence of the incumbent political 
9 Victor D. Cha. Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defence on the Korean Peninsular // International  
Security, Vol. 27, No. 1. Summer 2002. p. 46.
10 The empirical part of this research relies on the theoretical findings made by Karl Popper, Hannah 
Arendt,  Carl  Friedrich,  Zbigniew Brzezinski,  Juan  Linz,  Philippe  Schmitter,  Guillermo O’Donnell, 
Terry  Lynn  Karl  and  Alfred  Stepan,  who have  elaborated  on  types  of  political  regimes  and  their 
characteristics.
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regime under conditions of deep economic crisis and resentment on behalf 
of the international community. There is a possibility, however, that any 
dramatic changes (or reforms) will inevitably lead to the collapse of the 
political  system,  and,  in the gravest  scenario,  the disappearance of the 
state with its unique identity from the world map.
The  problem  regarding  nuclear  potential  of  the  DPRK,  which 
involves  directly  or  indirectly  interests  of  many  countries,  is  in  fact  a 
conflict  between  legitimate  states  (including  North  Korea).  The  North 
Korean nuclear problem has not arisen, as it often claimed by the media, 
exclusively as a result of personal interests of the country’s elite, whose 
power subjectivity, which is the foundation of legitimacy of the existing 
regime,  is  defined  by  the  acting  totalitarian  leader.  Obviously,  the 
“authority  leverage”  may  provide  the  acting  leader  the  possibility  to 
maintain  his  legitimacy  for  an  indefinite  period.  Having  lost  such 
leverage, a leader looses a chance to uphold its legitimacy, which may 
lead to the outburst of the potential of distrust of the regime, and thus 
provoke social unrest.
The  settlement  of  the  North  Korean  nuclear  problem  has  been 
closely connected to prognoses of the regime close collapse, which has 
proved to be wrong. The first crisis of 1993-1995, which concluded with 
signing the Geneva Agreement, was actually settled with the perspective 
that the state’s collapse would have happened in the short term11.
North Korea lacks significant economic and political leverages and 
resources,  and  thus,  can  not  project  an  adequate  influence  on  the 
unsatisfactory external conditions. So, it is likely to initiate a local conflict 
(with the direct or indirect involvement of great powers) in order to attract 
11 See Ruediger Frank. North Korea: Gigantic Change and a Gigantic Chance // Nautilus Institute Forum 
Online, May 9, 2003, http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0331_Frank.html.
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international  attention,  which  may  catalyze  foreign  investment.  The 
initiated  conflict  helps  to  create  a  “negative  publicity”  by  drawing  a 
formally negative image of a country at war, which in future may cause 
the positive change of attitude of the great powers. Another thing is that 
the role of the military factor is still  very high in the DPRK. Actually, 
with the come to power of Kim Jong Il, the role of the army has been 
emphasized  on  the  contrary  to  the  party,  whose  power  has  seriously 
diminished.
The politics of provocation, often employed by North Korea on the 
world  arena,  can  be  regarded  as  an  instrument  of  coercion  on  other 
countries. Moreover, even when it advances to the level of international 
interaction, the DPRK aims at short-term goals only,  which is proven by 
the  fact  of  its  formal  participation  in  numerous  international 
organizations.  For  example,  North  Korea  is  a  member  to  the  UN and 
regional  organizations,  and  formally  exercises  diplomatic  and consular 
relations with many countries.
In general, the wreckage of internal stability of the non-transparent 
states may become a potential threat to regional security, since it is the 
State which, regardless of the type of governance and political regime, 
acts as a levering mechanism of the conflict potential. This is performed 
regardless  of  the  parallel  existence  of  another  trend  in  modern 
International Relations,  where the State has to compete with new non-
state international agents. The threat of statelessness or the dilapidation of 
the State is the inability of non-transparent states to control the upsurge of 
its conflict potential to the level of open fire and non-contained hostility. 
The State acts as a managing lever of the conflict potential of the territory, 
and in case of its weakening or failure internal political processes become 
uncontrollable.
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In the 1990s the North Korean State demonstrated an exceptional 
stability of state power, while the collapse of socialist  systems and the 
chain reaction it  caused made many experts  believe that  the failure  of 
DPRK  was  imminent.  The  domestic  situation  an  the  international 
environment  seemed to  be complicated   hard economic  situation and 
food shortage and the death of Kim Il Sung, missing international political 
and economic backing after the socialist system fall down.
 The course of social and political transformation in the DPRK has 
been  certainly  based  on  the  principles  of  Confucianism.  The  North 
Korean  state,  generally  considered  a  communist  or  a  socialist  state 
combines in its ideology main traits of the above mentioned ideas together 
with strongly inherited Confucian traditions.
The Korean reality before the proclamation of independence was 
the one of traditional Confucian one and later on was used for the state-
building and implemented in the formula of the “family-state”. The state 
tried to employ fundamental Confucian ideals and practices as ideological 
resources12.
Even the transfer of power from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il was 
effected in the line with the Confucian father-to-son tradition. When Kim 
Il  Sung  passed  away  in  1994  analysts  argued  that  the  North  Korean 
system would collapse and his successor would hardly be able to succeed 
to power. However, Kim Jong Il  came to power without any dissident 
movement against him in witness.
Political system of North Korea under Kim Jong Il is different from 
what it used to be in the times of Kim Il Sung, who managed to establish 
his absolute leadership by the beginning of the 1970s. The leadership of 
12 Jin Woong Kang. The “Domestic Revolution” Policy and Traditional Confucianism in North Korean 
State Formation // Harvard Asia Quarterly, Volume IX, Number 4, Fall 2005.
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Kim Il Sung since was unrivaled and absolute. In effect,  the legacy of 
Kim  Il  Song  as  the  founder  and  the  first  President  of  the  State  has 
remained  preserved  after  his  death:  the  legacy  of  his  son’s  political 
leadership seem to be based on the premise that he would follow the line 
of his father13. The North Korean system was created as dependant on the 
single  leader  and  to  be  stable  needs  to  maintain  the  memory  of  his 
accomplishments in order to remain stable.
The end of the Cold war brought significant changes in the position 
of North Korea: international isolation and a systemic economic decline 
as  a  result  of  the  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  communist 
block. With the loss of the main trade partners the DPRK has to look for 
alternative ways of survival. A series of natural disasters contributed to 
the  fact,  that  the  government  could  no  longer  guarantee  a  level  of 
subsistent for the people. The end of the Cold war has posed the problem 
of new security allies and security guarantees: the new leadership had to 
take measures to assure both international and domestic security. After the 
death of Kim Il Sung, whose authority in the national army was strong, 
the new leader had to consolidate the government, the party and the army 
around  himself  to  guarantee  the  preservation  of  the  North  Korean 
system14.  There has been a rotation of personnel: a new generation has 
entered the power set-up, particularly at the middle level.
The amendments made to the Constitution of the DPRK of 1972 
reflect  noticeable  changes  in  the  leadership  structure  and  government 
13 Dae-Sook Suh. New Political Leadership / in The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era/ ed. 
by Samuel S. Kim. Palgrave, New York, 2001. – p. 67.
14 Kim Jong Il was born in 1942 in the Soviet Union – the fact that is denied by the official North 
Korean version of his biography. He graduated from the Kim Il Sung University in 1964, majoring in 
political economy. Kim Jong Il was promoted a successor to his father from the middle of the 1970s. In 
1991 he was appointed the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. In 1993 – the Chairman of the 
National  Defence  Committee  (NDC).  In  1997  Kim  Jong  Il  became  the  General  Secretary  of  the 
Workers’ Party of Korea.
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organization15. First of all, the office of the President was abolished and 
Kim  Il  Sung  proclaimed  in  the  Constitution’s  preamble  the  “eternal 
President” of the State. 
National Defense Committee (NDC) is the central military body of 
the State. Kim Jong Il himself occupies the post of the Chairman of the 
NDC and is in charge of the national armed forces. The Supreme People’s 
Assembly  (SPA)  has  remained  the  central  legislative  body  of  the 
government and the supreme authority of the state. The Chairman of the 
Standing Committee of the SPA has acquired some functions typical of 
the  head  of  the  state,  such  as  receiving  foreign  envoys,  ratifying  or 
abrogating treaties  concluded with other  countries,  instituting honorary 
titles and diplomatic ranks16. The head of he State in the DPRK is in fact 
represented  by  the  SPA  Presidium  –  a  collective  body.  The  SPA 
Presidium is the highest organ of power in the intervals between sessions 
of  the  SPA17.  Thus,  the  DPRK  has  shifted  from  being  a  presidential 
republic to parliamentary republic18.
Changes occurred in the relationship between the party, the military 
and the government. The Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) was the center of 
power during the Kim Il Sung rule. The edited Constitution still confirms 
that the nation is lead by the KWP19.  The Party’s leading role has been 
taken over by the military. Kim Jong Il was appointed the KWP’s General 
Secretary in 1997 with a simple announcement by the Central Committee 
of the party – without a party conference or a central Committee meeting. 
15 The 1972 Constitution was amended in 1992 and 1998.
16 DPRK’s Socialist Constitution, Article 110.
17 DPRK’s Socialist Constitution, Article 106.
18 Kim Jong Il is not the head of the State, as many journalists and even analysts sometimes mistakenly 
claim.
19 DPRK’s Socialist Constitution, Preface: “The DPRK and the entire Korean people will uphold the 
great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung as the eternal president of the Republic, defend and carry forward his 
ideas and exploits and complete the Juche revolution under the leadership of the Korean Workers’ 
Party.”
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The KWP’s central Committee has not been called in full session from 
199320.
In fact, the military have considerably consolidated their position in 
the government. The security concerns increased from eh beginning of the 
1990s have contributed to professional military officers’ engagement in 
the  government.  In  the  situation  of  the  changing  international 
environment and domestic economic hardships emphasized by the natural 
disasters,  only  the  army  could  safeguard  both  internal  and  external 
security  of  the  regime.  Kim  Jong  Il  introduced  the  “songun  policy” 
(military-first politics, or the priority of the arms, of a gun policy), aimed 
at  promoting  the  army  and  the  military  sector  in  general,  including 
military build-up and production, as the pillar of the State.
The amended Constitution adopted on September 5th 1998 by the 
first  session  of  the  10th  Supreme  People’s  Assembly  also  reveals  the 
effort made by the DPRK government to revive the economy in recession. 
In the first half of the 1990s it became evident that the continuation of the 
previous economic policies, based on mobilizing domestic resources, self 
reliance  and  holding  campaigns  such  as  the  “Arduous  march” 
(1994-1997)  and  the  “Forced  march”  in  1998,  failed.  It  should  be 
underlined that there are no economic reforms in course in North Korea, 
but  certain  adjustments  made  by  the  government  in  order  to  handle 
challenges that have arisen recently. The Constitution (1998) stipulates 
that the DPRK economy is self-sustaining; however, a new provision that 
guarantees private property has been added. The private property regards 
the property for individual possession and consumption of the citizens21.
20 Konstantin  Asmolov.  North  Korea:  Stalinism,  Stagnation,  or  Creeping  Reform?  //  Far  Eastern 
Affairs, 2005, No. 3, p.33.
21 Article 24: “Private property is confirmed to property meeting the simple and individual aims of the 
citizen. Private property consists of socialist distributions of the result of labor and additional benefits 
of the State and society. The products of individual sideline activities including those from the kitchen 
gardens of cooperative farmers and income from other legal economic activities shall also belong to 
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From  the  end  of  the  1990s  North  Korea  has  taken  important 
measures  to  provide  survival  of  the  national  economy.  Besides  other 
activities,  the  crucial  point  was  the  historic  meeting  of  the  North  and 
South Korean leaders in June 2000 on Pyongyang, which has been for the 
first  time  since  the  history  of  divided  Korea22.  The  meeting  gave 
momentum  for  the  further  diplomatic  expansion  of  the  DPRK,  which 
resulted in establishing diplomatic relations with most  of the European 
countries,  Canada,  Brazil,  New  Zealand,  Philippines  and  others.  The 
initiatives to enlarge the contacts with the international community had a 
practical  goal  of  contributing  to  the  revival  of  the  DPRK’s  economy 
through attracting loans, investment through specially created economic 
zones. The 2002 “July 1 Measures” – the initiative that introduced special 
economic zones in Sineuiju, Geumgang mountains and Gaesong sought to 
improve  economic  conditions  through  measures  of  openness23.  The 
measures included the abolishment of fixed prices (including the prices of 
general products, such as rice) and the rise of wages to adjust the prices. 
Another  significant  measure  was  the  emergence  of  markets  in  North 
Korea,  which  was  preciously  prohibited.  Currently  markets  operate 
countrywide and deal not only with the products of farming or kitchen 
gardens, but with industrial goods as well (factories can sell a part of their 
surplus in the markets).  Finally, the system of centralized planning has 
shifter  towards a  higher  grade of  autonomy for  provincial  entities  and 
enterprise in making decisions.
The Measures testify that the North Korean government is aware of 
the  shortcomings  of  a  planned  economy  and  is  trying  to  improve  its 
private property. The State shall protect private property and guarantee its legal inheritance.”
22 On June 13-15 2000 South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung and the North Korean leader Kim Joing 
Il held talks in Pyongyang.
23 Yoon Hwang, Kim Il-gi. North Korea’s Reform and Openness after July 1, 2002 Measures // Korea 
Focus, Summer 2006, pp. 96-111.
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investment  climate.  The  path  North  Korea  has  taken  is  of  gradual 
marketization  of  its  economy  and  would  inevitably  lead  to  further 
openness  that  might  start  bringing into the country capitalist  practices, 
which in itself can catalyze changes in the way of thinking in the DPRK. 
The North Korean government has demonstrated itself inclined to follow 
reforms  gradually,  without  accelerating  the  process  and  under  strict 
control – the activities in the special economic zones and the movement 
of the citizens are regulated. The reforms were introduced in order to put 
under regulation the process that had been already in course in the country 
due to its deepening economic crisis, when the state was no longer able to 
assure  individuals  and enterprises  their  necessities.   And  although the 
changes have been partial, the previous economic mechanisms with the 
economic planning system.
1.1.2 Prospects of reform and international engagement
The  North  Korea  political  system,  as  every  social  system,  is 
subjected to the processes of change and continuity. Changes might occur 
on different levels, but a considerable change is entitled to bring changes 
in the political system’s fundamentals – values, governing mechanisms, 
functions  and  processes.  Obviously,  any  fundamental  changes  require 
deep  transformation,  break  of  the  former  values  and structures,  which 
might occur through dramatic events, such as a war or a revolution. Each 
system  tends  to  reproduce  itself  constantly,  on  the  basis  of  many 
interlocking structures that guarantee self-preservation24. James Rosenau 
24 See  Talcott Parsons. The Social System. Free Press, 1951; David Easton. A Systems Analysis of 
Political Life. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965; James N. Rosenau. Turbulence in World 
Politics: A theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990; Robert Jervis. 
System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997. 
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evidences parameters of a system, which preserve it and “prescribe the 
goals, means and resources of the system’s role-occupants, including the 
mechanisms of enforcement”25. As a result, a system is reproduced on the 
basis of its fundamental parameters that guarantee its preservation. Thus, 
it is important to identify and examine characteristic features of the North 
Korean system to analyze the way it works and the possible evolution.
The principal question to pose is the stability of the North Korean 
regime  and  its  capacity  of  maintaining  control  over  its  territory  and 
population.  In  such  an  analysis,  the  crucial  matter  is  if  the  regime 
manages to survive as a sovereign political entity with its unique features. 
However, it is necessary to point out that a number of distinct changes 
have  taken  place  in  the  DPRK  since  Kim  Jong  Il  came  to  power. 
Although definitely with a strong orientation to the traditional political 
course, the system subjected notable alterations.
The amendments to the Constitution of the DPRK of 1972, adopted 
by  the  Supreme  People’s  Assembly  on  the  5th of  December  1998, 
introduced  a  preamble  where  Kim  Il  Sung  is  proclaimed  “eternal 
President” of the nation and the DPRK itself is named “the Kim Il Sung 
State”26. The traditionally privileged Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) has 
lost its usual influence while the power vacuum has been filled by the 
military.  In  1998  and  2003,  there  were  the  elections  to  the  Supreme 
National Assembly. Their results have shown that the new power headed 
by Kim Jong Il, the chairman of the State Defence Committee and the 
General  secretary  of  the  Korean  Workers’  Party,  has  stabilized.  The 
changes  introduced to  the  Constitution  of  the  DPRK had a  high legal 
status.  However,  actual  power  in  North  Korea  is  in  the  hands  of  the 
25 James Rosenau, p.79.
26 The first DPRK constitution was adopted on the 8th of September, 1948. It was substituted in 1972 by 
the new Constitution. The 1972 socialist constitution is still in force. Amendments were made in 1992 
and 1998.
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military. The role of the KWP has been reduced to the organizational and 
ideological support of Kim Jong Il’s decisions and those adopted by the 
National Defence Committee which he heads. The “songun policy” (the 
priority  position  of  the  army)  proclaimed  in  1995  has  led  to  further 
militarization of the entire socio-political life in the country.
However, it can not be claimed that there is a military rule in the 
DPRK. It is rather the reliance on the military. However, the proclamation 
of the songun policy (the priority of the army, the priority of the gun), the 
strengthening  of  the  army  and  the  military  in  all  spheres  of  life   
economy, politics and culture   are a sure confirmation of the DPRK’s 
continuing militarization. The slogan “The Army is the party, the people 
and the state” is in effect a reflection of the role played by the military in 
North Korean society. This role continues to gain strength27. The role of 
the army is not limited to fulfilling military functions only. The army has 
been actively involved in economic activities, mainly construction. Along 
with the need of strengthening national defence, the army can be regarded 
as  a  conservative  and  reliable  force  to  prevent  social  unrest  or  any 
domestic  instability  in  course  of  overcoming  of  the  present  socio-
economic crisis in the country.
Ideology in North Korea remains the main instrument of securing 
the  political  regime  legitimacy.  The  Constitution  underlines  that  the 
DPRK  is  the  country  has  “Kim  Il  Sung’s  Juche  state  construction 
ideology”28. The Juche ideology, thus, remains unrivaled. However, as it 
used to be in the Kim Il Sung era as well, ideological dogmas are being 
evolved, added and/or reinterpreted in accordance with current realities. 
The new introduction has been the “songun policy”. At the same time, the 
27 The Korean People’s Army accounts for 1,2 million men.
28 DPRK’s Socialist Constitution, Preface.
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ideological pressure is reported to have eased: many Koreans avoid mass 
meetings they were obliged to visit before, are more open to foreigners, 
social scientists’ discussions appear more spontaneous, etc.29 At the same 
time, the North Korean mass media remain strictly controlled by the State 
– the DPRK has been classified 195 out of 195 by the Freedom House 
“Freedom of the Press 2007” rating. The Constitution guarantees freedom 
of speech, but in practice these rights are nonexistent: the media is run by 
the  state,  radios  are  permanently  fixed  to  state  channels,  and  all 
publications are subject to strict supervision and censorship. As regarding 
general situation with human rights in the DPRK, the resolutions adopted 
by the UN every year continue to express serious concerns at persistent 
reports of human rights violations in North Korea30.
There are no known associations or organizations other than those 
created by the government. Strikes, collective bargaining, and other basic 
organized-labor activities are illegal. Still, it is thought that North Korea 
has taken a step away from the classical model of a totalitarian state. The 
state ideology of Juche, which was initially a version of Marxism, has 
been gradually transformed in a specific teaching   the outcome of the 
Korean tradition. Political course of the DPRK continues to move in the 
direction of nationalism with an emphasis on the national exclusiveness of 
the Koreans. North Korean propaganda claims that a powerful state has 
already been built in the sphere of ideology (the Juche ideas), the military 
sphere (the fortress). The third component of the powerful state concept, 
economy, is in the state of realization.
29 Such judgments based on personal experience can be found in the works of A. Lankov, S. Kurbanov, 
A. Mansurov and others, who visited North Korea recently.
30 Recently, the UN Human Rights Committee accepted a draft resolution on the 15 th of November 2007 
to be passed to the General Assembly for a final vote. Resolutions on the human rights situation in the 
DPRK:  resolutions  60/173  of  16  December  2005,  61/174  of  19  December  2006,  Commission  on 
Human Rights resolutions 2003/10 of 16 April 2003, 2004/13 of 15 April 2004 and 2005/11 of 14 April 
2005, and Human Rights Council decision 1/102 of 30 June 2006.
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A  number  of  government  measures,  aimed  at  making  certain 
changes  in  the  economy,  have been implemented.  The  analysis  of  the 
North Korean current state of affairs requires an outlook of domestic and 
international  causation  of  the  transformations  in  social,  economic  and 
political spheres that occurred in the country after the end of the Cold 
war. Some experts argue that what is now taking place in the DPRK is in 
fact  a building of market  practices,  when individuals and entities enter 
into private economic relations with other individuals or entities31. North 
Korea went  through a  series  of  economic  difficulties  after  having lost 
contributions from trade with the ex communist  countries.  A series  of 
natural  disasters  contributed  to  the  worsening  situation  and  the  state 
eventually  was  unable  to  provide  basic  need  of  the  population.  The 
response to the critical situation was the request for broad international 
assistance, both from states, international organizations, and the NGOs.
The government eventually had to accept as inevitable the situation 
of the state-guaranteed provision system to be abolished giving place to 
primitive  market  interactions  of  the  population.  The  state,  unlike  it 
happened in other countries with stately controlled economies, for long 
refused to recognize the changes that had already occurred and the sphere 
of market exchanges has not been regulated by any legislation until the 
amendments to the Constitution of 1998.
In  the  beginning of  the  21st century  DPRK has  taken numerous 
activities to open itself to the global community: diplomatic relations with 
most  EU  countries,  Philippines,  Canada,  Brazil  and  others  were 
established.  In  economy,  a  series  of  measures  were  introduced, 
culminating in the “July 1 Measures” in 2002. The scope of diplomatic 
31 Hazel Smith. Crime and economic instability: the real security threat from North Korea and what to 
do about it // International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 5, 2005. pp. 235-249.
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activities and the attempt of economic reform were aimed definitely at 
improving North Korea’s economic situation through broad international 
backing and gradual moves in economic management.
The objects that the DPRK pursued after announcing of the “July 1 
Measures” include32:
1. Readjustment of prices in compliance with production costs, but 
also  international  prices  and  supply-demand  situation  (an 
element of market economy).
2. Increase  of  incomes  in  order  to  adjust  them to  the  increased 
living  costs,  but  also  on  the  economic  sector  basis  and 
performance-based.
3. Legalization  of  markets,  previously  absent  in  the  country. 
Currently  over  300  markets  are  reported  to  operate  in  North 
Korea.
  
In general, the issue of reformability of the North Korean economy 
is under question. It is widely argued that North Korea might successfully 
follow the Chinese path of reforms. However, it would pose threats to the 
North Korean system, that its leaders might consider incompatible with 
maintaining the unique regime’s features. The move toward introduction 
of new principles in economy regulating does not imply that full-range 
economic reforms occur in the short term. It is acknowledged, that in case 
of North Korea the probability of reforms may be discussed rather in the 
middle or long term. Some changes have occurred recently, including the 
significant July 1st 2002 measures, however, it could be hardly claimed 
32 See Yoon Hwang and Kim Il-gi. North Korea’s Reform and Openness after July 1, 2002 Measures // 
Korea Focus, Summer 2006, pp. 96-111. 
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that the DPRK’s economy has entered the path of reform: the changes 
have not matured in real policy changes and have been extremely partial.
After the death of the charismatic leader – Kim Il Sung  the power 
has been passed to his successor smoothly and there are no visible signs 
of struggle for power inside the elite. The stability of political situation in 
the country does not offer opportunities for reform that appears when a 
change of leadership through competition for power occurs. The system 
of North Korea is highly institutionalized, which is not an advantage in 
changing economic  course.  In  fact,  the  regime in the DPRK has been 
stable and the institutions have been maintained non-interrupted for the 
whole period of the system’s being.
The economic structure of the DPRK also contributes to making 
reforms  a  difficult  enterprise33.  In  North  Korea  reforms  have  to  be 
concentrated  on  the  industrial  sector,  which  would  need  investment, 
modernization  and  reorganization  of  management  system.  Military 
spending is highly disproportional. The exact data is not available, since 
the  DPRK  government  does  not  provide  information,  but  defence 
spending  of  the  DPRK  is  estimated  to  constitute  around  25%  of  the 
country’s GDP. DPRK give priority to the development of military sector 
over economic goals: it has repeatedly demonstrated scarce interest in a 
sustained  economic  recovery  and  its  short-term and immediate  benefit 
oriented tactics.
Finally, the attitude of international environment can be estimated 
as twofold: on the one hand, improvement of situation in the DPRK – 
economic reforms, normalization of situation with the human rights, etc. 
is advocated, on the other hand, there is not any strong commitment to 
33 If compared to China, whose experience of reforms is often put as a possible way for North Korea to 
follow, the DPRK’s economy is highly urbanized.  See Robert  Dujarric  and Young-Ho Park.  North 
Korea’s Reformability in Comparative Perspective // Korea and World Affairs, Spring 2005, p. 57.
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contribute to reforming North Korea (with the exception of South Korea 
that  is  particularly  sensible  to  any  changes  in  the  North).  Obviously, 
economic reforms do not limit their impact only to the economic sphere: 
as  it  happened  in  former  socialist  countries,  economic  transformation 
eventually  undermined  and  destroyed  communist  regimes.  When  the 
State’s monopoly over economic management is rivaled, the authority of 
the  government  and the  Party  inevitably  weakens.  Other  actors  are  to 
acquire  growing  influence  in  the  policy-making  process  –  private 
businesses, foreign corporations – that would lead to the decline of the 
leader’s role and, eventually, undermine the institutionalized top-bottom 
power structure of the DPRK. This would happen due to the widening gap 
between  the  official  ideology  and  the  reality  of  reforms,  destroying 
coherence and thus bringing conflicts.
The isolation that the DPRK keeps from the outside world has been 
kept through all the history of the State. It is especially strict in case of 
interaction of North Korean with their co-nationals from South Korea34. 
The risk of ideological contagion through international exchanges makes 
the government prevent any contact of its citizens with the external world. 
The  DPRK’s  government,  though  highly  protective  of  its  self-help 
economic system, realized that in order to survive and to develop it is 
necessary  to  be  engaged  in  international  economic  system.  The 
contradiction  is  between  this  economic  imperative  and  the  regime’s 
closed  character  has  been  overcome  through the  policy  of  an  enclave 
opening to the external world.
If the efficiency of the North Korean economic system increases 
due  to  broad  foreign  cooperation,  promoting  functioning  of  economic 
34 North Korean citizens are kept out form the Mt.  Geumgang tourist area that  is  visited by South 
Korean tourists. 
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institutions  based  on the  principles  of  transparence  and accountability, 
political freedoms might also appear in the conditions of liberal market 
economy  situation.  Moreover,  in  the  current  situation  of  a  slow 
marketization, the absence of legal basis for market activities, adequate 
banking, legal and judicial system might lead to negative consequences, 
that would be later hard to cope with (illegal business, corruption), which 
might finish in destabilization in the country.  
The  experience  of  newly  industrialized  countries  shows  that  an 
authoritarian  regime  is  entirely  compatible  with  the  possibility  of 
economic development. The question then arises: what should the result 
of  economic  collaboration  be  –  a  change  of  the  political  regime  or  a 
change of the economic system?
With globalization and regional integration growing stronger, it is 
important that the path of a nation’s development be chosen by taking into 
consideration  the  experience  of  other  countries  with  similar  structure. 
There  are  several  projects  of  regional  involvement  of  North  Korean 
economy, such as the Gaesong Industrial Complex situated on the border 
between the DPRK, China and Russia or joint energy projects (a pipeline 
through  the  DPRK  territory).  However,  any  changes  in  economic 
management  in  the  DPRK,  although  facilitated  by  the  international 
support and involvement, have to gain ground inside North Korea with 
favorable  conditions  created.  International  economic  cooperation  could 
foster such conditions, but it would be difficult to expect changes as they 
might  mean  the  absorption  and  disappearance  of  the  North  Korean 
regime. For this reason, purely economic collaboration will not have the 
desired effect.  North Korea fears that integration will ruin the regime’s 
basics and thus continues to use economic ties with only partial efficiency 
 mainly as a means of gaining short-term goals and one-time profit. To 
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facilitate  North  Korea’s  participation  in  international  exchanges  it  is 
essential that the expansion of economic ties is accompanied by a political 
breakthrough in the outside world. In this light, recognition of the DPRK 
by the United States and Japan and normalization of relations would be 
helpful35.
On the contrary, imposing economic sanctions has proved its little 
efficiency in changing the situation in the North. In case of the “rogue 
states” against which they are used, such sanctions would rather lead to 
lowering  the  people’s  standard  of  living  and  thereby  destabilizing  the 
regime. The reliance on economic sanctions therefore seems erroneous, 
since they do not frighten North Korea.
The effectiveness of sanctions against the DPRK has been low and 
has not achieved the aim of discouraging North Korea from its nuclear 
programme or any other illicit activities.  Imposing sanctions has rather 
had the opposite effect. Moreover, the failure of a hard approach that may 
result  in noticeable changes may lead to irreversible consequences that 
would be hard to deal with36.
However, in view of recent changes the maintenance of status quo 
also  seems  troublesome.  The revival  of  the  North Korean economy is 
essential  and crucial for the survival of the DPRK’s political system in 
general.
1. 2 Nuclear issue
35 Asmolov Konstantin. Russian and South Korean Scholars on Today’s Problems of North Korea and 
Interkorean Relations // Far Eastern Affairs, 2006, No. 4, p.140.
36 See Ruediger Frank. The Political economy of Sanctions against North Korea //  Asian Perspective, 
Vol. 30, No. 3, 2006, pp. 5-36.
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1.2.1  An  insight  into  the  history  of  the  problem.  Nuclear  ambitions: 
origins and motives
To  analyze  the  question  of  the  etymology  of  the  North  Korean 
nuclear problem an insight into the origins and motivations of the DPRK 
nuclear ambitions, strategies, international/national impact is given. The 
North  Korean  nuclear  problem  is,  in  fact,  the  issue  of  unsanctioned 
nuclear developments that the country leads both for peaceful and as it is 
suspected, also military purposes. Politically the problem manifests itself 
in  a  conflict  situation that  at  times  breaks  up into international  crises. 
Nuclear development started in the DPRK in the 1960s with the Soviet 
assistance. After the Korean War Kim Il Song, and especially in the late 
1960s  and  early  1970s  efforts  to  develop  the  science  and  technology 
needed for nuclear weapons and missiles were undertaken. North Korea 
started  focusing  more  on  self-determination  and,  especially,  on  self-
defense.
At the same time, the other Korean state   South Korea, against 
which the fight for legitimacy was lead for decades, started its rapid and 
successful  economic  break-through  and  by  the  middle  of  the  1970s 
surpassed the North both in the indicators of economic development and 
in  military  might.  North Korea had strong and numerous  conventional 
military potential, but technically elevated industrial basis of the Republic 
of  Korea  and its  commitment  to  the  alliance  with  the  USA permitted 
Seoul  to  guarantee  an  actual  supremacy.  The  United  States  deployed 
nuclear weapons to South Korea in 1958 (remained until  1991). North 
Korean vision of nuclear threat from the USA contributed to its national 
nuclear programme development.
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The Korean nuclear program can be divided into four main stages: 
1) inception (the 1950s), 2) indigenous accumulation of knowledge and 
technical  expertise  (early  1960s-mid-1970s),  3)  rapid  expansion  (late 
1970s-early 1990s), and design switch/maturation (from 1994)37.
From  the  beginning  of  the  1950s  North  Korea  started  creating 
technological and institutional base for its nuclear development program. 
The  Atomic  Energy  Research  Institute  was  established  in  1952. 
Pyongyang began to send scientists and technicians to the Soviet Union 
there for education and training. Soviet help included establishing a an 
atomic  energy  research  complex  in  Yongbyon,  which  was  part  of  the 
cooperation agreement concluded between the USSR and the DPRK. In 
1965  a  Soviet  IRT-2M  research  reactor  and  other  facilities  were 
assembled for this center. From 1965 till 1973 enriched fuel supplied to 
the DPRK for this reactor. In the 1970s Pyongyang received a plutonium 
reprocessing technology from the USSR. From the 1980s North Korea 
scientists were able to conduct independent researches and modifications 
of nuclear technologies available at the time. In the middle of the 1980s 
Pyongyang began construction of a 50MW(e) nuclear power reactor and 
expanded its  uranium processing  facilities38.  In the 1980s North Korea 
began to construct facilities for uranium fabrication and conversion39. In 
1974 North Korean joined the IEAE and on the 12th of December 1985 – 
to  the  NPT (Pyongyang  agreed  to  sign  the  NPT  exchange  for  Soviet 
assistance in the construction of four light water reactors)40. The DPRK 
37 Alexandre Y. Mansourov. The Origins, Evolution and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear 
programme // The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1995, p. 25.
38 North  Korea  Profile.  Nuclear  Overview  //  The  Nuclear  Threat  Initiative  (NTI)   
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Nuclear/index.html  accessed 24 December 2007).
39 Uranium  mines  with  an  estimated  four  million  tons  of  exploitable  high-quality  uranium  ore   
containing  approximately 0.8% extractable  uranium (The Federation  of  American  Scientists  (FAS) 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html – accessed 15th November 2007).
40 According to the Treaty’s provisions, a new member must sign the Guarantee Agreement with the 
IEAE within  a  18-month  period  that  regard  control  over  its  nuclear  activities  and  implies  regular 
inspections by the IEAE experts. Meanwhile, in the DPRK’s case the process took the unprecedented 7 
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had to provide an initial  declaration on nuclear  facilities  and materials 
available and to provide access for the IAEA inspectors in order to verify 
the declared  status.  Inspections  started  in  May 1992 and concluded in 
February  1993.  The  IAEA  experts  found  out  several  incorrect  data 
regarding  plutonium  procession  and  requested  access  to  two  suspect 
nuclear  waste  sites  (reprocessed  plutonium),  North  Korea  rejected 
inspections41.
North  Korea’s  nuclear  arms  programme  includes  developing 
ballistic missile technologies, which causes particular concerns due to its 
presumed  ability  to  deliver  nuclear  warheads.  North  Korea  possesses 
short  and  intermediate-range  missile  systems  (medium-range  Nodong 
missiles),  but it is not clear if it  has acquired capabilities of delivering 
nuclear  weapons  with  its  ballistic  missiles.  However,  according to  the 
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, a two-stage Taepodong-2 could reach 
part of U.S. territory and a three-stage missile could strike the continental 
part of the United States. North Korea is reported to be able to develop an 
intercontinental  ballistic  missile  (ICBM)  by  201542.  According  to  the 
Center for Nonproliferation studies at least two other mobile missiles are 
being developed, which would rise up North Korea’s military capabilities. 
Currently, the missiles available to North Korea can theoretically strike 
the territory of Japan South Korea.
The missile development program in the DPRK started in the 1960s 
with the USSR’s assistance: the Soviet Scud-B missiles were passed to 
North Korea, however, it  is not clear whether they were received from 
Egypt or the USSR. China transferred to North Korea’s surface-to-air and 
years (30th of January 1992).
41 See Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards (8 January 2003) International Atomic Energy Agency 
– http://www.iaea.org.
42 See CNS Special Report on North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities. March 22, 2006 // Center for 
Nonproliferation  Studies,  Monterey  Institute  of  International  Studies  - 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf/060321.pdf  accessed 10th June 2007) – p. 1.
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anti-ship  missiles.  North  Korea  has  received  missile  technology  or 
materials from Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and Syria43.
North Korea’s  motivation  of  developing longer-range  missiles  is 
obviously in case of Japan and South Korea – preventing the USA forces 
from using their military bases in Japan and the Republic of Korea in a 
possible conflict. Long-range missiles capable of striking the territory of 
the United States could serve as a deterrence measure to prevent use of 
nuclear weapons against the DPRK.
With the collapse of the Communist bloc North Korea found itself 
in  diplomatic,  political  isolation,  while  its  economy  experienced  deep 
crisis. Consequently, its willingness to develop an alternative leverage of 
influence was not irrational, but rather rational and predictable.
Political  regimes  pursue  the  goal  of  providing  national  security, 
maintaining political identity and economic prosperity to meet the needs 
of the state and its people. These goals are pursued with a regard to the 
circumstances,  domestic  and  international  context,  in  which  a  regime 
operates. In case of North Korea, the international environment after the 
end  of  the  cold  war  was  rather  confusing,  economic  conditions 
complicated,  and  the  North  Korean  government  employed  policy 
resources available at the moment to meet the goal of regime’s survival as 
a unique political entity.
Domestically,  the  risk  of  legitimacy  crisis  was  posed  (possible 
system collapse was expected to happen by the majority of analysts), the 
North  Korean  government  opted  for  maintaining  legitimacy  base 
primarily on ideology rather than on effective economic success and the 
population’s well-being. North Korean regime has survived and managed 
43 CNS Special Report on North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities. March 22, 2006 // Center for 
Nonproliferation  Studies  Monterey  Institute  of  International  Studies  - 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf/060321.pdf  accessed 10th June 2007) – p.4.
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to keep its closed character even after the death of the first leader of the 
country  –  President  Kim  Il  Song  in  1994  –  when  the  power  was 
successfully passed to his son, current leader Kim Jong Il. The goal of 
political sovereignty, neglecting actual dynamics of international politics 
has worked for increasing national pride and national self-esteem, which 
has contributed to the legitimization of the regime.
Obviously, any security deterrence based on conventional weapons 
against  stronger  adversarial  forces  for  North  Korea  is  definitely 
inadequate.  The  conventional  military  balance  on  the  peninsula  has 
shifted  against  North  Korea.  As  US  and  South  Korean  forces  have 
modernized  and  strengthened  their  military  capabilities,  and  North 
Korea’s  forces  have  suffered  from  economic  deprivation,  obsolete 
equipment,  poor  maintenance,  and  inadequate  training.  However, 
numerous North Korean conventional forces make an offensive invasion 
to  change  political  regime  extremely  unattractive.  With  its  massed 
artillery near the DMZ, North Korea retains the ability to inflict heavy 
casualties  and collateral damage on allied forces and civilians44.  Korea 
may not be able to seize Seoul, but it can devastate it. In theory, US forces 
could  carry  out  limited  pre-emptive  attacks  to  destroy  known  North 
Korean  nuclear  facilities  and  missile  emplacements,  although  such  an 
attack almost certainly would not destroy all secret facilities and hidden 
weapons  and  it  would  risk  provoking  a  North  Korean  retaliation  that 
could  trigger  a  catastrophic  war.  The possibility  that  North Korea has 
acquired nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons makes the prospect of 
a general war even more difficult to contemplate. Recent developments in 
Afghanistan  and  Iraq  have  contributed  to  convincing  the  DPRK’s 
44 North Korea’s Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment // The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies,  Strategic  Dossier.  Press  Statement,  Dr.  John Chipman,  IISS  Director,  21 January 2004.   
www.iiss.org.
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government that its policies of nuclear weapons’ development could be 
optimal.
Another security challenge that the North Korean regime faces is 
economic  of  survival.  From the  beginning  of  the  1990s  North  Korea 
suffered  massive  starvation  and  economic  stagnation.  The  government 
initiated  diplomatic  campaigns  to  receive  food  aid  and  economic 
assistance,  admitting  its  failure  to  guarantee  minimum  needs  of  the 
citizens.
Pyongyang  is  using  the  nuclear  issue  as  bargaining  leverage, 
actually the only one that remains to it.  It  has made efforts to engage 
Washington in bilateral dialogues with the intention of using the nuclear 
issue for the purpose of negotiations. In fact,  the decades of the inter-
Korea relationship of hostility and legitimacy competition have gone with 
the South Korean engagement policy, started with the Sunshine policy of 
President Kim Dae Jung. The fact that the demise of the North Korean 
regime is  not  favoured  by any of  the neighboring countries,  including 
South Korea in the first place, has become clear to Pyongyang. It can be 
argued  that  the  nuclear  developments  in  the  North  are  not  aimed  at 
deterrence of the South.
The  desperate  state  of  economy and  inability  to  overcome  food 
shortages demanded implementing effective strategy to attract foreign aid. 
In this case the nuclear issue has been used as a bargain mechanism, but, 
obviously,  the  nuclear  issue  is  not  targeted  only  to  force  global 
community to subside economic assistance. Mainly, the target is receiving 
security guarantees from potential aggressors. In this light it is unlikely 
that Pyongyang abandons its only deterrence mechanism. The motivation 
of  the  DPRK becomes  stronger  in  the  international  context,  when  the 
Bush  administration  executed  regimes’  destruction basing  itself  on  the 
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premises that those were “rogue” and “evil” regimes. Since North Korea 
has  been  included  in  the  list  of  the  “axis  of  evil”.  For  Pyongyang, 
considering  the  case  of  Iraq  and  situation  over  the  Iranian  nuclear 
potential, a use of military force by the US represents a real probability.
The Yongbyon nuclear facilities remained freezed till October 2002 
in accordance with the Geneva Agreements. In October 2002, however, 
North  Korea  was  accused  by  the  US  of  developing  secrete  uranium-
enriching capabilities, which violated the Agreed Framework provisions. 
The  USA  stopped  providing  heavy-fuel  oil  to  the  DPRK  and  the 
construction  of  two  light-water  reactors.  North  Korea  responded  by 
expulsing the IAEA inspectors from its Yongbyong facilities and claimed 
that it would draw form the NPT.
In  order  to  explain  North  Korea’s  foreign  policy  strategies  and 
tactics  on  the  nuclear  program,  perceptions  held  by  Pyongyang  about 
world politics, the regional structure in the Eastern Asia and a role it plays 
in it should be examined. Pyongyang has pursued its own national interest 
putting security issue on the first place.
The idea to acquire nuclear technologies dates back to the end of 
the Second world war, when the Japanese Empire had to surrender after 
the atomic bombs were launched to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As soon as 
Kim  Il  Song  consolidated  his  power  by  the  end  of  the  1960s,  a 
programme  of  developing  technologies  needed  for  nuclear  weapons 
started.  North  Korean  scientists  were  sent  to  Moscow,  while  Soviet 
scientists came to Korea for consulting. Reasons to foster the programme 
were  numerous  for  North  Korea   contradictions  between  the  Soviet 
Union and China,  rapid development  of  the South Korean economy   
made DPRK focusing on self-defense and exploring alternative military 
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might.  The  need  for  self-reliance  in  the  realm of  defense  was  further 
enhanced  after  the  dissolution  of  the  Communist  block,  when  North 
Korea found itself isolated. In this light, the North Korean strategy is not 
irrational or unpredictable, but aimed at solving the problems it currently 
faces politically and economically.
Political  regimes  pursue  their  goals   primarily,  sovereignty, 
national security and economic prosperity   with a variety of strategies 
depending on the greater context in which their regimes operate. Different 
strategies might be implied according to various security contexts.  The 
North Korean regime has employed policy strategies and tactics according 
to the sources available that most effectively respond to achieving those 
goals.  As mentioned above,  the regime has opted for  strengthening its 
domestic legitimacy through ideological control, providing legitimacy to 
the regime, where the top authority cannot be subjected to criticism. The 
North Korea regime thus continues to remain stable.
In the defense realm North Korea elaborated the strategy against 
external  threats  mainly  on the self-defense  basis.  In  this  case,  security 
deterrence with the use of  nuclear  weapons  becomes highly attractive. 
Self-reliance  plays  a  double  role   it  strengthens  national  pride 
contributing to the regime’s legitimization.
Motivations that lay behind the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program 
are likely to be numerous.  Part of them is determined by a significant 
external threat. The DPRK opted for a mighty military forces from the 
very beginning of the State’s history due to international environment in 
which  it  was  established  and  the  Korean  war  that  followed  shortly 
afterwards. The aim to have a strong and numerous conventional army 
has been one of the regime’s prior goals (the policy of “songun” – the 
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priority of the army  introduced in the middle of the 1990s underlines the 
importance of the defence). Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in this 
light,  probably,  is  the  additional  and  important  option.  Some  analysts 
argue that North Korea is motivated to develop nuclear weapons because 
of its experience of having been exposed to nuclear threat from the USA 
during the period of the Korean war45.
Historically,  bombardment  of  Japan  demonstrated  the  power  of 
nuclear weapons and the North Korea leadership was not an exception. 
Consequently,  the  DPRK  signed  Alliance  Treaties  on  Friendship, 
Cooperation,  and Mutual  Assistance  with the  Soviet  Union and China 
(1961),  which  put  the  country  under  their  nuclear  umbrellas.  Military 
alliances with the USSR and China were aimed at strengthening national 
security. However, North Korean’s perception was that it could not fully 
rely on its allies: North Korea opted for reducing dependence upon the 
USSR  and  China  in  weapons  supply.  After  the  Cuban  missile  crisis 
(October 1962), however, Pyongyang began to doubt about the reliability 
of the allies (the perception was that the Soviet Union had abandoned 
Cuba). A greater emphasis was placed upon self-sufficiency of the nuclear 
development.
Obviously, that with the dissolution of the USSR North Korea in 
the  new  geopolitical  situation  could  further  rely  mainly  on  its  own 
capabilities. Further concerns appeared after the DPRK had been named 
part  of  the  “axis  of  evil,”  which  directly  implied  the  possibility  of  a 
preemptive strike against North Korea, as happened in the case of Iraq.
At  the  same  time,  reported  facts  of  exporting  ballistic  missiles 
indicates that North Korea is interested in commercialization of nuclear 
45 Bruce Cumings. The Origins of the Korean War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 750; 
Torkunov A.V. Koreiskaya voina (The Korean War).
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technology and materials (not excluding nuclear weapons). On the other 
hand,  the  imperative  of  defense  against  external  threats  is  to  be 
considered. In order to analyze the intentions of North Korea relative to 
its  nuclear  programme,  an  analytical  question  should  be  chosen. 
Generally, it is argued whether North Korea is determined to become a 
nuclear power or it perceives nuclear arms as a bargaining leverage only46. 
North Korea might have taken a decision that possessing nuclear weapons 
is  essential  for  the  regime's  survival  and  would  never  abandon  the 
possibility of nuclear deterrence. The experience of the 1993-94 nuclear 
crisis demonstrated that the DPRK was eager to bargain with the use of 
nuclear factor. The Agreed Framework actually determined North Korea’s 
commitment  to  the  NPT  regime  and  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA) 
monitoring of its nuclear facilities in exchange of the construction of two 
light-water reactors and supply of heavy fuel oil. The Agreement has not 
verified  actual  state  of  nuclear  developing.  The  nuclear  status  of  the 
DPRK remained  unclear   whether  it  had  enough plutonium to  make 
nuclear weapons. The IAEA special inspections had to lighten upon the 
North Korean nuclear programme status whole the two nuclear reactors 
were started to be build and the fuel oil delivered.
The core issue of the second nuclear crisis (October 2002) was the 
uranium enrichment program. Again, the DPRK used the nuclear weapons 
program as a bargaining leverage to pressure the United States to involve 
in  direct  bilateral  negotiations  over  security  assurances  and  end  of 
economic  sanctions  that  were  obstacle  to  the  country’s  economic 
development. It can be assumed that North Korea pursues creating a new 
relationship  with  the  United  States,  which  will  ensure  the  regime's 
46 See Han S. Park. Pyongyang Sees the Nuke Impasse // Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 42, 
No. 6, 2007. p. 256.
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survival. North Korea has repeatedly stated that it would negotiate deals 
directly with the United States47. Thus, nuclear programme efforts might 
be aimed at creating an additional bargaining option. On the other hand, 
North  Korea's  demonstrated  willingness  to  cheat  on  international 
agreements (including the Agreed Framework) makes a future deal very 
difficult to negotiate.
On the other hand, the lack of security guarantees that North Korea 
faces currently should not be underestimated when analyzing its nuclear 
policy goals. The concepts of regime change and the possibility of pre-
emptive strikes can not but alert the North Korea leadership. Moreover, 
significant  economic  and political  reforms are  likely  to  be required in 
change  of  security  guarantees  and  economic  assistance,  which  might 
undermine the regime's political survival. In this context nuclear weapons 
can  be  considered  a  guarantee  of  the  regime’s  survival.  Considerable 
effort to develop the national defence and especially, the costly nuclear 
programme such as long-range ballistic missiles presume that intentions 
of  the  DPRK  intends  at  least  to  have  an  adequate  compensation  of 
considerable  resources  implied  in  developing  nuclear  weapons.  The 
probably of complete and irreversible abandonment seems remote.
An overview of the system of international agreements relevant to 
the mater follows.
1.2.2 Proliferation regime challenge (legal aspects)
47 Participants  of  the  Six-party  talks  process  admitted  North  Korea’s  clear  position  on  negotiating 
directly with the USA.
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DPRK joined the IAEA - the International Atomic Energy Agency 
– in September 197448. In 1977, in compliance with the agreement with 
the IAEA, the atomic reactor in Yonbyon was inspected by the Agency’s 
experts.  On  December  12,  1985  DPRK  signed  the  Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). It should be noted, that North Korea was hesitant about 
joining the NPT and it was the USSR that insisted on its decision to join. 
However, the NPT requires that an acceding non-nuclear-weapon State 
must  put  into  effect  a  comprehensive  safeguards  agreement  with  the 
IAEA not later than 18 months after its accession. In case of North Korea, 
instead, it happened only 7 years after49. DPRK claimed that it would sign 
the agreement if certain conditions were fulfilled, among them – which 
the US nuclear weapons in the South of the peninsular dismantled. After 
Washington announced withdrawal of its tactic nuclear weapons, DPRK 
brought  its  safeguards  agreement  into  force.  On  30  January  1992  the 
DPRK  signed  a  nuclear  safeguards  agreement  with  the  IAEA,  which 
allowed IAEA inspections to start in June 1992. 
The NPT obliges all non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to 
the Treaty to put all nuclear activities under control. In order to prevent 
transformation  of  peaceful  nuclear  programmes  into  military  ones. 
Control measures are described in safeguards agreements, that the IAEA 
signers with member-states.
The NPT non-nuclear-weapon parties have to inform the Agency 
about  nuclear  material  imported  or  produced in  the country,  while  the 
IAEA experts conduct independent supervision and estimate the accuracy 
48 IAEA is an executive UN body, responsible for control of abiding by nuclear security agreements.
49 On 10 April 1992 the NPT Safeguards Agreement entered into force. INFCIRC/403. Agreement of 30 
January  1992  between  the  Government  of  the  Democratic  People’s  Republic  of  Korea  and  the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
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of the information submitted. Actually, the states itself executes control 
over  its  nuclear  materials,  the  IAEA  only  contribute  to  provide 
information over any changes that might have occurred.
The  IAEA inspections’  results  are  further  submitted  to  national 
authorities. If the collected data evidences a switch to the usage of nuclear 
materials  for  military  purposes  the  IAEA Board  of  Governors  has  to 
decide if the Agency is able to verify the situation or it should be passed 
over to the UN Security Council for an adequate response by the UN.
The IAEA safeguard system has shown definite weak points during 
the crises on the Korean peninsula in 1993-1994, as well as in the Iraqi 
case.  Consequently,  the  IAEA  adopted  a  series  of  control  measures, 
united in the form of Additional Protocols which are to be signed and 
ratified by the parties50. The measures suggested by Additional protocol 
include:
 IAEA inspector access to any location where nuclear material may be 
present;
 IAEA short-notice  access  to  all  buildings  on  a  nuclear  site.  IAEA 
inspectors have a “complementary” access with a short advance notice 
to any place on a nuclear site;
 IAEA  collection  of  environmental  samples  at  locations  beyond 
declared locations when the Agency considers necessary; 
 State  provision  of  information  about  and  IAEA  verification 
mechanisms for its research and development activities related to its 
nuclear fuel cycle; 
 State  provision  of  information  on  the  manufacture  and  export  of 
sensitive nuclear-related technologies.
50 INFCIRC/540.
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However, this system of safeguards is not applied equally to all the 
parties: 47 states out of 189 NPT participants still do not have safeguards 
agreements  entered  into  force,  while  additional  protocols  have  been 
ratified only by 37 non-nuclear-weapon parties.
Another  pillar  of  the  regional  normative  base  for  nuclear 
proliferation control is the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula (20 January 1992). The document was signed by the 
two Korean states.  Both DPRK and the ROK are the NPT parties and 
their obligations are stressed in the Joint Declaration. The parts have also 
reached  an  agreement  on  mutual  inspections51.  The  Joint  Declaration 
called  for  a  bilateral  nuclear  inspection  regime  to  verify  the 
denuclearization  of  the  peninsula.  The  Declaration  states  that  the  two 
sides “shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy 
or  use  nuclear  weapons”,  and  that  they  “shall  not  possess  nuclear 
reprocessing  and  uranium  enrichment  facilities”.  A  North-South  Joint 
Nuclear  Control  Commission  (JNCC)  was  given  the  mandate  of 
verification of the denuclearization of the peninsula52.
The IAEA activated mechanisms of control and the power entitled 
to  it  during the first  nuclear  crisis  on the Korean Peninsula.  After  the 
Safeguards Agreement was signed in May 199 and the IAEA inspections 
began  discrepancies  between  the  DPRK  statements  and  the  Agency’s 
conclusions were found. The IAEA claimed that an amount of undeclared 
plutonium existed in the DPRK. In order to further verify its suspects, the 
IAEA requested access  to  two sites  which it  considered related to the 
51 “The South and the North,  in order  to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,  shall 
conduct inspections of the objects selected by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides, in 
accordance  with procedures  and  methods to  be  determined  by a  South-North  joint  nuclear  control 
commission.” Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsular, January 20, 1992 - 
http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/agreements/CanKor-VTK-1992-01-20-joint-declaration-
denuclearization-korean-peninsula.pdf
52 The JNCC was established in March 1992, but failed to reach agreement on establishing a bilateral 
inspection regime.
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storage of nuclear waste. After the DPRK refused the access (including 
special  inspection  procedure  invoked)  the  IAEA  Board  of  Governors 
referred non-compliance to the UN Security Council.
The  UN Security  Council  called  the  DPRK to  comply  with  the 
Safeguards  Agreement  and  enable  the  inspectors  to  complete  their 
required activities.  North Korea made a decision to  withdraw from its 
IAEA membership on 13 June 1994. The Agency continued to consider 
obligations  of  the  DPRK binding;  however  the  DPRK had a  different 
vision of its obligations and did not allow inspections.
The USA’ initiative to negotiate with the DPRK resulted in signing 
the  Agreed  Framework  between  the  US  and  the  DPRK53.  The  US 
promised  to  provide  construction  of  two light  water  reactors  in  North 
Korea (LWR) and the DPRK – to freeze its graphite reactors and of the 
reprocessing facility, and to cease construction of the larger reactors. The 
DPRK  was  also  required  to  remain  a  party  to  the  NPT.  For 
implementation  of  the  Agreed  Framework  provisions  the  Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established in 
199554. The Agreed Framework was not a treaty in any binding sense but 
rather a set of guidelines to regulate the behavior of the parties. However, 
specific issues under the Agreed Framework were repeatedly subject to 
different  interpretation  by  the  two  sides.   Pyongyang  repeatedly 
complained about delays in delivery schedules. North Korea complained 
of  energy  and  economic  losses  sustaining  them a  consequence  of  the 
Agreed Framework.
In October 2002 North Korea announced that it  had an uranium-
enriching programme. Definitely, such a programme was not in line with 
53 Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People Republic of 
Korea. Geneva, October 21, 1994 // Security Dialog, Vol. 26 (1), 1995.
54 KEDO Charter  - Agreement  on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization. 9 March, 1995. http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/EstablishmentKEDO.pdf.
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the  Agreed  Framework  or  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty.  North  Korea 
announced its withdrawal from the NPT effective as of 11 January 2003.
The  Agreed  Framework  Between  was  aimed  at  securing  the 
DPRK’s compliance with its safeguards obligations. However, this goal 
failed,  since  North  Korea  claimed  to  have  an  unsanctioned  uranium 
enrichment programme, decided to relaunch its reactors and expulsed the 
IAEA inspectors.
In  July  2006  the  UN  Security  Council  adopted  a  resolution, 
condemning DPRK missile launches and urged to return to six-party talks, 
in course from 2002.55 On the 9th of October, same year, however, DRPK 
reported  to  have  executed  another  underground nuclear  test.  The  U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS) reported an explosion with a magnitude of 4.2 
on the Richter Scale56. However, in several days due to the low yield of 
the device and lack of information on detection of radioactivity caused 
doubts about whether a nuclear device test was actually carried and if it 
was successful. The law nuclear yield of explosion (less than one kiloton) 
and  lack  of  information  about  radioactivity  in  the  atmosphere  makes 
experts hesitate that it was a nuclear test and is so, that it was successful57. 
North Korea’s nuclear test  almost  certainly failed to achieve its design 
yield. Despite of a probably failed original design yield, the DPRK has 
taken into consideration its technological mistakes and has come closer to 
constructing  nuclear  weapons  (on  extended-range  ballistic  missiles) 
capable of targeting the neibouring countries58.
55 UN  Security  Council  Resolution  1695  (15  July,  2006)  - 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8778.doc.htm.
56 http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/Test_USGSreport.jpg
57 Richard L. Garwin and Frank N. von Hippel. A Technical Analysis of North Korea’s Oct. 9 Nuclear 
Test // Arms Control Today, Volume 36, Number 9, November 2006.
58 Ambassador  Robert  Gallucci.  Nuclear  Shockwaves:  Ramifications  of  the  North  Korean  Nuclear 
Test // Arms Control Today, Volume 36, Number 9. November 2006.
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The UN Security Council adopted a resolution imposing sanctions 
against the DPRK, demanding that the DPRK returned to the NPT and 
accepted safeguards with the IAEA59.  Only in February 2007 the crisis 
resolution  showed  progress  and  the  agreement  was  reached  that  the 
DPRK will close and eventually abandons the Yongbyon nuclear facility 
and will accept IAEA experts to conduct monitoring and verifications in 
compliance  with  the  IAEA  Safeguards  Agreement.  In  July  2007  the 
Agency confirmed shutdown of DPRK nuclear facilities.
In  fact,  the  Agreed  framework  of  1994  dealt  with  plutonium 
enriching capabilities of the DPRK (facilities producing it were to be shut 
down and the results verified by the IAEA).  North Korea actually was in 
compliance  with  the  Geneva  agreements,  keeping  frozen  the  graphite-
moderated reactor and its related facilities. On the contrary, the American 
part had not  fulfilled its  obligations.  In general,  the first  nuclear crisis 
demonstrated the isolate role of the UN Security council and the IAEA in 
resolving the matter, while the only efficient mechanism provided was the 
Agreed framework – a  bilateral  agreement,  without  any binding force. 
Later on, in course of developments under the six-party talks format and 
joint declaration s reached have become the only instrument of making 
North  Korea  de  facto  comply  with  the  NPT  provisions.  The  DPRK 
announced intention to withdraw from the NPT, which is actually allowed 
under  Article  X.60 Even  after  North  Korea  was  informed  of  its 
noncompliance and tempted to withdraw from the NPT (1993), and the 
Security  Council  had  to  take  actions  upon  it,  the  Security  Council 
59 UN  Security  Council  Resolution  1718  (14  October,  2006)  - 
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/unscres_14102006.pdf.
60 “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if 
it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the 
supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty 
and  to  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  three  months  in  advance.  Such notice  shall  include  a 
statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” Article 
X.1, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
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members  were  divided.  China took the position that   that  the Council 
should call upon North Korea to permit IAEA inspections and remain a 
party to the NPT at least until the disputes over compliance were resolved 
through  further  negotiation  or  further  Council  action.  As  mentioned 
before,  the  crisis  was  settled  through  signing  the  Geneva  Framework 
agreements.
In January 2003 North Korea announced its withdrawal from the 
NPT61. According to the Treaty mechanism the withdrawal was put before 
the  Security  Council,  which  could  not  develop  any  action  due  to 
disagreements  among  the  permanent  members,  notably  China  and  the 
United States. The North Korea’s case fostered discussions over the role 
of the Security Council. Under the UN Charter, the Council has authority 
to stop a withdrawal, to impose sanctions on the withdrawing NPT party 
or  to  require  such  a  party  to  give  up  nuclear  materials  or  equipment 
acquired while it was still an NPT party since a withdrawal may constitute 
a possible  threat  to international  peace and security.  The IAEA has to 
report noncompliance with the NPT to the Security Council, which has to 
bear the main responsibility for maintenance of international peace and 
security. Although the Security Council failed to command North Korea 
to take any specific action. North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and 
the  future  threats  to  international  peace  and  security  that  such  a 
withdrawal  presents.  North  Korea’s  withdrawal  is  the  first  withdrawal 
from the  NPT and  there  have  not  been  any  serious  consequences  for 
North Korea. However, the withdrawal threatens at least the neighbours 
of the DPRK and could well represent long-term threat to international 
and regional security.
61 North  Korea’s  Statement  on  NPT  Withdrawal.  Pyongyang,  10  January  2003. 
http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nptstate.htm.
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The  international  non-proliferation  regime  is  challenges  by  the 
DPRK’s position that moreover has been elaborated to be mainly in line 
with  the  current  international  agreements  named  above.  On  the  other 
hand, the North Korea’s claim that it possesses nuclear weapons has been 
crucial for regarding the regime as a violator of the international nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. The NPT does not prohibit to any member-state 
to develop nuclear programme to be used for peaceful purposes. In fact, 
the parties to the Agreed Framework (1994) recognized the right of the 
DPRK  to  develop  such  programme  for  energy  production.  When 
withdrawing form the  NPT North  Korea  did  not  violate  the  norms  of 
international law, since the Treaty contain the possibility of withdrawal. 
However, the case is alerting and has created a worrisome precedent. At 
the same time, the decision of the USA to threaten North Korea with the 
possibility  of  preventive  nuclear  strikes  as  the  state  sponsoring 
international terrorism violates one of the major principles of the NPT  
the nuclear states should not threaten non-nuclear states with the use of 
nuclear weapons against them.
As regarding missile  technologies,  there  is  no legal  international 
binding instrument on their production, proliferation and acquisition. The 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal agreement 
for cooperation to exchange information and coordinate export of missile 
technologies62. The Hague Code of Conduct has a much wider scope due 
to  larger  membership,  but  is  not  legally  binding.  Thus,  there  is  no 
internationally binding legal instrument to control the spread of missile 
technologies63. Another broader international agreement on missile non-
62 The MTCR was signed in 1987 and currently has 34 members.
63 Jorgen  Staun,  Martin  Fernando  Jakobsen  and  Line  Selmer  Friborg.  Missile  Proliferation:  New 
Challenges and new Threats. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations form the DIIS Conference on 
Missile Proliferation, May 2, 2007 // Danish Institute for International Studies  www.diis.dk 
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proliferation is the Hague International  Code of Conduct  (HCOC) that 
was concluded in 2002 (currently  124 states). The confidence building 
measures under the HCOC are rather vague: the members are required to 
make their programs transparent and to give notice of missile launches. 
Still, the HCOC as an instrument of control remains rather weak since it 
focuses  on  transparency  and  not  on  any  forceful  measures  regarding 
missile non-proliferation64.
A further challenge in control over ballistic  missiles is  that such 
programmes can be covered by the space launch vehicles development 
and can be easily transformed to military programmes. In fact, after North 
Korea  had  executed  the  test  of  the  Taepodong-2  missile  in  2006,  it 
claimed that it was an artificial satellite launch.
Nuclear  deterrence  of  states  that  possess  even a  relatively  small 
nuclear  arsenal  can  be  efficient  in  deterring  nuclear  superpowers. 
Currently in the face of new proliferation challenges an approbation of 
adequate settlement mechanisms is in course.
64 See Marianne Hanson, The Spread of Missile Technology and its Countermeasures // Danish Institute 
for International Studies  www.diis.dk
54
Part 2 International impact: regional and global powers involved
2.1  The  USA  policies  towards  North  Korea:  the  shift  after  the  Bush 
administration in power
The North Korean question and the nuclear issue have been on the 
agenda of the USA administration since the beginning of the peninsula’s 
division65. The American policy towards North Korea was shaped under 
the legacy of the Cold war and the geopolitical situation created in the 
North-East Asia: the historical experience of shared distrust has driven 
them apart, while the geopolitical situation of regionally interconnected 
security imperatives has continued to keep them intertwined.
It could hardly be claimed that the US policy towards North Korea 
has been subjected to important changes after the end of the Cold war. 
The  first  nuclear  crisis  that  ended  with  signing  of  the  1994  Agreed 
Framework between the USA and the DPRK seemed to have settled a 
basis for bilateral relationship during President Clinton administration’s 
first  term. This agreement provided an barter   frozen activities of the 
North  Korea  nuclear  facilities  in  exchange  of  heavy  fuel  oil  and 
construction of two light-water reactors to meet the North Korean energy 
needs66.  The agreement  that  was achieved on bilateral basis  seemed to 
have  provided  advancement  towards  the  normalization  of  relations 
65 Robert M. Hathaway. Just Whose Side Is Time On?: North Korea and George W. Bush, 20014 // 
Journal of Asian and African Studies, Volume 42, No. 6, 2007. pp. 263-282.
66 Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea. Geneva, October 21, 1994 // Security Dialog, Vol. 26 (1), 1995.
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between  Washington  and  Pyongyang.  Actually,  the  Framework 
Agreement  established  a  mechanism  for  a  gradual  progress  towards 
controlled North Korean nuclear activities. However, the difficulties with 
the Agreement’s implementation that followed led to the collapse of this 
accord.
The conflict over the implementation of the 1994 Agreement arose 
from both parties   on the one hand, the USA claimed that in course of 
the  years  followed  the  conclusion  of  the  Agreement  its  intelligence 
services  uncovered  numerous  indications  of  violation  of  the  Agreed 
Framework and of a new nuclear weapons programme concentrated on 
producing highly  enriched  uranium (HEU).  The  DPRK authorities,  on 
their part, alleged significant irregularities in heavy oil fuel provisions and 
uncompleted  light-water  reactors’  construction  in  accordance  with  the 
terms of the Agreement. However it was not until the George W. Bush 
administration came to power that it was officially claimed that the USA 
possessed  a  clear  evidence  of  the  DPRK  unsanctioned  programme  of 
uranium enrichment in October 2002. Consequently the USA suspended 
further  delivery  of  the  heavy  fuel  oil.  Further  on,  a  set  of  actions 
eventually led to the outbreak of a profound international crisis.
The  Clinton  administration  came  very  close  to  normalization  of 
relations  with  North  Korea:  the  “Joint  US-DPRK  Statement  on 
International  Terrorism”  and  the  “US-DPRK  Joint  Communiqué”  was 
signed in October 2000. The official visit to Pyongyang by the US State 
secretary Madeleine Albright contributed to substantial  improvement in 
bilateral relations by the end of the Clinton administration’s term.
The Bush administration approach to North Korea has not become a 
logical continuation of the policy line initiated by Clinton. The principal 
shift  was  from  the  policy  of  engagement  (partial  and  hesitant)  to 
following the hard line of pressure, abandon and antagonism. Actually, 
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with the presidential office taken by the Bush administration in January 
2001, the policy towards the Korean peninsular made a shift starting from 
disregarding  previous  approach  and  its  achievements.  The  Bush 
administration’s policy has been accused of being inconsistent  by both 
liberals and conservatives (“doves” and “hawks”): for his policy towards 
Pyongyang being neither too hard, nor the policy aimed at engagement 
and  cooperation  with  the  North  Korean  regime67.  The  US  has  been 
criticized for referring to the DPRK as one of the “axis of evil” countries 
and at the same time, for being inconsistent with its later tough policy line 
in contrasting the nuclear proliferation after the decision to release the 
frozen North Korean bank accounts form the Banco Delta Asia in 2007. 
President  Bush’s  late  commitment  to  engagement  has  been  criticized 
since it rewarded North Korea’s bad behavior. However, the policy of the 
late  second  term  Bush  administration  was  marked  by  a  significant 
enhancement on the Korean track if compared to the earlier years. Many 
analysts  believe  that  President  Bush's  flexibility  regarding engagement 
with the DPRK is paying dividends68.
In fact, the Bush administration has acquired an uncompromising 
approach  of  dealing  with  the  North  Korean  issue  in  general.  The 
Framework Agreement of 1994 concluded by the Clinton administration 
in this light was perceived as a concession to the regime in the North that 
incited further development of its weapons programme. At the same time, 
the South Korean policy of engagement towards the DPRK was regarded 
negatively  as  having  contributed  to  the  survival  of  the  North  Korean 
economy and the political  regime there69.  The US policy was urged to 
67 See Victor D. Cha. Winning Asia // Foreign Affairs, November-December 2007, Vol. 86, Issue 6, pp. 
98-113.
68 Tensions ease, doubts remain. Wilson Center President and Director Lee H. Hamilton’s opinion piece 
on the US’ North Korea policy // North Korea International  Documentation project. Wilson Center, 
November  2005,  2007  –  available  at  http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?
topic_id=230972&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=309566.
69 The “sunshine policy” was introduced by President Kim Dae Jung in 1999 and continued by President 
Roh Moo Hyun’s administration in 2003-2007.
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favour containment strategy towards the DPRK, in spite of the fact that 
the  1994  Agreement  remained  the  only  real  working  mechanism  of 
dealing with the problem. The terrorist  attacks of September 2001 had 
major impact on deteriorating North Korean-American relations. Labeling 
the  DPRK an “axis  of  evil”  state  in  January  2002  by  President  Bush 
caused serious concerns both in the North and in the South of the Korean 
peninsular.  Hesitations  of  the  Bush  administration  that  considered  the 
possibility to start preemptive attack on the DPRK with the use of nuclear 
weapons contributed to agitating North Korea and the whole region of 
East  Asia70.  The  National  Security  Strategy  (2002)  expanded  on  the 
possibility  to  use  preventive  strikes  against  the  rogue  states  with  the 
weapons of mass destruction71.
The new administration claimed the DPRK’s complete, verifiable 
and irreversible disarmament stressing that no concession could be made 
until Pyongyang gave up its nuclear programme. The major policy shift 
occurred refers to introducing a broader agenda for discussion with the 
DPRK  that  was  to  include  the  nuclear  problem,  human  rights  issue, 
ballistic  missiles72.  Alongside  with  the  hard  stance,  the  Bush  policy 
towards North Korea has begun to make use of non-traditional security 
issues in addressing North Korean problem more broadly: human rights, 
undemocratic political regime, illegal activities, such as drug trafficking 
and  currency  counterfeit,  etc73.  Persistence  on  probably  legitimate  but 
coincident demands to the DPRK in addition to the demand to dismantle 
its nuclear program has been counterproductive.
70 Bleiker R. A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis // 
International Affairs, 2003. 74 (9), p. 727.
71 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Part V. Prevent Our Enemies from 
Threatening  Us,  Our  Allies,  and  Our  Friends  with  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  –  available  at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html
72 Samore G. The Korean Nuclear Crisis // Survival, 2003. 45 (1), p. 11.
73 Kim  Mikyoung.  Ethos  and  Contingencies.  A  comparative  Analysis  of  the  Clinton  and  Bush 
Administrations’ North Korea Policy // Korea and World Affairs, Summer 2007, p. 183.
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Many  analysts  viewed  the  Bush  administration’s  policy  towards 
North Korea as somewhat ignoring the threat from the DPRK and being 
inconsistent  and  indecisive  with  policy  implementation74.  Hard-line 
advocates criticized the administration for having opted for a lengthy path 
of a multilateral diplomatic process instead of using military might and 
economic leverages, while the engagement supporters disapproved tough 
stance as counterproductive in the case of North Korea. The failure of the 
Bush administration during its first term to introduce a coherent policy 
towards North Korea is attributed to the inability to reconcile these two 
policy approaches. The decision whether the settlement of nuclear issue 
only is the matter of interest or whether to aim at collapse of the political 
regime in the DPRK is likely to have been one of discussion points in the 
USA administration.
President  George W. Bush’s  personal  beliefs  are  argued to  have 
contributed greatly to the approach of the administration towards North 
Korea in the beginning of his term. President Bush’s personal hatred and 
moral condemn of the North Korean regime has been observed by many 
of his counterparts75. The idea that dictatorships are morally at fault and 
thus cannot be dealt with and trusted dominated his personal vision of the 
DPRK and its leadership76. As a result the policy ended up in confusing 
long-term geopolitical interests of the USA and strategic importance of its 
alliances in the region (especially, with South Korea, whose engagement 
policy  suffered  form  the  Bush  administration  approach)  and  actually 
blocked the process of imposing international control over the DPRK’s 
nuclear programme and normalization of relationship.
74 See Cha, Victor D. Winning Asia // Foreign Affairs, November-December 2007, Vol. 86, Issue 6, pp. 
98-113; Hathaway, Robert M. Just Whose Side Is Time On?: North Korea and George W. Bush, 2001
—4 // Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2007, Volume 42 (3/4), p. 264.
75 Kim Mikyoung lists interview records with George W. Bush and other literature on the matter that 
testify personal negative approach of the President to the DPRK leadership.
76 See Mazarr, Michael J. The Long Road to Pyongyang //  Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007, 
Vol. 86. Issue 5, pp. 75-94; Kim Mikyoung. Ethos and Contingencies. A comparative Analysis of the 
Clinton and Bush Administrations’ North Korea Policy //  Korea and World Affairs, Summer 2007, p. 
172-203.
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The  declared  policy  priorities  by  the  Bush  administration  have 
made  believe  that  the  prime  objective  initially  was  to  foster  regime 
change in the DPRK77. However, achieving such an objective appeared to 
be complicated both due to the challenges that presents any rivaled regime 
struggling  for  survival  and  international  constrains,  especially  with  a 
numerous and well-trained conventional forces and a suspected nuclear 
capabilities  such  as  the  DPRK.  The  maintenance  of  the  political  and 
military  alliance  with  the  ROK  hindered  further  development  of  the 
regime collapse approach. South Korean leadership and public opinion 
were mainly against any coercive measures against the DPRK. President 
of  the  ROK  even  reported  that  North  Korea’s  nuclear  weapons  were 
aimed at  the  country’s  defense  and that  there  has  been no perceptible 
connection  between  the  Pyongyang  regime  and  terrorism  since  1987 
(November,  14th 2004):  “Some  expect  the  North  Korean  regime  to 
collapse.  But  this  would  be  a  disaster  for  Korea,  because  there  is  no 
assurance that  North Korea will  not  make a dangerous choice when it 
faces a threat to its regime. In the end, there is no way except dialogue.”78
As  regarding  North  Korea,  it  could  be  claimed  with  a  high 
probability  that  above  all  it  has  been  seeking  a  long-term  strategic 
relationship with the United States79. This pragmatic calculation is based 
on geopolitical realities perceived in Pyongyang: North Korea generally 
feels the need to balance the impact their neighbors have on the situation 
development and the stability of the political regime in the DPRK. North 
Korean propaganda historically called for withdrawal of the US forces 
from the peninsula, but in fact, North Korea’s leadership understands that 
remaining permanent  enemies  of  the  United States  would  rather  bring 
77 Mitchell  B.  Reiss.  A  Nuclear-armed  North  Korea:  Accepting  the  “Unacceptable”?  //  Survival, 
Volume 48, No. 4. Winter 2006-2007, p.104.
78 Cited  in James  Cotton.  The  Proliferation  Security  Initiative  and  North  Korea:  Legality  and 
Limitations of a Coalition Strategy // Security Dialogue, Vol. 36, No. 2, June 2005. p. 206.
79 Daniel A. Pinkston. North Korea’s Foreign Policy Towards the United States //  Strategic Insights, 
Volume V, Issue 7 (September 2006).
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inconvenience than benefit and that the adversarial relationship should be 
changed.
North  Korea’s  relations  with  the  United  States  started  with  the 
experience of the peninsula’s division and the Korean war. The United 
States  in  fact  contributed  to  separation  of  the  Korean  nation,  the 
responsibility which they share with other great powers. The Korean war 
prevented the effort of the North to unite the Korean peninsular with the 
use of military force: the USA took the part of the South and became its 
strategic ally, while the DPRK’s propaganda for decades encouraged anti-
Americanism  as  part  of  national  ideology  and  nationalism.  Since  the 
principle  national  goal  both  for  the  North  and  the  South  was  the 
unification of the nation, the USA was considered in the DPRK as the 
main  obstruction  to  it.  With  the  mergence  of  the  USA-ROK  military 
alliance,  the DPRK’s policy regarding the US was withdrawal of  U.S. 
military forces deployed in the South. Thus, its population still could be 
mobilized against the threat of a possible USA military attack or invasion.
In the new strategic environment, the United States continue to play 
a critical role for the DPRK in its efforts to achieve national objectives. 
After the end of the Cold war the DPRK has repeatedly sought negative 
security assurance from the United States. However, President George W. 
Bush’s State of the Union Address of 2002 where he referred to North 
Korea as part of the “axis of evil” deepened bilateral incomprehension 
and gave to the DPRK affirmation of a hostile policy towards Pyongyang 
prevailing. The North Korean nuclear programme, whatever mighty the 
capabilities the DPRK has acquired are, is aimed at deterring the United 
States. The national security of the DPRK can never be assured until the 
United States agree to deliver guarantees of security.
It has been widely acknowledged that North Korea after the end of 
the Cold war has become interested in transforming adversarial relations 
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with  the  USA  into  cooperative  and  friendly,  as  the  normalization  of 
relationship would be essential in achieving both security and economic 
goals80. However, the position of Washington, which has been refusal to 
maintain  any  rapport  with  the  DPRK  unless  it  assures  a  full 
denuclearization and complies with other conditions that the USA has set, 
creates the situation unfavourable to any constructive discussion of the 
matter.
In the economic realm the DPRK would like to improve bilateral 
relations  in  order  to  obtain  the  USA  assistance  and  investment.  In 
particular,  Pyongyang  requests  to  be  removed  from  the  State 
Department’s list of states that sponsor international terrorism, and have 
all the US sanctions eliminated, so that the DPRK can join international 
financial  institutions  in  order  to  gain  access  to  foreign  capital  and 
overseas  markets.  However,  from the  US point  of  view,  especially  of 
conservative  circles,  the  idea  of  economically  engaging  North  Korea 
appears inappropriate, though other parties involved retain it the road to 
resolving  both  the  nuclear  issue  and  ensuring  Korean  reunification 
(China, the ROK, Russia)81.
Insistence on pre-conditions for a rapprochement with the DPRK − 
such as a complete and irreversible dismantling of North Korean nuclear 
program − has been counterproductive. The DPRK regularly demonstrates 
that it can not be pressed and through a series of nuclear tests it actually 
has managed to strengthen its bargaining position. By placing the nuclear 
issue as the top priority, but within the context of engagement and trust-
building,  the parties  are  likely to  see  a  major  progress  because  of  the 
strategic need in North Korea to forge strong ties with the United States.
80 Mark P. Barry. North Korea Requires Long-term Strategic Relationship with the U.S. // International  
Journal on World Peace, Vol. XXIV No. 1 March 2007. p. 38.
81 Mark P. Barry. North Korea Requires Long-term Strategic Relationship with the U.S. // International  
Journal on World Peace, Vol. XXIV No. 1 March 2007. p. 40.
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Until  recently,  the  strategy  of  North  Korea  has  achieved  the 
principle  goal  of  guaranteeing  the  survival  of  the  state  in  the  face  of 
possibility  of  military  actions  by  the  USA:  the  deterrence  with  the 
declared  nuclear  capabilities  succeeded;  however,  obtaining  security 
assurances from the USA remains a remote perspective. The USA and 
North  Korea  failed  to  normalize  bilateral  relations.  In  this  light  it  is 
essential to determine the ultimate policy goal of the USA as regarding 
the DPRK: to promote engagement with the DPRK or to push towards the 
regime’s collapse. Under the Bush administration the policy shifted from 
ignoring  the  possibility  of  dealing  with  the  North  Korean  regime  to 
concluding agreements with it  in the framework of the Six-party talks. 
Some  analysts  believe  that  it  was  for  the  internal  division  within  the 
administration  about  the best  policy  options  towards  North Korea that 
prevented the ultimate resolution of the North Korean issue82.
In  case  of  positive  response  from  the  USA  to  the  idea  of 
normalization with the DPRK, it would bring about changes in mind-set 
and new dynamics for the development of bilateral relations. North Korea 
might be eager to exchange the security deterrence of its nuclear weapons 
for the security guarantee of a strategic friendship with the United States.
The US policy towards North Korea during the Bush administration 
in  power,  especially  during  the  first  term,  suffered  from  significant 
setbacks  in  achieving  its  main  objective   put  an  end  to  the  nuclear 
weapons programme. Actually, North Korea has got the opportunity to 
product nuclear materials for a possible nuclear weapons’ creation almost 
without any restraint83. The USA together with other nuclear powers were 
not  able  to  prevent  expulsion of  the IAEA inspectors  from the DPRK 
facilities and its withdrawal form the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thus the 
82 Narushige Michishita. Coercing to Reconcile: North Korea’s Response to US ‘Hegemony’  //  The 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 6, December 2006. p. 1035.
83 See North  Korea’s  Weapons  Programmes:  A  Net  Assessment  //  The  International  Institute  for 
Strategic  Studies,  Strategic  Dossier.  Press Statement,  Dr.  John Chipman, IISS  Director,  21 January 
2004.  www.iiss.org.
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entire  non-proliferation  regime  continued  to  be  rivaled  by  the  North 
Korean activities, which could not but have negative consequences at the 
American policy in the region and globally. Manifold policy goals related 
to North Korea and the situation on the Korean peninsular  the American 
role in the region of North-East Asia  has been determined by the North 
Korean nuclear deadlock and policy implications in the region that arose.
As  has  been  mentioned  above,  some  data  that  the  DPRK  was 
producing enriched uranium appeared during the Clinton administration 
term,  but only in June of 2002 the American intelligence claimed that 
according  to  its  information  North  Korea  had  acquired  processing 
facilities for the enrichment of uranium. The reaction of the DPRK was a 
series  of  demonstrative  and challenging actions:  the nuclear  reactor  in 
Yongbyon (closed  according with the Framework Agreement  in  1994) 
was reactivated; the IAEA experts were expelled form the country and 
later on, in January 2003, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the 
NPT. Responding to the North Korean actions, the USA adopted a hard 
posture, which included intimidation with preemptive strikes and the UN 
Security Council sanctions.
However, it should be noted that despite of declaring its intentions 
to  pressure  Pyongyang and,  probably,  of  making  it  abide  by  the  NPT 
regime principles through the use of force, the United States starting from 
2003 maintained their preference to peaceful means of conflict resolution. 
The  Bush  administration  adopted  a  multilateral  approach  towards  the 
nuclear  issue  settlement,  advocating  the  idea  to  involve  all  powers 
concerned  into  guaranteeing  implementation  of  an  agreement  with  the 
DPRK and financing the deal84.  The principle concern of the US since 
than has been to clarify the intentions of North Korea to really abandon 
and dismantle its nuclear facilities.
84 Michael Mazarr mentions that adopting a multinational approach was not an immediate decision, but 
came after a long discussion within the administration and with key regional powers. Mazarr, Michael 
J. The Long Road to Pyongyang // Foreign Affairs, September-October 2007, Vol. 86. Issue 5.
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The initial stage of the Bush administration’s policy versus North 
Korea  uncovered  the  divisions  within  the  administration  regarding  the 
continuation  of  the  engagement  policy  towards  the  DPRK.  The  new 
administration apparently needed to highlight a different policy approach 
from that of the Clinton administration. At the same time, in the aftermath 
of the first North-South Korean summit in Pyongyang in June 2000 there 
was  a  considerable  pressure  from  South  Korea  and  international 
community for a more efficient engagement with the DPRK. The hard-
line approach towards North Korea has been revealed by senior officials 
in the US Defense department. The term “rogue state” was reintroduced 
into the political discourse regarding the DPRK after years it has not been 
used: the Clinton administration abandoned the expression in the middle 
of the 1990s when referring to North Korea85. The anti-terror campaign 
led by the USA created concerns that Washington had chosen to limit its 
diplomatic  activities  and  give  priority  to  military  power  logic  and 
advantages it possesses in this sphere86.
Though  the  issue  of  disarmament  has  been  the  core  argument 
throughout all the period of the Bush administration in power, only in the 
second term the policy towards North Korea changed substantially against 
the  earlier  approach  due  to  multiple  factors,  such  as  changes  in  the 
political  context  (military  engagement  in  Iraq),  stuff  reshuffle  (State 
Secretary  D.  Rumsfeld  who  advocated  a  hard-line  approach  was 
substituted  by  C.  Rice,  whose  approach  was  more  pragmatic).  The 
multilateralism option prevailed and Bush’s foreign policy initiated to be 
effected through the mechanism of the Six-party talks. The new policy 
strategy  is  argued  to  have  brought  some  visible  progress,  such  as 
preventing escalation of tensions,  concluding a deal with the DPRK in 
85 Sebastian Harnisch. Make Multilateralism Work on the Korean Peninsula: A View from Europe // 
Manuscript for the International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, p. 5.
86 See Stefano Guzzini. Foreign Policy Without Diplomacy: the Bush Administration at a Crossroads // 
International relations, Vol.16, No.2, August 2002.
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February  2007),  although,  the  real  outcome  is  still  far  from  being 
evident87.
2.2 US political and military unions with Japan and the ROK and their 
impact on the trilateral approaches towards North Korea
The region of North-East Asia has special regional dynamics in the 
Asia-Pacific  region:  the  interests  of  several  great  powers  are  tightly 
intertwined there, including the interests  of  the three nuclear powers – 
China,  the  USA and the  Russian  Federation.  The  regional  structure  is 
determined by the absence  of  institutionalized regional  mechanisms  of 
confidence-building  and cooperation  and  the  relationships  between the 
regional  states  are  built  mainly  on  bilateral  basis.  The  regional 
environment carries the legacy of historic hostility – the Japanese colonial 
rule and the following Cold war antagonism, which at times contribute to 
shaping a negative political climate that prevent countries of the region 
from  efficient  cooperation88.  Significant  obstacle  for  cooperation  and 
mutual trust is continuously represented by the colonial memory and anti-
Japanese sentiment in both Koreas and China towards Japan89.
However,  the  level  of  regional  stability  is  evaluated  by  many 
analysts as sufficient  (the Korean issue not considered).  The American 
87 Cha, Victor D. Winning Asia //  Foreign Affairs, November-December 2007, Vol. 86, Issue 6, pp. 
98-113.
88 Major part of such conflicts is latent and include the Korean division (the war of 1950-1953), the 
Taiwan problem, territorial disputes between Russia and Japan over the south Sakhalin islands, between 
South Korea and Japan over the isle of Dokdo (Takishima), absence of a peace treaty between Japan 
and Russia, etc.
89 The first official apology form Japan to Korea was delivered only after 50 years form the liberation: 
on August 15 1995 the Japanese prime-minister T. Murayama acknowledged that Japan led the policy 
of aggression on the Korean peninsular. See Apology by Japan’s Prime Minister // Korea Focus, 1995, 
July-August, Vol.3, No. 4. p.120.
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researcher of East Asian affairs Thomas Christensen believes that in the 
XXI century the regional stability is more likely in North-East Asia than 
in  Europe.90 Actually,  the  majority  of  the  US analysts  are  inclined  to 
consider  the  US  military  presence  in  Asia  the  key  factor  of  conflict 
prevention in the region91. The USA continues to play the dominant role 
in regional affairs and their allies remain committed to their obligations 
and  are  reluctant  to  any  important  changes.  Among  Russian  political 
analysts the US military alliances’ role in the region is regarded as an 
obstacle  to  independent  policies  by  other  regional  powers.  Such 
assessments  were  shaped  in  the  Soviet  period  and  began  to  be  partly 
revised in the middle of the 1990s; however, negative estimations can be 
found in relatively recent works. This perception is particularly negative 
in the light of the North Korean nuclear problem, when policy choices of 
the  USA have  proved to  be  able  to  challenge  regional  stability:  “The 
region  of  North-East  Asia,  more  than  other  sub-regions  of  the  Asia-
Pacific is challenged by instability.  Military alliances of the USA with 
Japan and South Korea that remained from the cold war period are not 
mere historical documents, but real military alliances. Since such alliances 
exist, the targets against which they are maintained continue to exist as 
well92.”
However, the system of the US political and military alliances in 
the  North-East  Asia  has  undergone  through  changes  due  to  new 
international  environment  after  the end of the Cold war,  domestic  and 
international factors that followed. The USA took a considerable effort to 
create  a  network  of  alliances  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region,  to  which  the 
alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea are parts. Strengthening 
90 Thomas J.  Christensen.  China? The U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia // 
International Security, Vol.23, No.4, Spring 1999. p.49.
91 See Robert  S.  Ross.  The  Geography  of  the  Peace:  East  Asia  in  the  Twenty-first  Century  // 
International Security,  Vol.23, No.4, Spring 1999; Glenn H. Snyder.  Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive 
Realism and the Struggle for Security // International security, Vol. 27, No.1, Summer 2002.
92 Tkachenko  V.P.  Koreiskii  poluostrov  i  interesy  Rossii  (The  Korean  Peninsular  and  the  Russian 
Interests). Moscow, 2000. p. 104.
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these  alliances  is  believed  to  promote  confidence-building  and  is 
constantly evolving in the direction of broadening the operation ability 
horizons and coercive measures against hostile countries to be taken by 
the allies.
A nuclear threat from North Korea poses a menace to the security 
of  US  troops  deployed  in  the  region  on  its  regional  allies’  national 
territories – in Japan and South Korea. Another concern is that the North 
Korean  nuclear  hazard  can  foster  regional  powers  to  pursue  nuclear 
weapons on order to deter the DPRK, which would destabilize the current 
regional structure and rival more than half a century long dominance of 
the USA in East Asia.
As  regarding  South  Korean  and  Japan’s  approach  towards 
Pyongyang, for both the nuclear issue enters in the sphere of potential 
direct security threats. The unpredictability of the North Korean policies 
has challenged the stability in the region for decades, with the perspective 
of the regime’s collapse becoming the main threat in the first half of the 
1990s93. Neither South Korea, nor Japan favoured a potential spontaneous 
collapse of the DPRK: the paradoxical situation stands form the fact that 
sponsoring  the  survival  of  Pyongyang  while  it  challenges  regional 
security with nuclear weapons has been the only feasible policy option. 
By  the  end  of  the  1990s  the  tendency  both  in  Tokyo  and  Seoul  was 
acquiring  more  independency  in  exercising  their  diplomatic  activities, 
even if it sometimes implied disagreement with Washington. South Korea 
and Japan were moving towards improving their  bilateral  relationships 
with  North  Korea.  The  official  visit  of  the  Japanese  Prime  Minister 
Koizumi to Pyongyang in September 2002 was a significant autonomous 
93 Victor D.Cha. Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defence on the Korean Peninsula //  International  
Security, Vol.27, No.1 Summer 2002 – p. 46.
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policy initiative,  the first  of  such independent  actions  by  the Japanese 
side94.
Japan
In the 1990s the Japanese diplomacy (equally as South Korean) had 
to  face  the  situation  of  the  bilateral  US-DPRK  Agreed  Framework’s 
conclusion  without  detailed  consent  from  the  allies,  that,  however, 
presumed  that  Japan  would  contribute  $1  billion  dollars  for  the 
construction  of  two  light  water  nuclear  reactors  in  the  North.  Japan’s 
position  over  the  means  of  control  over  the  North  Korean  nuclear 
developments  has  been  supportive  of  the  USA  policy  line  aimed  at 
restraining  the  DPRK’s  activities  that  might  be  related  to  the  North 
Korean  nuclear  programme.  Launches  of  missiles  over  the  Japanese 
territory  contributed  to  taking  a  hard  stance  and  coercive  measures 
towards  the  nuclear  issue  in  Japan.  Currently,  Japan  links  the 
normalization process to the resolution of the nuclear issue and thus the 
negotiations came to a deadlock.
Japan  and  the  DPRK have  never  established  official  diplomatic 
relations  since  the  end  of  the  Japanese  colonial  rule  on  the  Korean 
peninsular. After the Cold war ended there have been several attempts to 
normalize the relations: Prime Minister Koizumi and Kim Jong Il hold the 
first  in  the  history  summit  in  September  2000  in  Pyongyang,  but  the 
normalization  process  later  hindered95.  The normalization  was  to  bring 
significant economic assistance to North Korea as a compensation for the 
Japanese exploitation of Korea during the annexation period. The 2000 
summit was an engagement-oriented approach, which in the situation of 
94 Hyeong Jung Park.  North  Korea,  Northeast  Asia,  and  the  ROK-U.S.  Alliance  //  The  Brookings 
Institution  CNAPS  Visiting  Fellow  Working  Paper,  p.  8  –  available  at 
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08004Park.pdf.
95 In  January  1991 Japan  started  the  first  official  normalization  negotiation  with  North  Korea.  12 
sessions of negotiations were held from 1991 to 2002. Last sessions were held in 2002 in Kuala Lumpur 
on October 29 and in Pyongyang in May 2004.
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the  Bush  administration’s  tough  policy  line  could  mean  a  completely 
diverse  strategy  and  could  bring  discrepancies  within  the  USA-Japan 
alliance.
The position of Japan regarding the DPRK after 2002 has become 
largely coordinated with that of the United States: Japan has adopted a 
transformative approach in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem 
because  its  strategic  interests  are  best  served  by  fundamentally 
transforming  and,  if  possible,  changing  the  North  Korean  regime96. 
Although stressing  the  importance  of  negotiations,  Japan  has  in  effect 
followed  the  path  of  pressuring  Pyongyang  in  order  to  eliminate  its 
nuclear program and make Korea commit itself to inspections. Japan has 
also warned that if negotiations fail to bring any progress it would not 
hesitate to impose sanctions. Like the USA, the Japanese authorities claim 
verifiable abandon of the nuclear problem by the DPRK. Prime Minister 
Koizumi  sustained  that  the  prime  objective  of  Japan’s  policy  towards 
North Korea was not to promote collapse of the regime, but to persuade 
the DPRK to stop taking provocative actions and to adopt the path of 
gradual reform of its political and economic system97. Economic leverage 
has been left apart until normalization process develops substantially to 
permit Japan deliver economic assistance to the DPRK. The Japan-DPRK 
Pyongyang Declaration plainly states that Japan’s economic cooperation 
to  the  North  would  be  provided  only  after  the  normalization  of 
relationship98.
In  fact,  Japan  remains  directly  threatened  by  the  North  Korean 
nuclear weapons – ballistic missiles have been repeatedly launched in the 
96 Mark  E.  Manyin.  Japan-North  Korea  Relations:  Selected  Issues,  CRS  Report  RL32161, 
Congressional Research Service, November 26, 2003, p. 1. The author states that Japan has been the 
strongest supporter of regime change in the DPRK.
97 Cited in Matake Kamiya. A Disillusioned Japan Confronts North Korea // Arms Control Today, May 
2003,  Volume  33.  Number  4.  –  available  at 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/kamiya_may03.asp.
98 Japan-DPRK  Pyongyang  Declaration.  December  1,  2002.  -  available  at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html.
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direction of  its  territory99 – and thus acquiring a hard-line approach is 
aimed  at  effectively  eliminating  the  overall  threat  posed by the  North 
Korean regime and its policies to its security interests due to geographic 
proximity  of  the  DPRK.  Therefore,  the  national  security  of  Japan  is 
exceptionally vulnerable to nuclear weapons and missiles that might be 
launched by North Korea. On the other hand, acquisition of the nuclear 
status by a member of the region would create incentives for commencing 
a nuclear arms race in North-East Asia, which is not favourable for Japan.
Concerns that  North Korea’s  nuclear  weapons programme might 
lead to nuclear proliferation in North-East Asia were expressed during the 
first  crisis in 1993-1994 and afterwards by the United States and other 
regional  powers.  After  the  nuclear  test  conducted  by  the  DPRK  in 
October 2006 there have been numerous concerns that it might encourage 
Japan to search for its own nuclear weapons capabilities. However, the 
traditionally less than 1% of the gross domestic product military budget of 
Japan has not been increased since then and, on the contrary, the Self-
Defense Forces of Japan were to cut their personnel100.
Japan is acknowledged to possess adequate technical capabilities to 
develop nuclear weapons. However, initiating such a programme would 
violate Japan’s commitment to bilateral and international agreements to 
which Japan is  part.  Japan’s  strategy is rather  based  on respect  to  the 
legitimacy  of  international  treaties,  including  the  Non-proliferation 
regime and the country is trying to enhance its position through respect to 
the  rule  of  international  law  and  universal  values  rather  than  through 
challenging  the  surrounding  international  community  with  its  military 
capabilities.  In  this  light,  the  political-military  alliance  with  the  USA 
remains one of its foreign policy pillars and deterrence towards the DPRK 
99 North Korea’s tested the Taepodong ballistic missile which fell into the sea over Japan in August 
1998.
100 Hajime Izumi, Katsuhisa Furukawa. Not Going Nuclear: Japan’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear 
Test // Arms Control Today, June 2007, Volume 37 Number 5. p. 7.
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continues to be built on security cooperation provided by this alliance: in 
fact, Japan has delivered support for the US operation in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. A widely shared opinion is that one of the main reasons for Japan 
lending  support  has  been  evidently  Japan’s  dependence  on  the  USA 
defense capabilities needed in case of a possible missile attack by North 
Korea101.  According  to  the  national  constitution  cooperative  military 
actions, except those to defend Japan, violate the county’s legislation that 
prohibits  settling  international  disputes  with  the  use  of  force  and  the 
country is not able to engage in collective operations under the auspices 
of the United Nations102. Japan can also be expected to continue to rely on 
the US nuclear umbrella.
The Japan’s policy towards North Korea has adopted a line in the 
middle  between containment  and engagement  towards the DPRK.  The 
rapprochement efforts have largely failed despite some political success 
such as the Pyongyang Declaration of 2002. For Japan the threat posed by 
North Korea arises from the nuclear program as well as from the very 
nature of the political regime in the DPRK103. Giving importance to the 
abduction issue has made Japan’ reconciliation effort  limited.  Japanese 
public opinion is reported to be more concerned with a possible nuclear 
contamination  as  a  result  of  the  DPRK  nuclear  activities.  Cases  of 
abduction  of  Japanese  citizens  by  the  North  Korean  special  services 
remain one of the policy main concerns. The Japanese government insists 
on resolving abduction issue and the nuclear issue together. By having 
taking a motionless attitude towards the resolution of the nuclear issue 
Japan  demonstrates  its  preferences  to  the  current  status  quo  and  its 
101 Makoto Taniguchi. Japan’s Policy for North Korea in the Nexus of Great Power Politics in East Asia 
// The European Institute of Japanese Studies, Stockholm School of Economies. Working Paper 170. 
June  2003  –  available  at  http://www.hhs.se/NR/rdonlyres/9D436E97-7F62-4749-B139-
C54117DF8F8/0/Working_Paper_No_170.PDF. p. 4.
102 Richard Katz; Peter Ennis. How Able Is Abe? // Foreign Affairs, March-April 2007, Vol. 86, Issue 2. 
pp. 75-91.
103 Missile launches, abduction of Japanese citizens, intrusion of North Korean ships into the Japanese 
waters, etc.
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strategic  approach  towards  North  Korea  is  formulated  in  coordination 
with the US policy line.
The Republic of Korea–US alliance
The US-ROK military alliance has been created in order to deter a 
possible  North  Korea  aggression  and  in  course  of  the  years  has  been 
highly vulnerable to changes in the geopolitical situation over the Korean 
peninsular,  developments  in  the  bilateral  relationship  between  the  two 
Korean states. With the beginning of the Bush administration first term 
that  coincided  with  the  start  of  the  South  Korean  engagement  policy 
towards the North, the allies seem to have developed diverse vision over 
the key issues  of  policy choices towards North Korea and the nuclear 
problem.
The alliance has been maintained for more than half a century and 
disagreements between the Republic of Korea and the United States did 
not lack in that period. However, recent discrepancies that appeared due 
to numerous factors,  domestic  and international,  are  different  from the 
previous ones. Obviously, both allies are going through identity crises and 
need to review the common target and the mean of achieving it104. The 
Republic  of  Korea  has  considerably  revised  its  approach  towards  the 
DPRK in the end of the 1990s and the evaluation of the threat it poses, 
while the United States has had to adjust its security vision in the light of 
global anti-terrorist campaign it currently leads.
The  “sunshine  policy”  that  was  introduced  after  Kim Dae  Jung 
became President in 1999 was aimed at fostering gradual change of the 
North  Korea  regime  through  economic  engagement,  cooperation  and 
assistance  by  the  South.  Since  then  the  South  Korean  leadership  has 
restrained form confronting the DPRK, accusing the regime of its hostility 
104 Cheon Seongwhun. North Korea and the ROK-U.S. Security Alliance //  Armed Forces & Society, 
Volume 34, Number 1, October 2007. pp. 5-28.
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or  human  rights  violations,  etc.  The  policy  of  engagement  sought  to 
provide North Korea with survival guarantees and further concessions that 
were also to reduce the nuclear threat, since an economically stable and 
reassured in the security realm regime would be less eager to trigger its 
status through pursuing nuclear weapons. The first historic meeting of the 
leaders of the two Korean states was held in Pyongyang in June 2000 and 
created  a  powerful  momentum  of  broad  international  support  for  the 
engagement  initiative  of  the  Republic  of  Korea  and  normalization  of 
relationship with the DPRK.
President  Roh  Moo  Hyun’s  administration  (2003-2007)  mainly 
continued  the  line  of  the  engagement  policy  with  the  DPRK with  its 
“Peace and prosperity policy”. The second nuclear crisis and the North 
Korean  nuclear  capabilities  have  become  incompliant  with  the  effort 
taken  by  the  ROK  to  create  a  trustful  partnership  with  North  Korea. 
However, South Korea has never considered the option of a military strike 
at  the  DPRK,  since  it  might  have  dramatic  consequences  on  its  own 
national security and economic stability. In this light, provocative actions 
or  even verbal  accusations  towards the DPRK by the USA have been 
perceived as needless and avoidable steps105. Primary differences between 
the allies are in practical policy measures to achieve common goals of 
security on the Korean peninsular. The ROK has repeatedly emphasized 
the feasibility of the peaceful resolution and definitely considers coercive 
options as unacceptable.
Democratic  transition  in  the Republic  of  Korea after  decades  of 
authoritarian rule has brought changes to its identity and self-perception 
in regional  and world politics.  Actually,  as  one of  the main  American 
allies in Asia, it has been part of many US-led campaigns starting form 
105 “It is true that an option to North Korea’s nuclear problem is the possibility of a U.S. military attack 
against North Korea. However, striking North Korea is a grave problem that can cause a war on the 
Korean  peninsula  and  I  object  to  even  reviewing  such  a  possibility.”  President  Roh  Moo  Hyun’s 
remarks. Dong-a Ilbo, February 20, 2003. – cited in Cheon Seongwhun, p. 11.
74
the war in Vietnam, where it made a significant contribution, to the Iraqi 
campaign, where it has been the third largest contingent after the USA 
and  Great  Britain.  However,  its  real  commitment  has  never  been 
recognized  as  such,  which  creates  resentment  and  collaterally  makes 
South  Korea  to  search  to  act  on its  own.  The  presence  of  the  United 
States’  military  forces  deployed  in  the  ROK  to  deter  North  Korean 
aggression has also caused a sense of discrimination – like in the case of 
Japan, local legal system can not exercise its jurisdiction over the crimes 
committed by American soldiers on its territory.
In the middle of the 1990s the question of equality in the alliance 
arose after the settlement of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, when 
the USA took alone the initiative and negotiated a deal with the DPRK 
that later was to be paid by its North-East Asian allies. The USA acted in 
the frames of settling the proliferation crisis, not within the North-South 
relations vision. As a result, the position of the ROK (Japan as well) as an 
independent policy-maker able to decide at least upon the North Korean 
matters was seriously undermined.
As Victor Cha, a prominent American expert on North-East Asian 
affairs  points  out,  despite  of  the  common  ally  and  common  security 
threats  that  come up from the former  USSR, China and North Korea, 
bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea are marked by constant 
discrepancies106. A vague interest of the first-term Bush administration to 
the engagement policy of the ROK received a pronounced criticism from 
Seoul.  President  Roh  Moo  Hyun  warned  the  US  that  a  tough  stance 
regarding the DPRK might cause resistance and disagreement between in 
the US-ROK alliance107.  The South Korean government prefers to deal 
with the North Korean nuclear problem outside the UN Security Council 
since  it  believes  that  such  a  discussion  would  only  contribute  to 
106 Victor D. Cha. Alignment Despite Antagonism // Pacific Forum CSIS - http://www.csis.org.
107 Cited in Zhiqun Zhu. Small Power, Big Ambition. South Korea’s Role in Northeast Asian Security 
under President Roh Moo-hyun // Korea and World Affairs, Summer 2007. p.160.
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convincing Pyongyang in hostile intentions (following the case of Iraqi 
WMD and the military operation). The ROK government has adopted a 
non-provocative  policy  line  in  order  to  minimize  tensions  on  the 
peninsula. In this sense, South Korea favours the multilateral format of 
dialogue with the DPRK.
A consolidated vision in the framework of alliances with Japan and 
South  Korea  would  be  helpful  in  convincing  North  Korea  about  the 
unanimity of international opinion over its nuclear programme. The ROK 
during  the  presidential  terms  of  Kim  Dae  Jung  and  Roh  Moo  Hyun 
introduced  the  engagement  policy  –  the  “sunshine  policy”  and  the 
expended  version  of  the  “peace  and  prosperity  policy”.  Japan  has 
accepted a position rather close to that of the USA as it preconditions any 
real normalization process to the resolution of the nuclear matter and the 
particular issue of the abducted Japanese citizens. The policy of the ROK 
and Japan towards North Korea can be described as double-sided or dual 
diplomacy: they are engaged both in multilateral work together with the 
he United States and other six-party talks participants and also in bilateral 
dialogue with the North.
However, the principle position difference between the USA and its 
North-East  Asian allies  is  that  they stand against  any solution through 
military  confrontation.  Being  neighboring  countries  to  the  DPRK  the 
ROK and Japan would bear the consequences of an enforced solution. 
The USA policy under the Bush administration has been irregular: giving 
importance  to  the  military  might  and  lacking  (or  absent)  usage  of 
economic leverages and normative power. By disregard to the interests of 
its  allies  the  USA  in  effect  has  lost  the  regional  consensus,  which 
prevented form coordinating its vision with the allies and acting together 
in  order  to  dissolve  the  North  Korean  nuclear  issue.  The  late  Bush 
administration seemed to have reconsidered its previous policy line and 
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made an attempt to strengthen the temporarily confused alliances in the 
region and at the same time tried to include them in the framework of the 
multilateral regional mechanism (the Six-party talks), which includes also 
China and Russia. Francis Fukuyama and other analysts state that creating 
a set  of multilateral  organizations in parallel  with the existing bilateral 
organizations would be important for the regional stability in the region: 
“With the end of the Cold War and the continuing economic development 
of  eastern  Asia,  power  relationships  are  changing  in  ways  that  have 
unlocked  nationalist  passions  and  rivalries.  The  potential  for 
misunderstanding and conflict among South Korea, Japan, and China will 
be significant in the coming years – but it can be mitigated if multiple 
avenues of discussion exist between the states108.”
North  Korea  itself  seems  inclined  to  negotiate  the  nuclear  issue 
with the United States  on a  bilateral  basis.  However,  any negotiations 
would be more efficient if a consolidated multilateral pressure in the form 
of  a  common  position  is  exercised  over  it.  The  parties  involved have 
already  recognized the  multilateral  format  as  the  most  appropriate  for 
resolving the North Korean nuclear issue – the price for any initiative and 
in case of any policy failure is to be paid by all regional powers, so they 
pretend to be considered.
2.3 China’s increasing role
Historically, the relationship of Korea with China evolved in the 
context  of  the  regional  impact  of  the  Chinese  civilization,  when  the 
108 Fukuyama, Francis. Re-Envisioning Asia // Foreign Affairs, January-February 2005, Vol. 84 Issue 1, 
p75-87.
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neighbouring countries had to choose between paying tribute to China or 
invasion.  Korea  was  influenced  by  the  Chinese  culture  and  political 
system; the relationship reflected the Confucian principle of hierarchy. 
When Japan made Korea its colony (Korea was annexed in 1910), the 
organized guerilla was held by both Korean and Chinese people in the 
North-East part of China. Among them were both Kim Il Song and Mao 
Zedong109.  During  the  Korean  war  of  1950-1953  the  Chinese  troops 
supported North Koreans, suffering approximately 1 mln casualties. Later 
on,  China  advocated  North  Korean  independence  and  for  decades 
regarded it as the only legitimate Korean state on the peninsular.
The present relationship between China and North Korea is based 
on long historical experience, close cultural and geographical roots. As a 
state that shares a common border with China (1400 km), the DPRK is 
important for the Chinese security. China is sensitive to the developments 
on the Korean peninsular in general, since a hostile or socially troubled 
state on its border would present a direct threat to the Chinese national 
security. The ability to influence progress on the whole Korea peninsular 
and enhance its influence thus is crucial for China110.
During the cold war era the DPRK concluded two bilateral security 
treaties – with the USSR and with China. The treaty between the DPRK 
and the latter is still in force111. It should be reminded, however, that the 
bilateral relationship was rather complicated during the Cold war decades. 
Actually,  neither  Soviet  Union nor China had overall  influence on the 
DPRK,  though  both  supported  Pyongyang  economically  and  provided 
security guarantees. The end of the Cold war brought dramatic changes 
both  to  the  Soviet-Korean  and  Sino-Korean  relationship:  diplomatic 
109 Beck Peter M., Reader Nicolas. China and North Korea.  Comrades forever?  ∕∕ Korea and World 
Affairs, Summer 2006. pp. 51-52.
110 Russell Ong. North Korea’s Enduring Importance to China’s Security Interests in the Post-Cold War 
Era // Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, no. 1 June 2000. p. 47.
111 The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of 
China and the democratic People’s Republic of Korea., July 11, 1961 (effective since September 10, 
1986).
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recognition of the Republic of Korea put the end to the policy exclusively 
oriented at  North Korea112.  Currently  China maintains  official  relations 
with both North and South Korea – the priority that only Russia shares out 
of other parties concerned.
Close ties and special trust created between the Chinese and North 
Korean leadership contributes to enabling China with special  leverages 
over  Pyongyang.  While  the  economic  support  from the  Soviet  Union 
came to the end with it dissolution, commercial trade between China and 
North Korea has been maintained and has steadily grown, especially after 
the economic policy changes in the DPRK, which are sometimes regarded 
as an attempt of reform (2002)113. Currently, China occupies 40% in the 
North Korea trade balance.
The rise of China as an economic and security power is one of the 
most widely discussed topics that dominate global agenda. After the end 
of the Cold war China has extended its bilateral relationships with many 
regional  and  non-regional  powers,  actively  participates  in  multilateral 
organizations,  addressing  global  economic  and security  issues  as  well. 
China has currently become more involved in efforts  to contest  global 
security threats, where the active role in resolution of the second North 
Korean nuclear crisis can be listed as an example114. The policy towards 
North Korea combines various factors,  starting from domestic situation 
and  economic  development  priorities  to  ambitions  to  exercise  power, 
especially  in the North Easter  Asia.  The sensible  Taiwan issue  is  also 
concerned.  Obviously,  the Chinese  foreign policy  is  determined by its 
national interests – a pragmatic vision. First, perspective of collapse of 
North  Korea  or  any  dramatic  political  changes  there  would  inevitably 
damage China’s internal economic development and stability. China has a 
112 China recognized South Korea in 1992.
113 July 12 Measures.
114 Medeiros,  Evan  S.,  Fravel,  M.  Taylor.  China’s  New Diplomacy //  Foreign  Affairs, November-
December 2003, Vol. 82. Issue 6, p. 22-35.
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1.400 km border with North Korea, which in case of perturbations would 
be easily crossed by refugees. Uncontrollable processes in the DPRK in 
case  of  the  present  regime’s  collapse  pose  threat  to  China’s  internal 
stability and to its international positions as well,  since a future united 
Korean state might be not friendly to Beijing. Perceiving instability on the 
peninsula  as  a  threat  to  national  security  gives  China  no  other  policy 
option that advocating peaceful  process and continued dialogue even if 
unproductive in order to prevent military conflict on the peninsula. China 
seeks  to promote  a  stable  regional  environment  that  would allow it  to 
accomplish economic modernization and receive a global power status115. 
Pragmatic  calculations  of  the  consequences  of  political  change  in  the 
DPRK on the development of the Chinese economy make China remain 
devoted to the status quo and peaceful  settlement of the nuclear issue. 
Another immediate consequence of a sudden collapse in the North would 
be struggle for influence there among different fraction, which could be 
pro-American,  pro-Chinese,  pro-South  Korean  –  the  perplexing 
environment  on  the  Korean  peninsular  would  not  contribute  to  the 
national security of China.
Second, North Korean nuclear programme poses threats to regional 
stability,  since  it  may  cause  a  chain  reaction  –  acquisition  of  nuclear 
weapons by Japan and South Korea that are capable of constructing them 
in a short term due to elevated technologies available.
Strategically,  China viewed North Korea as a buffer  zone which 
separated the Chinese territory from the presence of the US troops116. For 
decades China maintained official relations only with North Korea, but 
after the end of the cold war managed to normalize of relations with the 
Republic of Korea. After the recognition in 1992 the relationship with the 
115 Russel Ong. China, US and the North Korean Issue // Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2006. p. 
129.
116 China  intervened  in  the  Korean  war  to  safeguard  the  Korean  buffer  zone  form the  US  troops 
presence in the region. China and the USA signed the 1953 Armistice Agreement.
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ROK has developing rapidly and while South Korea has shifted towards a 
more independent approach in its foreign politics, China and South Korea 
should be rather seen as partners, not the former rivals of the Cold war 
period. Both China and South Korea, as neighbour countries are equally 
interested in maintaining stability in North Korea.
The primary aim is to prevent any upheavals and social unrest in 
the country, since it would directly harm stability of both China and the 
Republic of Korea. North Korea realizes the importance of relationship 
with China, but it is hardly inclined to trust China completely, since China 
first  of  all  defends  its  own national  interests  and  when they  may  not 
correspond to the North Korean interests, Beijing would act for achieving 
its own benefits. The Taiwan issue is particularly sensitive in this sense 
and if concerned, China would inevitably give priority to the Taiwan issue 
rather than defend North Korea117. Chinese political choice after the end 
of the cold war has also contributed to the fact that the DPRK realized 
that the relationship was no longer the one of the past.
Mistrust achieved the highest levels after China recognized South 
Korea in 1992. Ideologically, China and North Korea, though each with 
its own national type of a communist-like ideologies, for decades were 
considered close partners. Since the policy of market reforms in China 
and  its  further  opening  to  international  exchanges,  the  mistrust  in  the 
North steadily grew. Significant changes that took place in the Chinese 
ideology and economy have probably made Pyongyang feel “betrayed”.
The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between China and the 
DPRK was signed in 1961. According to the Treaty's provisions, each part 
has to help another in case of military invasion118. Actually, though the 
international context has changed significantly after the Treaty came into 
117 Moreover, North Korea possesses its leverage to challenge China − the Taiwan issue. Pyongyang has 
used  several  times  in  the  1990s  to  threaten  to  establish  ties  with  Taiwan  (especially,  after  China 
established relations with the ROK).
118 The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of 
China and the democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
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force,  the  parts  remained  officially  committed  to  it:  during  the  first 
nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsular when the possibility of the US 
attack seemed plausible, China seemed to be ready to provide assistance 
with its troops. However, by the end of the 1990s China announced that it 
would not automatically interfere in case of military conflict and that its 
assistance  to  the  DPRK would  not  automatically  mean  deployment  of 
Chinese troops119.
China abides by its principle of respect for national sovereignty of 
every state and non-interference into internal policies. However, it would 
definitely not tolerate North Korea’s provocative behaviour to the extent 
it  would pose  risks  of  a  military  conflict  or  the  state's  collapse.  Such 
developments are contrary to the logic of Chinese development, based on 
regional stability and economic prosperity.
During  the  first  nuclear  crisis,  in  1993  China  took  initiative  to 
mediate  between  North  Korea  and  the  USA  and  supported  bilateral 
negotiations between them to settle the issue acting as an intermediary 
between  the  parties.  When  the  second  nuclear  crisis  broke  up  on  the 
Korean peninsular and North Korea announced its withdrawal form the 
NPT China again accepted the role of a mediator and strongly advocated 
bilateral talks as it happened in 1993-1994120. Later on, China got itself 
actively involved in the preparation of the starting multilateral negotiation 
process together with the USA, Japan, Russia and the Republic of Korea. 
The  Six-party  talks  since  the  beginning  of  the  process  were  held  in 
Beijing, with China hosting the meetings and drafting statements, etc.
In  course  of  the  second  nuclear  crisis  China  called  upon  North 
Korea to dismantle the nuclear programme and to comply with the NPT 
and the IAEA safeguards. However, the influence leverage of China was 
evidently not powerful enough to make North Korea to comply with the 
119 Tuva Kahrs. Regional Security Complex Theory and Chinese Policy towards North Korea //  East  
Asia, Winter 2004, Vol. 21, No. 4, p. 73.
120 The challenge of a preemptive strike by the USA made China particularly sensitive to the issue.
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NPT principles.  At the same time,  China played a determining role in 
convincing  North  Korea  and  the  USA  to  negotiate  (the  Bush 
administration  refused  any agreement  with the NPT violator  while  the 
DPRK perceived as  real  the possibility  of  a pre-emptive attack by the 
USA in the light of the Iraqi war started in 2003). Eventually, the Six-
party talks opened in Beijing in August 2003. The Chinese position was 
far from being coercive with the DPRK: it has traditionally opposed any 
sanctions to North Korea, considering such measures only harmful for the 
population,  but  not  efficient  in  convincing the  North Korea  regime  to 
make certain concessions.
For the same reasons China expresses itself  against any coercive 
measures – it may lead to instability121. The China’s active commitment to 
the Six-party talks process  as a  multilateral  channel  of communication 
and  peaceful  settlement  of  North  Korean  nuclear  issue  reflected  its 
strategic  choice.  China  tries  to  prevent  provocative  actions  form both 
North  Korea  and  the  USA.  As  regarding  the  later,  China  refused  to 
participate  in  the  Proliferation  Security  Initiative  of  the  Bush 
administration. Concerning North Korea, China is reluctant to support any 
resolutions by the UN Security Council that introduce sanctions against it: 
China follows the doctrine of non-conditionality of its relationship with 
North Korea and has not cut aids or economic relationship to impose to 
the DPRK a certain position on the nuclear issue.
It  should be noted,  that  China has  decided not  to interfere  even 
considering the negative consequences of the regime collapse. One reason 
for  it  could  be  the  position  that  sanctions  would  hardly  seriously 
undermine the legitimacy of the North Korea regime, but rather block the 
marketization  processes  in  the  country  and  cause  difficulties  for  the 
population. In the long term, China advocates economic reforms in North 
121 During the first nuclear crisis in 1993-1994 China supported the UN resolution urging the DPRK to 
abide by the NPT, but it expressed its position to oppose sanctions against the DPRK.
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Korea,  its  opening  to  economic  cooperation  and  foreign  investment. 
China  favours  North  Korea’s  economic  reforms  and  escaping  form 
diplomatic isolation122. China’s economic engagement would in the long 
term reduce costs of the North Korea regime’s “soft landing”, which are 
to be paid primarily by South Korea and the neigbours. There is evidence 
that  China tries to engage and encourage North Korea’s elite,  drawing 
their attention to the success of Chinese economic development.  There 
have been numerous visits of the top government representatives to the 
Chinese most developed economic zones, including the visit by Kim Jong 
Il in 2001 to Shanghai and to Beijing in 2006, when the North Korean 
representatives showed interest in economic management of the Chinese 
enterprises123.
However,  there  are  numerous  difficulties  of  North  Korea’s 
embarking the same reforms, combined with the deepening mistrust that 
China might interfere within the North Korean affairs, China believes that 
its valuable contribution would be to convince North Korea to create more 
business  opportunities  for  foreign  investors  and  introduce  adequate 
institutional changes. China itself has invested into building infrastructure 
in  the  bordering region,  including construction  of  several  new bridges 
across  the  Yalu  river  on  the  border  with  the  DPRK.  Besides  other 
enterprises, Chinese companies leased piers at the port of Rajin (in the 
Rajin-Sonbong free trade zone) to transport goods directly.
The Chinese policies  toward North Korea have long history and 
have undergone through changes in course of the last decade, also due to 
transformations  inside  China.  China  remains  interested  in  keeping  the 
status quo in the Korean peninsular and providing survival of the North 
Korea regime. Its primary goal is to avoid destabilization and collapse in 
122 Kim Youngho.  The Great  Powers  in  Peaceful  Korean Reunification //  International  Journal  on 
World Peace, Vol. XX. No. 3. September 2003. p. 11.
123 Beck Peter M., Reader Nicolas. China and North Korea. Comrades forever? Part II  ∕∕ Korea and 
World Affairs, Summer 2006. p. 226.
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the  DPRK.  A unified  Korea  may  pose  serious  threats  to  the  Chinese 
national interests through the increase of the US role in the region that 
may  impact  the  Taiwan  issue.  Formally  China  still  supports  peaceful 
reunification  of  Korea,  but  since  it  has  become  hesitant  about  its 
consequences and anxious about potential negative impact on its national 
security, the Chinese leadership rather advocates maintaining the status 
quo on the Korean peninsula124.
Meanwhile,  the  North  Korea’s  attitude  towards  China  has  been 
changing. The DPRK has never, even in the past, fully relied on China as 
a strategic partner and ally. Currently, the North Korean authorities prefer 
not to depend greatly on any country. China in this sense has discredited 
itself after the recognition of the Republic of Korea. North Korea could 
not rely on the Chinese security guarantees at the moment – and China 
itself  has  repeatedly  stressed  that  the  responsibility  under  the  1961 
security  treaty  is  not  automatic  –  even  if  cooperation  with  China  is 
essential for sustaining the North Korean economy.
China is interested in ensuring the continued survival of the North 
Korean regime, and on its it would likely remain eager to deliver political 
support  and security  guarantees  (though not  direct  as  according to  the 
1961) Treaty and material assistance. However, at least maintenance of 
the status quo and a partnership with China provides North Korea with a 
kind of security assurance. In this sense, the DPRK continues to rely on 
China:  thus  in  the  foreseeable  future  China  and  North  Korea  seem 
destined to remain close to, but uncomfortable with, each other.
China  has  played  a  crucial  role  in  organizing  the  negotiating 
process  of  the  Six-party  talks  in  Beijing.  It  has  used  its  unrivaled 
economic and political ties with the DPRK to convince it to negotiate the 
denuclearization issue in a multilateral format.  At the same time China 
124 Joseph  Yu-shek  Cheng.  China  and  the  Korean  Situation:  the  Challenge  of  Pyongyang’s 
Brinkmanship // East Asia, Winter 2003, p.53.
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has avoided using coercive methods towards North Korea. In principle, 
the six-party talks have become an appropriate format for resolving not 
only  the  nuclear  issue,  but  matters  related  to  creating  a  permanent 
peninsular peace regime. Each of the four major powers is responsible for 
Korea’s  division  and  is  interested  in  maintaining  stability.  However, 
North Korea fears that the six-party talks may become an arena of the 
strategic  battle  between the  great  powers  and  that  Pyongyang may  be 
pressured. The responsibility to host the six-party talks has been given to 
China since it is considered the nation with significant influence over the 
North. It has definitely granted considerable prestige to China.
The situation  on the Korean peninsular  remains  important,  since 
without the status quo in the region it  would be difficult  for  China to 
focus on its  modernization.  Thus,  China is highly unfavourable to any 
armed conflict  or abrupt changes on the peninsular. During the second 
nuclear  crisis  China  has  become  increasingly  concerned  about  the 
possibility of a military conflict on the peninsular. The Chinese authorities 
have taken an active stance in ensuring a peaceful outcome of the crisis 
and initiated a series of diplomatic steps in order to resolve the crisis. 
China’s perception is generally shared by other major powers involved, 
allowing it to play a rescuing role in crisis prevention. China has adopted 
the strategy of both bilateral and multilateral negotiations to address the 
North Korean nuclear issue and has even successfully managed to take the 
leading role in facilitating multilateral process. The Chinese initiative of 
the six-party talks has been crucial for the nuclear issue management and 
at the same time reflects the growing role of the Chinese diplomacy in 
determining the regional balance of power.
China stands for the denuclearization of the DPRK, but it has been 
reluctant  to  exert  pressure  on  North  Korea  on  the  matter.  Obviously, 
China alone does not possess an adequate influence leverage to persuade 
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North Korea neither to dismantle its nuclear programme nor to engage in 
economic reforms and open itself to the outside world. The Chinese self-
perception in the current world order, where many security and economic 
challenges  are  common  and  the  task  of  a  continued  economic 
development is crucial, is argued to identify its strategic diplomatic task 
of  improving  its  soft  power  and  upgrade  its  moral  image  within  the 
international community125. In the resolution of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis China has demonstrated itself  committed to the principles of the 
international  law,  promoting  dialogue  on  the  nonproliferation  and  the 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Though China is not inclined to 
press  North Korea  on the nuclear  issue  or  to  impose  and support  any 
sanctions against the DPRK, it is far from supporting the violations of the 
non-proliferation  regime,  thus  it  has  adopted  the  policy  of  continues 
engagement  of  North Korea that  allows to negotiate the matter.  China 
would  remain  committed  to  the  peaceful  settlement  of  the  nuclear 
problem and to  reforming the North Korea economy in the long term 
perspective.
2.4  Russia’s  position  on  maintaining  security  on  the  North  Korean 
peninsular
The history of bilateral relations between Russia and Korea dates 
back as  far  as  120 years.  The relations started in  the end of  the XIX 
century, when the Russian empire became close to the Kingdom of Korea, 
since the instability there could have posed challenges to Russian security. 
Since then Russia has been directly involved in the developments over the 
125 Yang Bojiang. Redefining Sino-Japanese Relations after Koizumi // The Washington Quarterly, 
29:4, Autumn 2006. p. 130.
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Korean  peninsula:  the  Russian-Japanese  war  broke  out  as  a  result  of 
contradictions  of  the  two  powers  over  Korea  and  Manchuria126.  After 
having been defeated in the war, Russia had to recognize Korea as part of 
the Japanese sphere of influence127.
In  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  the  Soviet  troops  in 
accordance with the decisions taken at the Yalta conference in February 
1945,  entered  in  war  with  Japan  and  fought  to  liberate  the  Korean 
peninsular from the Japanese troops. Later on, the USSR together with 
other great powers was participant of determining the future of the Korean 
nation and the Korean war of 1950-1953 and afterwards, in course of the 
system’ confrontation on the peninsular.
After the end of the Cold war a new system of relations over the 
Korean  peninsula  was  gradually  formed,  with  Russia  giving  no 
appropriate  significance  to  North  Korea  due  to  its  own  domestic 
confusing situation in the beginning of the 1990s and a strong ideological 
shift towards the pro-Western policy and integration in the international 
economy that had not permitted it for almost a decade to comprehend and 
assure  its  national  interests128.  In  the  1990s,  due  to  DPRK’s  isolated 
position  and  deep  economic  crisis,  serious  shortcomings  of  food  and 
energy and, eventually, after the death of the charismatic leader – Kim Il 
Song in 1994 – the collapse of the North Korean state seemed to be the 
matter of several years, which also had its impact on a passive stance of 
Russia  on  the  matter.  The  decrease  of  Russian  influence  over  North 
Korea, especially after the USSR had recognized the Republic of Korea in 
1990,  the  growing  mistrust  of  the  North  Korea  towards  Moscow 
contributed  to  creating  a  situation,  when  the  first  nuclear  crisis  of 
126 February 10, 1904-September 5, 1905.
127 The  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  was  signed  on  September  5,  1905.  The  text  is  available  at 
http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1914m/portsmouth.html.
128 Dealing with a totalitarian state was considered out of necessity: political, economic assistance and 
trade between Russia and the DPRK were cut.
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1993-1994 was  actually  settled  without  any Russia’s  engagement.  The 
role of Russia was, in fact, limited to that of an observer.
In course of the first  North Korean nuclear  crisis  Russia  mainly 
supported  the  position  of  the  USA,  for  instance   by  sustaining  the 
American initiative of adopting the UN Security Council  resolution on 
sanctions against the DPRK, which was later vetoed by China. Numerous 
attempts  taken  by  the  Russian  diplomacy  to  convince  North  Korea  to 
cooperate with the IAEA were perceived in Pyongyang as a common with 
the  USA  pressure  in  order  to  foster  the  DPRK  to  make  unilateral 
concessions129.  Russia  failed  to  implement  other  initiatives,  such  as 
getting the contract on supply of the light-water reactors of the Russian 
(Soviet)  type,  which were to be constructed in North Korea under the 
Framework  Agreement  of  1994.  The  DPRK  advocated  the  Russian 
reactors,  since  its  nuclear  programme  was  developed  with  the  Soviet 
Union’s assistance and its scientists were trained in the USSR. However, 
Russia  had  lost  the  opportunity  and  was  actually  excluded  from  the 
KEDO  consortium’s  activities  on  implementing  the  Framework 
Agreement of 1994.
While having reduced defense, industrial, food, and energy support 
to North Korea dramatically by the beginning of the 1990s, at the same 
time, the Russian leadership favoured a fast  rapprochement with South 
Korea to accelerate bilateral economic partnership in order to facilitate 
Russian  economy’s  recovery.  Throughout  the  first  decade  after  the 
collapse of the USSR Russia continued a pro-South Korean policy line, 
hampering any ties with Pyongyang. Russia’s support to the UN sanctions 
against  the  DPRK  during  the  first  nuclear  crisis  also  contributed  to 
aggravating its relations with North Korea. The security agreement with 
129 Torkunov A.V., Ufimtsev E.P. Koreiskaja problema: novii vzgljad (The Korean Problem: a New 
Outlook). Moscow.: Ankil, 1995. p. 183.
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Pyongyang  of  1961  was  claimed  obsolete,  since  Russia  was  no  more 
eager to lend support to the DPRK in case of a direct attack130.
Since  Russian  interests  were  actually  neglected  in  the  Agreed 
Framework of 1994 and, later on, Russia  was excluded from the four-
party talks – all these was perceived as an alarming factor of the demise 
of Russian influence. In the beginning of the 1990s the Russian position 
on the Korean peninsula and the possibility to influence the DPRK was 
very favorable and presumed Russia’s ability to be an efficient mediator 
in the settlement in order both to provide for its national interest and to 
facilitate  the  dialogue  between  all  the  parties  engaged.  However,  as  a 
result of an unbalanced pro-South policy and the lack of clear political 
priorities Russia lost considerably in its political and economic leverages 
over the North. By the late 1990s, therefore, Moscow began to reassess its 
pro-South  policy  and  to  call  for  a  more  balanced  policy  towards  the 
Korean peninsula.
Significant changes occurred in Russia’s national security strategy 
through the reassessment of various factors after President Vladimir Putin 
came to  the Presidential  office.  Stating that  fundamental  changes  took 
place in the strategic environment of the country the government had to 
introduce a series of foreign policies in order to strengthen its positions 
and gain possible benefits.
A  stimulating  momentum  arrived  from South  Korea,  where  the 
policy of “sunshine warm” – or engagement – was started by President 
Kim  Dae  Jung  together  with  an  attempt  by  North  Korea  to  improve 
relations  with  international  community.  The  rapprochement  with  the 
DPRK started in the end of the 1990s and the appeal by the South Korean 
president to engage North Korea created encouraging precondition for a 
shift in Russian policy towards Pyongyang. On the other hand, the North 
130 The DPRK-Soviet Union Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, July 11, 
1961.
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Korean  leadership  was  keen  on  improving  relationship  with  foreign 
countries,  which  also  created  a  favourable  opportunity  to  reestablish 
relations on a new level.
Russia took a course towards a more balanced relationship with the 
two  Koreas  and  hastened  to  normalize  relations  with  the  DPRK  that 
seriously  deteriorated  in  the  first  half  of  the  1990s.  At  the same time 
Russia continued to sustain its partnership with the Republic of Korea. By 
the time Russia was no longer considered a key player in resolving the 
Korean problem mainly as a result of its neglect of relations with a non-
democratic regime131.
The  renovated Treaty  on  Friendship,  Good-Neighborly  Relations 
and  Cooperation  between  the  DPRK  and  the  Russian  Federation  was 
signed  on  February  9,  2000.  The  previous  treaty  of  1961  concluded 
between the DPRK and the USSR presumed that a party to the Treaty was 
obliged to lend military support in case of war expired on June 10, 1996. 
The treaty of 1961 was replaced with a new DPRK-Russia Agreement on 
Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation signed on February 9, 
2000132.
The first summit between the leaders of Russia and the DPRK that 
was held in Pyongyang soon afterwards – in July 2000  for the first time 
that a Russian leader visited North Korea. The summit is considered one 
of  the  most  successful  steps  the  Russian  diplomacy  has  made.  The 
meeting  between  the  Russian  and  North  Korean  leaders  has  provided 
evidence of the inaccuracy of previously stated arguments that it was not 
possible to deal and negotiate with the DPRK. Another surprising point 
was the revelation that the role of the Russian Federation on the Korean 
peninsular that had been largely disregarded in the 1990s turned out to be 
131 Seung-Ho  Joo.  DPRK-Russian  Rapprochement  and  its  Implications  for  Korean  Security  // 
International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 8, No.1. 2000. p. 194.
132 The Russian Federation and the DPRK had agreed that the Treaty (2000) should not include a clause 
about mutual military assistance in case of an outside aggression.
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still considerable. The summit has become precious in the sense that it 
demonstrated  that  international  isolation  of  North  Korea  could  be 
overcome through engagement policy133.
Kim Jong Il made a return visit to Moscow and met President Putin 
in August 2001 (he made a remarkable journey by train that lasted more 
than a month) during which the leaders expressed common position on 
strengthening peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and their will 
to expand bilateral relationship. The summit concluded with signing of 
the Moscow Declaration, which was signed on August, 4th 2001134. The 
Declaration became a basis for the development of bilateral relations and 
contributed  to  the  international  efforts  over  the  security  issue  on  the 
peninsular.
The Moscow summit created momentum for progress in political 
and economic cooperation. The Declaration underline mutual intention to 
“… give concrete shape to agreements already reached between them on 
cooperation in trade and economy”, with a priority of reconstruction of 
the enterprises built with the USSR’s assistance and the railways linking. 
One of the projects currently in course is the common railway system that 
would  include  the  DPRK  and  the  Republic  of  Korea  and  further  the 
Russian  Trans-Siberian railway,  which besides of  producing a positive 
economic  effect  would  contribute  to  engaging  North  Korea  in 
international cooperation135.
Contemporarily, Russia has signed a long-term agreement with the 
Republic of Korea on supply of natural gas. The delivery is scheduled to 
be effected through a pipeline on the sea shelf or through the territory of 
the DPRK136. This project is also aimed at further engaging North Korea 
133 Toloraya G. Koreiskii poluostov i Rossija (Russia and the Korean peninsular) // Mezhdunarodnaya 
zhizn (International affairs), 2002. № 12. pp. 63-72.
134 The Moscow Declaration of the DPRK and the Russian Federation // The People’s Korea. 11 August 
2001.
135 The Moscow Declaration of the DPRK and the Russian Federation, points 5, 6.
136 Another common project is the first South Korean cosmonaut to be trained and fly into space on a 
Russian spacecraft in 2008.
92
in cooperation instead of advocating the regime’s collapse. In fact Russian 
is  advancing  in  strengthening  its  ties  with  the  ROK  –  the  increased 
technical,  scientific  and military cooperation testifies  this new level  of 
relationship.  President  Roh  Moo  Hyun  visited  Moscow  in  September 
2004 for consultations, during which the parties stressed common views 
they share on the main international politics issues137. The leaders signed a 
Russian-Korean  Joint  Declaration,  which  covers  numerous  areas  of 
bilateral  and  international  cooperation138.  Strengthening  political 
cooperation with the ROK can be attributed to the Republic of Korea’s 
effort to conduct a more independent from the USA foreign policy, but 
the rapprochement between Seoul and Moscow definitely contributes to 
increasing Russia’s impact on the peninsular and its engagement in the 
region.
Currently, the new relationship with the Korean states is based on 
the new policy of pragmatism:  the key Russian political and economic 
objectives  in  the Far  East  are  to  reduce  tensions,  re-establish  Russia’s 
presence and foster development of the Russian Far East, which cannot be 
achieved without re-engagement with the DPRK. For North Korea it is 
important that Russia is against liquidation of the political regime in the 
North and that it avoids imposing any solution or dictating conditions139.
For  Russia  it  is  important,  first  of  all,  to  ensure  stability  and 
development  in  the  region  of  North  East  Asia.  Obviously,  this  goal 
includes non-proliferation of the WMD, particularly acute in the North 
Korea case. In this light, Russia favoures transformation of the DPRK into 
a  nuclear  free,  friendly  and  economically  stable  state.  International 
community, especially the involved states should promote these changes, 
137 The International Herald Tribune, September 22, 2004.
138 Intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the study and use of space for peaceful purposes, 
abolishing visas for diplomatic passport holders. Agreement between Tatneft and LG Engineering and 
Construction on construction of an oil refinery and petrochemical plant. Credit agreements between 
Vneshtorgbank and the Export-Import Bank of Korea, etc.
139 See Bulychev  Georgy,  Vorontsov  Aleksander.  Korean  Peninsula:  Russia’s  Priorities  ∕∕  Russian 
Analytica, Volume 3, 2004. pp. 39-61.
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assuring North Korea their support in modifying its economy and gradual 
ideological  liberalization:  only in this  case  the DPRK may follow this 
path without counting on nuclear deterrence.
With the end of  the cold war the system of traditional  alliances 
collapsed  and  to  ensure  its  national  security  and  provide  for  national 
interests Russia had to adhere to the changing geopolitical environment in 
the  region.  Being  overwhelmed  with  domestic  problems  Russia  has 
considerably lost its weight in the Korean affairs, which, however, can not 
be attributed to the fact that it has abandoned its interests in the region. 
Russia  will  remain concerned over developments in Korea since it  has 
directs impact on sustainable development of the Russian vast region of 
the Far East140.  The possibility of direct military threat for the Russian 
Federation  in  the  region  can  rather  be  estimated  as  low.  However,  a 
potential military threat in the region remains due to local conflicts that 
could evolve into a regional conflict political, economic and ideological 
disagreements, which can be the international divergences over the North 
Korean nuclear programme and the future of the DPRK in general. The 
dominant  role of the USA in the region and growing weight  of China 
make the diminished impact  of Russian on regional affairs particularly 
evident.  The rising economic potential  of  China and South Korea also 
present a challenge for Russian economy in the Far East.
The role  of  the USA in Korean affairs  increased  after  it  almost 
unaided  managed  to  settle  the  nuclear  crisis  of  1993-1994  when  the 
Agreed framework between the USA and the DPRK was concluded141. 
Russia  protested  against  the  nuclear  agreement  for  not  having  been 
consulted about it. China determined its impact through acting as the only 
ally  of  North Korea that  remained.  The KEDO consortium framework 
also  excluded  Russia  from  promoting  its  interests  on  the  peninsular. 
140 Seung-Ho Joo. Russian Policy on Korean Unification in the Post-Cold War Era //  Pacific Affairs, 
Vol. 69, No.1. Spring, 1996, p. 40.
141 At the time Russian supported the US proposal of imposing UN sanctions against the DPRK.
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Actually,  the  role  of  Russian  Federation by the end of  the 1990s was 
limited to that of an observer whose interests were mainly ignored.
Russia advocates that it should be directly involved directly in any 
decision over the Korean Peninsula, thus emphasizing the importance of a 
multilateral approach as the USA recently does. Russia called upon the 
necessity of an international format of resolving the first nuclear crisis in 
the middle of the 1990s142. In fact, later on it has become clear that the 
bilateral  framework  could  not  be  applied  efficiently  to  resolving  the 
nuclear issue, since the parties engages are at least six. A common shared 
position  can  better  strain  the  DPRK to  terminate  its  nuclear  weapons 
programme.
Russia has been rather coherent in advocating gradual reduction in 
tensions  over  the  nuclear  issue  and  negotiation  strategy  as  the  only 
plausible  mean  of  resolution.  However,  after  the  nuclear  tests  and the 
announcement of withdrawal from eh NPT by the DPRK the position of 
Russia hardened. Russia supported the UN Security Council resolution on 
North Korea that imposed sanctions on it143. The Russia’s motivation of 
lending support  to  the Resolution  was  to  prevent  further  escalation  of 
tensions.  At  the  same  time,  Russia  insisted  on  including  on  the 
Resolution’s text a preposition underlining that “further decisions will be 
required, should additional measures be necessary”144 in order to ensure 
only  non-aggressive  measures  towards  the  DPRK.  The  final  aim  of 
adopting  sanctions  against  North  Korea  for  Russia  was  to  facilitate 
negotiation process and make the DPRK to resolve the issue through the 
six party talks145.  Officially it was sustained that negotiations were still 
142 In 1994 Russia proposed an eight-party talks initiative – North Korea, South Korea, Russia, the USA, 
Japan, IAEA and the UN Secretary General.
143 United  Nations  Security  Council  Resolution  1718  (2006),  14  October  2006.  –  available  at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf?OpenElement.
144 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), 14 October 2006, point 16.
145 Pismennoye interviju s meksikanskim izdatelem Mario Veskes Ragna (Written interview to Mexican 
editor Mario Vesces Ragna). December, 7th 2006. – available at the President of Russia official site 
http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2006/12/115090.shtml.
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possible  and  a  peaceful  resolution  had  to  be  reached.  The  Russian 
Federation’s  diplomatic  advance  was  based  on  contacts  with  other 
involved parties,  the United Nations, the UN Security Council  and the 
IAEA. Russia continues to advocate a possibility to conclude a pact with 
the DPRK by providing it with security guaranties and non-interference 
within its domestic affairs on the condition that it abandons its weapons of 
mass  destruction  programme.  The  reliability  of  any  deal  could  be 
sustained,  however,  only  through  international  guarantees  and  the 
interests of other parties considered.
Special  interests  of  the  Russian  Federation  on  the  Korean 
peninsular  are  connected  to  safeguarding  its  national  economic  and 
strategic interests, stability of the Far East Russian region. In case of a 
military stand-up massive investment effected in projects on oil, natural 
gas  and  transport  projects  in  the  Far  East  can  be  blocked  bringing 
economic decay in the region. The threat might cause migration form the 
region and damage demographic situation there146. Thus, maintaining the 
status quo is the policy’s priority and in the perspective – emergence of a 
united and neutral Korean state.
 In  this  light,  the  approach of  Russia  towards the North Korean 
problem can not be considered out of relationship with the Republic of 
Korea. In the long term Russia seeks strengthening ties with the South 
Korea, which would eventually lead also to a broader autonomy of the 
ROK in regional relations. Obviously, since the North Korean question 
and the future of the DPRK remains one of the central issues for the ROK, 
the common position with Russia,  that shares its engagement approach 
towards Pyongyang, remains essential. Russia and the Republic of Korea 
have close positions both on the issue of the nuclear programme – in the 
sense that  they believe that  the matter  should be negotiated peacefully 
146 Zhebin Alexandr. Jadernyi krisis v Koree I interesy bezopasnosti Rossii (The Nuclear Crisis on the 
Korean peninsular and Rusia’s Security Interests) //  Problemy Dalnego Vostoka (Problems of the Far 
East), No. 2, 2004, p. 21.
96
even in case of further nuclear tests – and on the issue of human rights in 
the DPRK, which they prefer to leave behind discussion.
Russian policy on the Korean peninsular from the end of the 1990s 
can generally be evaluated as successful. However, it remains a point of 
discussion, whether Russia has managed to undermine the influence of the 
USA and China on Korean affairs. Russian experts mainly estimate the 
recent policy course as pragmatic and positive, being hesitant on further 
perspectives of Russian influence due both to the place that Korea keeps 
in  the  scale  of  policy  preferences  (not  the  top  priority)  and  structural 
restrains in the regional policy Russia has to adhere to147. Official Russian 
policy towards the Korean peninsula is expressed in a series of documents 
and speeches made by the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
other officials, and in the Foreign Policy Concept (2000). In the latter the 
Korean  issue  is  given  little  space,  stating  the  “efforts  would  be 
concentrated on ensuring Russia with rightful participation in settlement 
of  the  Korean  problem,  on  maintaining  balanced  relations  with  both 
Korean states”148. The Concept thus states that the policy towards Korea 
would focus on guaranteeing Russia’s equal participation in the Korean 
issues  and  relations  with  both  North  and South  Korea.  This  policy  is 
mainly deliberated to concentrate on economic  cooperation with South 
Korea and on political and security cooperation with the DPRK.
Russian analysts share common opinion that the actual policy on 
the Korean peninsular does not correspond to the resources that Russia 
really possesses and that could be implied. In fact, both the DPRK and the 
Republic of Korea at the moment maintain stable relationship with the 
Russian  Federation  –  a  friendly  neighbor’s  relationship149.  Moreover, 
147 Dzhadan  Igor.  Jadrenaya  Koreja  //  Agenstvo  politicheskih  novostei (Political  News  Agency), 
November 1st, 2006. – available at http://www.apn.ru/publications/article10802.htm.
148 Unofficial translation. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, accepted by President V. 
Putin on September 28, 2000. Ministry of Foreign Affairs - http://www.mid.ru.
149 Georgy  Toloraya.  Vostochnoaziatskaya  strategiya  Rossii:  koreiskii  vizov  (Russia’s  East-Asian 
strategy: the Korean challenge) // Rossija v globalnoi politike (Russia in global politics). Volume 5, № 
6. November-December 2007, p. 169.
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engaging more deeply with Russia is considered to be beneficial for the 
Korean states that try to promote their more independent foreign policy 
courses  (in  case  of  the ROK – from the USA).  In  this  light,  a  closer 
relationship with Russia may act as a counterbalance of the other great 
powers’ politics in the region. Maintaining close ties with the DPRK and 
the  ROK  and  a  more  active  stance  in  the  negotiation  process  could 
enhance Russia’s strategic position in the region and enable it with further 
influential  leverages  in  other  regional  disputes  it  is  engaged  in.  In  it 
acknowledged, however, that there is a lack of political will to give more 
attention to the Korean issue recently. Up to the middle of the 1990s it 
was generally agreed that Russia was not able to engage in Korea due to 
the  lack  of  economic  resources  and  difficult  path  of  economic 
transformation  it  had  embraced  after  the  dissolution  of  the  USSR150. 
However, recently it is recognized that Russia possesses enough resources 
to be fully participant of the changes that occur on the Korean peninsular. 
Experts widely agree that there are no obstacles for a Russian leadership 
both on the Korean peninsular and in developing a concept of security and 
cooperation in the region of North East Asia151.
Concerning  the  second  North  Korean  nuclear  crisis,  Russia 
proposed the idea to hold the Six-party talks (2002), which contributed to 
creating an adequate international environment for the resolution of the 
issue.  Thus,  Russia  has  once  again  shown  interest  in  promoting  a 
multilateral  structure  in  the  North  East  Asia,  possibly  encouraging  a 
multilateral security system in the region. Currently, the North-East Asia 
lacks  any  regional  security  system  or  an  institutionalized  system  of 
regional cooperation: the relationships are mainly bilateral. Geopolitical 
changes  that  occurred after  the  end of  the cold  war  at  first  decreased 
150 See Bolyatko  A.V.  Dalnii  vostok:  v  poiskah  strategicheskoi  stabilnosti  (Far  East:  in  Search  of 
Strategic Stability). Moscow, Russian Academy of Science, Institute of the Far East, 2003. p. 161.
151 Georgy  Toloraya.  Vostochnoaziatskaya  strategiya  Rossii:  koreiskii  vizov  (Russia’s  East-Asian 
strategy: the Korean challenge) // Rossija v globalnoi politike (Russia in global politics), Volume 5, № 
6. November-December 2007, p. 170.
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Russian influence in the region, but from the beginning of the 21st century 
Russia has been constantly trying to increase its weight in the North-East 
Asia.  The  changes  in  the  regional  balance  of  power  due  to  the  rising 
potential of China have created a transitive situation, where other regional 
players have to acquire a flexible approach to be adjusted in line with the 
China’s development and ambitions. Close relationship with China and 
strategic partnership with the USA make Russia coordinate its position 
with other parts on the Korean issue as well. As a nuclear power Russia’s 
position  on  the  North  Korean  nuclear  programme  is  essential  and  its 
cooperation  for  safeguarding  of  the  NPT  regime  can  not  be  ignored. 
However, the impact of Russia has recently increased also through the use 
of “soft” power: negotiating agreements and joint economic projects with 
both DPRK and the ROK.
Definitely,  a  military conflict  on the Korean peninsula would be 
injurious  for  Russia’s  national  interest.  The  maintenance  of  domestic 
stability  and  stability  of  the  surrounding  international  environment  is 
crucial  for  the  country’s  development.  Russian  approach  to  the  North 
Korean nuclear programme consists in advocating observance of the NPT 
and  settling  any  disputes  through  negotiations.  There  is  also  the 
understanding that North Korea’s energy problems should be resolved in 
order to provide an adequate solution to the matter. In this light, Russia is 
eager to foster negotiations, advocate a multilateral approach and to act as 
a  mediator  if  needed to  prevent  possible  preemptive  military  strike on 
North Korea. On the other hand, Russia pursues a goal to promote the 
development the Russian Far East and the Siberian region with projects of 
transportation  (a  joint  Korean railway connected  to  the  Trans-Siberian 
railway) and joint energy projects pretending both economic benefits and 
an  enhanced  position  among  other  regional  powers.  Such  soft-powers 
policies dominate the Russian vision towards the Korean peninsula. It can 
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be  summarized  that  the  Russian  political  agenda  towards  the  Korean 
peninsular is shaped by the consideration of security issues and economic 
factors that are interrelated.
Part 3 Dealing with North Korea
3.1 The nature of conflict and resolution methods: asymmetric potential of 
a minor state vs. major powers
The core element of a conflict study is determining its content – the 
difficult interaction of social-political events and the conflict participants’ 
activities. The nature of political conflict has changed after the Cold war. 
Currently, the conflicts prevailing are those inside the states for control 
over resources and the asymmetric international conflicts between major 
states and the so called rogue states. The asymmetric potentials refer to 
relationship  between  incomparable  adversaries,  where  the  paradox 
consists in the fact that even the weaker can course serious damage and 
impose its conditions to the stronger152. Obviously, success of a weaker 
can not be determined by the logic of dominance of power, but rather 
attributed to efficient strategy and tactics it chooses.
152 Ivan  Arreguin-Toft.  How  the  Weak  Wins  Wars:  A  Theory  of  Asymmetric  Conflict  // 
International Security, 2001. Vol. 26. No 1.
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The  absence  of  a  peer  competitor  for  the  USA  has  created  a 
situation of the only superpower in world politics. However, if no state 
can  rival  the USA directly,  there  is  still  the  possibility  of  asymmetric 
conflicts,  when  the  threat  may  arise  from  the  possession  of  mass 
destruction technologies by the competitor. The conflict can be perceived 
as blackmailing against the major power (in this case – the USA and/or its 
allies) with the WMD. In this case, major powers become unable or have 
difficulties in defending themselves in the face of a potential threat and 
damage that result unbearable. In an armed conflict a minor state is unable 
to defeat a major state; however, it has become evident that minor states 
might succeed in managing the conflict and imposing conditions on major 
adversary. 
Power disparity conflict presumes that not only power factor, but 
various political, strategic, ideological and tactical factors matter in the 
outcome of a conflict153. One of the essential conditions for a minor power 
victory is the broad domestic support and legitimating of its goals in the 
conflict  inside the country. In this light,  democratic  power have major 
difficulties  in  finding  national  consent  for  a  war,  since  they  need  to 
present important justifications and actually, every difficulty might lead to 
public dissent and turn public opinion against the war. On the contrary, if 
a minor power with high mobilization potential  consolidate the society 
under the idea of a conflict necessary for providing its vital interests (of 
survival), may give it serious priorities in the conflict.
In  the  latter  type  of  contemporary  international  conflicts  the 
economic factor plays important role. It has been widely argued that since 
during the Cold war period ethnic, religious and racial conflicts had been 
temporarily  freezed,  with the changing international  environment  these 
disputes broke out. However, it should not be neglected that currently the 
153 Derek J. Clark, Kai A. Konrad. Asymmetric Conflict //  Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 
2007, Vol. 51 Issue 3, pp. 457-469.
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issue  of  control  over  natural  resources,  especially  –  the  strategically 
important energy resources – has emerged as one of the central premises 
for the rise of international and domestic conflicts154. In this light, minor 
powers, which do not possess adequate natural resources, are particularly 
challenged.
The issues of development, international economic cooperation and 
the probability of conflict have been the point of discussion between the 
advocates  of  liberal  approach  and  the  realism  in  the  international 
relations. Liberals believe that highly developed economic interchanges 
prevent trade partners from initiating an armed conflict, while the realism 
supporters  claim  that  states  prefer  to  seize  territories  and  resources 
especially  if  the  opponent  is  weak,  in  order  to  maximize  profits155. 
Following  this  logic,  in  case  of  an  asymmetric  potential,  economic 
contacts between asymmetric powers contribute to increasing argument 
between the parties.
The  “normative”  factor  contributed  to  initiating  conflicts: 
democracies  never fight  with each other,  but  against  minor  states  with 
authoritarian political regimes. In the XXI century the USA seem to have 
taken  the  leading  role  in  global  democratization  and  combating  non-
democratic  regimes.  Democracies  are  rather  eager  to  engage  in 
international conflicts in case of humanitarian interventions, safeguarding 
their security from terrorism-sponsoring states and in case of spread of 
weapons of mass destruction.
The humanitarian intervention argument and protection of human 
rights  have  apparently  become  a  justifiable  pretense  for  an  armed 
154 See Sandler Todd. Economic Analysis of Conflict //  The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2000. 
No 44 (6). pp. 724-725; Mark F. Giordano, Meredith A. Giordano, T. Aaron Wolf. International 
Resource Conflict and Mitigation // Journal of Peace Research, 2005. No 42 (1). pp. 47-65; John 
W. Maxwell, Rafael Reuveny. Resource Scarcity and Conflict in Developing Countries // Journal 
of Peace Research, 2000. Vol. 37 (3).
155 Edward D. Mansfield, Brian M. Pollins. The Study of Interdependence and Conflict: Recent 
Advances,  Open  Questions,  and  Directions  for  Future  Research  //  The  Journal  of  Conflict  
Resolution, 2001. No 45 (6).
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intervention  within  the  sovereignty  of  a  State156.  However,  after  the 
terrorist attacks in the USA the most appealing pretense has become that 
of  counter  fighting  international  terrorism157.  The  USA tested  the  new 
conflict  concept  over Afghanistan and Iraq,  conducting preventive war 
against terrorists and terror-supporting states. However, the USA, though 
the leader of combating international terrorism, has sought for a broad 
international approval and engagement.
North Korea has been referred to as one of such states. In case of 
the DPRK the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has 
become decisive together with the non-democratic type of the political 
regime for the crisis breaking out.
An  armed  conflict  involving  the  DPRK  is  agreed  to  present  a 
serious  challenge.  A  direct  comparison  of  military  potential  of  North 
Korea  and the  USA,  for  instance,  presumes  that  the  DPRK would  be 
defeated  in  a  direct  armed  collision.  However,  the  public,  almost 
unconditional support, for the political regime and for the idea of conflict 
with the outside powers, would present a powerful structural and stable 
characteristic,  which  would  almost  certainly  lead  to  a  sustainable  and 
protracted confrontation.
The conflict on the Korean peninsula has evolved different stages 
and can be characterized as multifaceted. Geographically, the conflict can 
be referred to as regional, since in its origin lay disagreement between the 
two Korean states. At the same time, the Korean conflict has its global 
dimension,  since  from  the  very  origin  and  for  decades  it  has  been 
influenced by the interplay of the major powers – initially, the USSR and 
the  USA,  which  landed  support  to  the  corresponding  allies  on  the 
peninsula.  The  Korean  peninsula  has  for  decades  been  reflecting  both 
156 Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun. The Responsibility to Protect // Foreign Affairs, 2002. No 81 
(6). p. 100.
157 Ulrich Beck. The Silence of Words: On Terror and War // Security Dialogue, September 2003, 
Vol. 34. Issue 3, pp. 255-268.
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regional dynamics of its direct parties and the transformation of the global 
political system158. Moreover, the routs of the Korean division in general 
lay in the systemic confrontation of the cold war period, when the Korean 
peninsula became one of the regional theaters of the global social-political 
conflict.
The period after the end of the Cold war was marked by significant 
changes in the geopolitical situation over the Korean peninsula. On the 
one hand,  despite  of  pessimistic  prognoses  of  the near  collapse of  the 
North Korean state, it has managed to survive and the Korean problem 
has formally remained what it previously was – the main interested parties 
are  the  DPRK  and  the  Republic  of  Korea,  which  struggle  over  the 
legitimacy of the national division and claim their rights of authority over 
the  whole  national  territory.  The  two  Korean  states  announced  the 
national  unification  as  their  primary  goal  and  rivaled  each  other  with 
economic development and increasing military capacities. However, the 
bilateral confrontation during the Cold war era was highly dependent on 
the international context.
The  Korean  peninsula  due  to  its  specific  position  in  the  region 
between China,  Japan  and on the border  with  Russia  has  been highly 
attractive as a sphere of influence for each of the major  powers, since 
exclusive dominating positions of one of them on the Korean peninsula 
could directly challenge security of the others. The powers involved have 
tried to exercise  their  own approaches to the resolution of  the Korean 
problem in accordance with their interests, resources and risks they might 
bear.  Thus,  in  the light  of  inevitable  presence  of  major  powers  in  the 
conflict,  the Korean states take maneuver to gain international backing 
158 Like in case of other regional conflicts of the Cold war, periods of détente in tensions between 
the two superpowers were marked by decrease of tensions and controversy between the two Korean 
states  –  such as  the North-South Joint  Declaration  of  July 4th,  1972. On the wake of  the new 
geopolitical  situation  right  after  the  Cold  war  had  ended,  North  and  South  Korea  signed  the 
bilateral Agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, cooperation and the Joint declaration on the 
nuclear-free Korean peninsula (1991).
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and  assure  support  or,  on  the  contrary,  diminish  dependence  on  great 
powers.
However,  despite  of  the continued existence  of  the  two rivaling 
stated on the Korean peninsula, the focus of international attention has 
been  gradually  shifting  after  the  end  of  the  Cold  war  towards  a  new 
international  political  situation  and  regional  balance  of  power.  The 
collapse of the Soviet Union has had a major impact on the situation in 
East-Asia  –  with  the  USA becoming  the  most  influential  actor  in  the 
region.
The  first  nuclear  crisis  on  the  Korean  peninsula  occurred  in 
1993-1994  in  the  framework  of  a  changing  international  environment 
after the end of the Cold war. The latent phase of the conflict dates back 
to the beginning of the North Korean nuclear programme development, 
but especially – to the end of the 1980s, when the DPRK joined the NPT 
(1985) and the question of the IAEA inspections to the country’s nuclear 
facilities emerged. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union international 
environment has changed unfavourably for North Korea – it has lost its 
main ally and economic  partner.  In the new circumstances the nuclear 
programme possibly acquired particular significance as it was seemingly 
able to provide additional guarantees for the political regime’s survival in 
the  North.  At  the  same  time,  the  revelations  of  unauthorized  nuclear 
developments  in  the  DPRK  challenged  the  effectiveness  of  the 
nonproliferation  regime  and  the  security  of  regional  powers  and  thus 
could not be tolerated by the international community. Formally, the first 
crisis broke out as a result of discrepancies between North Korea and the 
IAEA  regarding  the  correspondence  of  the  nuclear  programme  to  the 
norms of the Treaty and data evidence provided for the IAEA159.
159 See Fact  Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards (8 January 2003) International  Atomic Energy 
Agency – http://www.iaea.org.
INFCIRC/403.  Agreement  of  30  January  1992  between  the  Governments  of  the  Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of 
Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
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The crisis  was characterized by escalation of  tensions,  when the 
DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT in 1993 and the 
USA challenged North Korea with imposing sanctions and conducting a 
military operation. In the first nuclear crisis the United States deliberately 
took the role of the international nonproliferation regime guard and later 
on,  due  to  domestic  institutional  constraints  and  international 
responsibilities (including those before their allies in the region) could not 
refuse the mission of defending security on the peninsula.
At the same time, the crisis of 1993-1994 escaped from bringing in 
open hostilities as a result of other parties involved advocating a peaceful 
resolution. The crisis was resolved with signing of the Geneva Framework 
Agreement of 1994 between the DPRK and the USA, which set up the 
basis for the future regulation of the North Korean nuclear activities and 
prevented  its  unilateral  withdrawal  from  the  NPT.  However,  the 
Agreement presumed a temporarily deal aimed at preventing North Korea 
from further  advance  in  its  nuclear  weapons  programme,  but  did  not 
provide for the overall control of the nuclear capabilities of the DPRK – 
in  fact,  it  was  permitted  to  preserve  the  nuclear  materials  already 
processed until the two light-water reactors (LWR) were constructed160.
The resolution of the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis demonstrated that 
bargaining tactics of a minor state such as North Korea could be efficient 
and the country actually gained benefits from the resolution of the issue – 
through entering in a direct dialogue with the USA, creating a positive 
momentum,  attracting  international  attention  and  receiving  foreign 
assistance and aid – fostering contacts with South Korea (economic aid). 
Meanwhile,  the  settlement  of  1994  has  not  introduced  a  permanent 
mechanism of addressing the issue being in its core an exchange bargain. 
The  DPRK  agreed  to  stop  its  programme  in  exchange  of  economic 
160 Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea. Geneva, October 21, 1994 // Security Dialog, Vol. 26 (1), 1995.
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benefits – heavy oil supply and the two LWR’s construction and thus led 
to further exploitation of the nuclear factor as a political leverage: after 
the USA revealed their intelligence data of a secret uranium enrichment 
by the DPRK the heavy oil deliveries were terminated and North Korea 
announced  intention  to  re-launch  the  programme  of  constructing  its 
nuclear facilities161.
The  second  nuclear  crisis  was  marked  by  implying  significant 
multilateral  effort  to  settle  the  North  Korean  nuclear  issue  in  the 
framework of the Six-party talks. After a series of talks’ rounds, when a 
solution o even a partial agreement were deemed unreachable, in October 
of  2005 the  parties  signed  a  Joint  statement,  which  introduced a  path 
(though very extensive and sketchy) for the settlement. In February 2007 
the Joint statement received further progress, when tangible measures to 
arrive at a final resolution were elaborated. However, the deal to resolve 
the second nuclear crisis is based on the same premises as the Framework 
Agreement  of  1994 –  the DPRK assures  closing  its  suspected  nuclear 
facilities  and abandoning its  nuclear  weapons programme,  in exchange 
receiving energy assistance and further normalization of relations with the 
USA162.
During  the  second  nuclear  crisis  the  USA  were  capable  of 
conducting  a  military  operation  targeted  at  terminating  (or  seriously 
destructing) the North Korean programme, since the main nuclear object 
have been traced and are known. However, the response from the DPRK 
might have been attacking both the American military bases stationed in 
the region and the territory of its regional allies – Japan and the Republic 
of Korea – with nuclear and/or conversional weapons in its possession. In 
this  case,  the  casualties  –  both  military  and  civil  –  could  have  been 
161 Cotton James. The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis //  Australian Journal of International  
Affairs, 2003. Volume 57, Issue 2. p. 273.
162 The  major  difference  from  the  1994  Agreement  is  that  it  has  been  elaborated  with  the 
participation of the six parties and thus is guaranteed by them.
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estimated  as  too  numerous  to  make  such  an  advance.  In  this  light,  a 
preventive action may be considered necessary in case of a concrete and 
imminent military threat (the North Korea, even if  armed with nuclear 
weapons, does not pose such a threat to the USA)163. However, the threat 
posed by the possession of the WMD by the “rogue states” can foster and 
sponsor terrorist group, which as referred to as a threat to the US national 
security164. The negative experience of pre-emptive strikes’ policy in Iraq 
has made the Bush administration in the second term change approach 
towards a more cautious one and reconsiders diplomacy as a preferable 
option of the rogue states’ nuclear potential settlement. Evidently, when 
applied  to  Korean  peninsula,  the  option  of  military  prevention  is  less 
appropriate  and  a  diplomatic  engagement  with  emphases  primarily  on 
political instruments combined with deterrence results more favourable165.
Actually, during the second nuclear crisis the USA demonstrated 
preference for a diplomatic solution. Opting for peaceful solution might, 
however, imply some coercive measures, such as referring the matter to 
the UN Security Council and imposing sanctions on the DPRK. The non-
coercive  path  presents  its  difficulties,  limitations  and  structural 
constraints. For instance, China, South Korea and Russia have expressed 
themselves against economic sanctions and without their full participation 
the  efficiency  of  sanctions  would  be  restricted.  Another  important 
constraint  is  that the neighbour states – China,  the Republic of Korea, 
Russia and Japan claim denuclearization of the DPRK, but do not support 
of the settlement of the problem by military means.  
163 See Anthony Blinken.  From Preemption  to  Engagement  //  Survival, Vol.  45,  No.  4.  2003; 
Campbell, Kurt M.; Chollet, Derek. The New Tribalism: Cliques and the Making of U.S. Foreign 
Policy //  Washington Quarterly, Winter  2006/2007, Vol.  30 Issue 1;  Feinstein,  Lee;  Slaughter, 
Anne-Marie. A Duty to Prevent //  Foreign Affairs, January/February 2004, Vol. 83 Issue 1, pp. 
136-150; Litwak, Robert S. The New Calculus of Pre-emption //  Survival, Winter 2002, Vol. 44 
Issue 4; Ikenberry G. John. America’s Imperial Ambition – The Lures of Preemption //  Foreign 
Affairs, September/October 2002, Vol. 81 Issue 5, pp. 44-60.
164 George W. Bush. The State of the Union Address. Washington, DC: The White House, January 
29, 2002.
165 Victor  D.  Cha.  Hawk  Engagement  and  Preventive  Defense  on  the  Korean  Peninsula  // 
International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1. 2002. pp. 40-78.
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The hegemonic stability and power-transition theories have set out 
the issue of  non-military basis  for  major  powers’  dominating  in world 
politics.  A hegemonic dominance could rather  be accepted as far  as it 
provides certain advantage for the weaker, such as security and favourable 
economic  conditions  for  development,  possible  –  an  economic 
assistance166. These are the conditions which the DPRK actually has put 
before the USA as a precondition for a final and ultimate dismantlement 
of its nuclear weapons programme.
3.2 Efforts to resolve North Korean nuclear issue through the Six-party 
negotiations
The first nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was resolved with 
signing of the Geneva Agreed Framework between North Korea and the 
United States in 1994. However, the issue became acute again in October 
2002, when the DPRK disclosed its programme of uranium enrichment. 
In order to settle the second North Koreas nuclear crisis that emerged in 
2002, previous agreements are to be considered. The Agreed Framework 
of 1994 between the USA and the DPRK provided North Korea’s return 
in the Non-Proliferation Treaty membership, but no the return to a full 
membership in the sense that the actual status of its nuclear programme 
had not been verified. Controls were to be made after the two light water 
reactors  were  constructed  by  KEDO  –  the  Korean  Peninsula  Energy 
Development  Organization.  In  fact,  these  shortages  of  the  Agreed 
framework contributed to the outbreak of the second crisis on the Korean 
peninsula.  North  Korea  reconsidered  the  economic  assistance  (energy 
supply) as insufficient, while the USA introduced a new requirement – a 
complete, verifiable and irreversible, dismantlement167.
166 Margit  Bussmann,  John  R.  Oneal.  Do  Hegemons  Distribute  Private  Goods?  //  Journal  of  
Conflict Resolution, February 2007, Vol. 51 Issue 1, pp. 88-111
167 James  Cotton.  Whither  the  six-party  process  on  North  Korea?  //  Australian  Journal  of  
International Affairs, September 2005. Vol. 59, No. 3, p. 278, 
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The DPRK first  threatened to  withdraw from the  NPT in  1993. 
However,  when  it  declared  its  withdrawal  in  2003,  the  international 
context had changed. At the same time the limitations a partial settlement 
agreement  –  such  as  the  agreed  Framework  of  1994  –  were  to  be 
reconsidered and a new plan of action introduces to arrange the problem. 
The  American  policy  shifted  to  counter-proliferation  and  combating 
terrorism and pre-emptive measures.
In spite of the USA advocating hard line approach towards North 
Korea, the negotiation strategy prevailed as a peaceful option for settling 
the problem168. 
The first round of the Six-party talks was held in Beijing on August 
27-29, 200, the second and the third rounds - on February 25-28 and on 
June 23-26, 2004 respectively. The first three rounds of the Six-party talks 
did not result in any concrete decisions169. The talks demonstrated a deep 
comprehension  gap  and  mutual  distrust  between  North  Korea  and  the 
United States. The USA from the very beginning demanded a complete, 
verifiable,  irreversible  dismantling  of  the  North  Korean  nuclear 
programme (CVID), naming it  as a necessary pre-condition for  further 
negotiation and a possible economic assistance and normalization with the 
North, while the DPRK pretended corresponding incentives in the form of 
a  simultaneous  exchange for  freezing it  nuclear  facilities  and allowing 
inspections.
Conditions under which any new agreement on the nuclear issue 
was  to  be  achieved  implied  providing  an  internationally  controlled 
verification of the effective nuclear status of the DPRK, with the IAEA’s 
role essential. The IAEA possesses mechanism of control and expertise 
and is a fundamental part of the NPT regime. A multilateral mechanism 
formula  had  to  be  found  for  managing  both  nuclear  issue  (peaceful 
168 See Jung-Hoon Lee, Chung-in Moon. The North Korean Nuclear Crisis Revisited: The Case for 
a Negotiated Settlement // Security Dialogue, June 2003, Vol. 34, Issue 2. pp. 135-151.
169 On April 23-25, 2003 North Korea admitted possessing nuclear weapons.
110
development of nuclear facilities) and providing security assurances for 
Pyongyang.
At the starting point, there were numerous obstacles for providing a 
comprehensive compliance of North Korea with the NPT regime. First, a 
broad  and  supported  by  all  the  negotiating  parties’  international 
agreement was to be achieved. The issue of sanctions and/or incentives to 
North  Korea,  as  well  as  the  issue  of  economic  assistance,  should  be 
agreed  between  the  parties  involved  in  order  to  avoid  uncoordinated 
policy steps which lead to counterproductive measures170.  In fact North 
Korea agreed to participate in the international negotiation mechanism, 
comprehending  that  the  United  States  would  not  accept  a  bilateral 
nonaggression  pact  (neither  they  accepted  a  proposal  of  bilateral 
negotiations  in  2003)  and  a  multilateral  framework  was  necessary  to 
guarantee the regime’s survival through mutual cooperation.
The  nations  concerned  expressed  themselves  in  favour  of 
institutionalization  of  the  Six-party  talks.  The  security  issues  that  are 
involved present direct challenges for the stability in the region and in this 
light  the  nations  involved  would  face  economic  and  political 
consequences that can be avoided only through cooperation. There is an 
understanding that North Korea would not renounce nuclear capabilities 
on an unconditioned basis (unless it would be an abrupt collapse, which is 
highly undesirable).  Obviously,  the lack of mutual  confidence  presents 
political  challenges,  which  might  repeatedly  lead  to  delays  in 
implementing  any agreement  or  solution on the matter  and result  in  a 
stalemate.
The  Six-party  talks  were  also  expected  to  become  a  regional 
multilateral  confidence-building instrument.  However,  for  several  years 
170 The Republic of Korea is engaged with the DPRK and submits valuable economic assistance to 
it, so the first-term Bush administration’ s approach to Seoul as an marginal party to ay deal or 
agreement on North Korea resulted in complicating South Korean activities there and a critical 
situation in the USA-ROK bilateral relations.
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the disillusions about the efficiency of the negotiation mechanism were 
growing, since in 2 years of talks no progress was made and the regional 
security so far was continuously challenged with the unresolved nuclear 
issue.  Especially,  with  the  North  Korean  declaration  of  having 
manufactured additional nuclear weapons and suspending its participation 
in the talks on 10 February 2005 it seemed that the mechanism had failed.
Discontinuity of positions of the five parties on the matter and the 
means of settlement, which did not fully correspond with each other on 
essential issues, such as the issue of sanctions – China, the Republic of 
Korea and Russia advocate economic assistance to North Korea, while the 
United  States  and  Japan  stand  for  the  opposing  –  also  contributed  to 
hampering the negotiation process.
Finally, the fourth round of the six-party talks resulted in signing of 
the Joint Declaration171, which described a broad plan of settling the North 
Korea nuclear problem. However, the agreement introduced only a set of 
goals  to  be  specified  and  implemented  in  the  future.  Evidently,  the 
declaration represented important concessions and agreement reached by 
the negotiations’ parties, especially – by the USA and the DPRK.
It has been acknowledged that the Joint Declaration of 2005 was 
achieved due to the active pressure from China172. The role of China in the 
Six-party  talks process  has been constructive and consistent.  From the 
very emergency of the new nuclear crisis in 2002 China became an active 
mediator  between  Washington  and  Pyongyang  supporting  the  idea  of 
direct  contact  between  them.  The  first  attempt  to  hold  trilateral  talks 
(DPRK- USA-China) ended without any progress. Further on, the idea of 
a  broader  multinational  format  found support  both  in  Washington and 
Pyongyang. China acted as an active facilitator and hosted all the rounds 
171 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing,  September 19, 2005. – 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm.
172 Zhebin  A. Peregovory po jadernoi  probleme na Koreiskom poluostrove:  promezhutochniyev 
itogi (Negotiations Regarding the Nuclear Problem on the Korean Peninsula: Interim Results) // 
Problemi Dalnego Vostoka (Far Eastern Affairs), №1, 2006. p.54.
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in Beijing and its effort has been invariably acknowledged by the other 
parties. However, the Six-party talks process and the Chinese mediating 
role  have  demonstrated  various  constraints  of  the  Chinese  potential  to 
influence North Korea.
The  USA  on  their  part  agreed  not  to  attack  the  DPRK  with 
conventional  weapons (the Agreed Framework of  1994 contained non-
attack with nuclear weapons). The DPRK promised to abandon its nuclear 
weapons,  but  to  maintain  the  right  of  peaceful  use  of  atomic  energy. 
However,  the  elusive  character  of  the declaration’s  provisions  and the 
absence  of  any  time  references  on  when  the  declaration  would  be 
implemented  made  the  results  of  the  fourth  round  of  talks  rather 
preliminary than conclusive.
After the Joint Declaration was signed the general atmosphere over 
the  problem  deteriorated:  the  USA  approach  remained  that  of 
implementing  the  declaration  with  the  previous  condition  of  the 
“complete,  verifiable,  and  irreversible  dismantling”  of  the  nuclear 
programmes and concessions (such as normalization of relations) were to 
be made only after the abandon.
Soon  afterwards  the  negotiations  seemed  to  have  come  to  a 
standstill,  since North Korea refused to participate in the talks until the 
USA  maintained  their  accusations  of  the  DPRK’s  participation  in 
currency counterfeiting – the North Korean accounts in Banco Delta Asia 
in Macau were freeezed.
When  consenting  to  participate  in  the  talks,  North  Korea 
demonstrated  that  it  did  not  intend  to  give  up  its  nuclear  programme 
without any adequate retribution in turn. At least,  the demand was the 
construction  of  light-water  reactors  and  abandon  of  a  hostile  policy 
toward the regime on behalf of the United States. The USA, on their part, 
stressed  the  importance  of  the  human  rights  issue  and  the  counterfeit 
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currency problem as well  as  stopping production of  missiles  and their 
exports, eliminating chemical and bacteriological weapons, renouncing to 
terrorism and exports of drugs173.
However,  the  American  negative  position  on  the  character  of 
political regime in Pyongyang is believed to have represented the most 
difficult stumbling block to be overcome in course of the settlement. To 
reach any stable and protractive solution of the nuclear problem the North 
Korean authorities should have been first of all reassured that there were 
no intention on behalf of the USA and its allies to overthrow the political 
regime  in  the  country.  The  outcome  of  the  insensitive  labeling  of  the 
North  Korean  regime  would  obviously  lead  to  a  stalemate  in  any 
negotiating  process   mutual  insulations  are  not  desirable  in  any 
negotiations.
The breakthrough in the Six-party talks process occurred on the 13th 
February 2007: in line with the previously agreed Joint Declaration of 
2005 the “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” 
were signed, under which Pyongyang agreed to shut down the Yongbyon 
nuclear facility and admit inspectors for verification within 60 days174.
The retribution was energy aid and security assurances. In the first 
phase  North  Korea  was  to  obtain  a  million  tons  of  heavy  fuel  oil  in 
exchange of  freezing  its  plutonium production in  Yongbyon.  The  first 
50,000 tones of heavy fuel oil were delivered by the Republic of Korea 
shortly after the deal had been reached. North Korea allowed the IAEA 
inspectors to return on its nuclear facilities to verify them freezed.
The second phase began with the October 3, 2007 agreement on the 
second phase actions – “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of 
the  September  2005  Joint  Statement”175,  when  the  DPRK  agreed  to 
173 Zhebin, p.55.
174 Special Report 07-013A: February 13th, 2007 Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint 
Statement - http://www.nautilus.org.
175 Policy  Forum  Online  07-075A:  October  4th,  2007.  Second-Phase  Actions  for  the 
Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement - http://www.nautilus.org. 
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disable all existing nuclear facilities, starting with disabling the three core 
facilities  at  Yongbyon by the end of  2007 and to  provide  a  complete 
declaration of its nuclear programs. The latter had not been submitted in a 
due form until  recently (February 2008) according to the evaluation of 
Christopher Hill, the USA Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs176. However, since the DPRK remains committed to the process 
(providing assistance in disabling the nuclear facilities and verification of 
the results) the issue has been given time to develop positively.
In change the delivery of 950,000 tons of fuel oil was agreed. The 
delivery  was  agreed to  be  provided  by  the  end of  2007,  but  was  not 
completed. Until recently North Korea has received about 200,000 tons of 
heavy fuel oil, provided by China, Russia, the ROK and the United States 
(Japan rejected assistance on this stage). The strategy chosen has been a 
gradual exchange of mutual concessions – as the DPRK fulfills its part of 
commitments, the Six-party states fulfill their obligations.
The 2007 deal  is  argued to have been reached due to reciprocal 
necessities  both  in  North  Korea  and  the  USA.  The  former  needed  its 
accounts  in Macao unfrozen,  while the latter  found itself  in a difficult 
situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, which influenced the ruling Republican 
Party losses in the national midterm elections in November 2006177.
Specifics  in  positions  of  other  Six-party  talks  parties  have  also 
implied additional difficulties for negotiations’ progress. For example, the 
Japanese claim of including the issue of abduction of the Japanese citizens 
by the DPRK secret  services in the 1970s caused criticism from other 
participants  as  unproductive  for  the  negotiations  process  (with  the 
exception of the USA). The criticism aroused form the fact that Japan that 
176 Status of the Six-Party Talks for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Christopher R. 
Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Statement Before the Senate Foreign 
Relations  Committee,  Washington,  DC.  February  6,  2008.  - 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2008/02/100069.htm.
177 See Crisis  Group  Asia  Briefing  N°62,  30  April  2007,  After  the  North  Korean  Nuclear 
Breakthrough: Compliance or Confrontation? p. 2.
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actually  would  be  directly  rivaled  in  case  of  further  uncontrolled 
development  of  the  North  Korean  weapons  programme,  had  put  the 
abduction issue as a pre-condition for the normalization of relationship 
with the DPRK thus stalling the peaceful process. Such an approach may 
be attributed to the very contingent position of Japan of being a party 
concerned, but not a primary negotiator from the North Korea’s point of 
view178. At the same time, since the resolution of the abductions issue has 
been claimed a prerequisite to the Japanese further economic contribution 
in a general agreement of the nuclear settlement, it can not be avoided.
In  contrast,  the  Republic  of  Korea advocates  engagement  policy 
towards  the  North  and  employed  the  February  2007  agreement  as 
justification for recommencing aid to the DPRK not in a full compliance 
with the progress of the implementation of the deal.
The new deal has been disapproved of adopting the same strategy 
as that of the failed Agreed Framework of 1994, when North Korea had 
been rewarded with concessions without prior verification of the status of 
its nuclear programme. However, the significance of the agreement that 
has set up a new arrangement towards resolving the North Korean nuclear 
problem in  a  peaceful  way  should  not  be  put  into  doubt.  The  major 
difference  from the  1994  agreement  is  its  multilateral  character  –  the 
agreement  has  been  reached  in  the  frame  of  the  Six-party  talks 
negotiations.  Another  significant  distinction of  the  2007 deal  is  that  it 
presumes  not  a  one-time  exchange  of  actions  (dismantling  nuclear 
facilities  in  exchange  of  economic  aid),  but  a  gradual  set  of  actions 
targeted at any further actions in exchange of adequate concessions.
The  issue  of  verification  presents  most  apparent  challenges. 
Inspections might require several years. The USA pretends an extensive 
verification of the North Korea’s abandonment of the nuclear weapons 
178 Kuniko Ashizawa. Tokyo’s Quandary, Beijing’s Moment in the Six-Party Talks: A Regional 
Multilateral Approach to Resolve the DPRK’s Nuclear Problem // Pacific Affairs, Volume 79, No. 
3. Fall 2006. p. 413.
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program. In controlling the 1994 Agreement implementation the IAEA 
faces  numerous  difficulties  in  monitoring  and verifying the process  of 
denuclearization of North Korea. The IAEA is likely to meet the same 
obstacles  from he Korean part gain, such as restricting access to some 
facilities  and  concealing  information,  which  would  prevent  form 
obtaining a clear  evidence of the actual status of the nuclear program. 
What is more important the demand has been of initial actions to be taken 
by  the  DPRK,  which  would  come  prior  to  all  further  economic  and 
political concessions from the other side179. The DPRK links progress to 
lifting sanctions against them and insists on its right to maintain nuclear 
facilities for energy purposes.
North Korea, on the one hand, and the United States and Japan, on 
the other,  have stated their intentions to take steps toward normalizing 
relations.  However,  as  it  has  become  evident  the  USA  consider 
concession  form Pyongyang  in  other  realms  –  such  as  that  of  human 
rights, counterfeit of the U.S. dollars, cigarettes and pharmaceuticals, drug 
production  and  trafficking,  etc.  –  as  a  precondition  to  normalization 
despite  of  the  nuclear  problem.  Pyongyang  refutes  all  accuses,  but  it 
might make the normalization process even more complicating.
The DPRK has estimated the removal  from the US list  of states 
sponsoring terrorism and the termination of the application to it of the 
Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) as well  as lifting sanctions as a 
necessary  precondition  for  such  normalization.  However,  institutional 
procedure for such a removal in the USA Congress is lengthy and requires 
a lot of scrutiny in order to approve de-listing of a nation; in case of North 
Korea  it  can  rather  occur  after  denuclearization180.  The  February  13 
agreement contains the plan to remove the DPRK from the terrorism list 
179 Robert A. Scalapino. In Search of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding the Korean 
Peninsula - Challenges and Opportunities //  American Foreign Policy Interests, 2006. Vol. 28. p. 
376.
180 See Crisis  Group  Asia  Briefing  N°62,  30  April  2007,  After  the  North  Korean  Nuclear 
Breakthrough: Compliance or Confrontation? p. 6.
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and later on it has been agreed that the removal would occur with the 
completion  of  the  second  phase  of  the  agreement’s  implementation  – 
when the North would have disabled its plutonium facilities at Yongbyon. 
However, the deadline has been missed and the conclusion of haltering 
North Korea facilities at Yongbyon delayed and the DPRK has not yet 
presented a full report on its current nuclear programs181. Since, the issue 
of removal has been postponed until the process under the second phase is 
not completed182. Meanwhile, analysts suggest that the USA should abide 
by their agreement to remove the DPRK from the list, since fulfilling this 
obligation  would  allow  successful  implementation  of  the  whole 
agreement with the DPRK and would not bring it to a stalemate183.
The  most  challenging doubt  is,  however,  if  the  DPRK seriously 
intends to abandon its nuclear weapons programme. It has become evident 
that  a  strategy  of  a  simultaneous  abandon  in  change  of  economic 
incentives has failed (1994 Agreed Framework).  A gradual  progress is 
believed to be more efficient – accompanied by rigorous monitoring and 
verification followed.
To be committed to the negotiation process North Korea should be 
offered satisfactory guarantees of regime survival together with economic 
assistance. Russian and South Korean experts for long have stressed the 
importance of separating such issues as human rights and other form the 
most  important  argument  –  the  denuclearization  of  North  Korea  –  as 
impeding  the  progress  on  the  matter.  The  USA  and  Japan  with  its 
abduction issue maintained another strategy.
3.3 Scenarios for the North Korean regime
181 In the view of the DPRK it has already submitted a complete report on its nuclear programmes.
182 Christopher R. Hill. “...the U.S. action …will depend on the DPRK’s fulfillment of its Second-
Phase  commitments  on providing a  complete  and  correct  declaration  and  disabling its  nuclear 
facilities, as well as on satisfaction of legal requirements”.
183 CRS Report for Congress RL30613, Larry Niksch, Raphael Perl. North Korea: Terrorism List 
Removal? January 14, 2008. - http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08008CRS.pdf.
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Notwithstanding the progress of the Six-party talks and a gradual 
settlement of the nuclear problem that lasted for almost a year without any 
significant deadlocks, the matter of reliability of the DPRK as a partner 
and its desire to cooperate remain under suspicion.
The  fact  is  that  North  Korea  continued  to  be  an  exceptionally 
closed  political  regime  and  seeks  to  control  every  sphere  of  outside 
interference with its policies and related issues. Much has been spoken 
about  unpredictability  of  the  DPRK’s  policies  and  about  the  most 
adequate strategy to be implied towards the North to assure that it remains 
committed to its obligations. There are still  concerns that North Korea 
would  persist  on  maintaining  nuclear  potential  as  a  guarantee  of  its 
security. The first obvious measure to control the DPRK is supervising its 
access to double-use technologies,  which is being in part  implemented 
under the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 1718184.
The strategy of dealing with North Korea is strictly connected to 
the overall vision of applying an adequate and efficient strategy towards 
the states that proliferate weapons of mass destruction. The Korean issue 
is even more complicated – the DPRK has been included in the list of the 
states  sponsoring  terrorism,  violating  human  rights  and  proliferating 
nuclear weapons. The resolution of the problem of nuclear proliferation 
could be based at applying principles of international law, corresponding 
arms control agreements, regimes and international control.
Preventing further production of nuclear-relative materials such as 
plutonium  or  enriched  uranium  is  the  prior  goal  in  controlling 
proliferation. This could be potentially done both by diplomatic and/or 
coercive measures. 
The international Non-proliferation regime has been criticized for 
its  inconsistence  with  modern  realities  and  inadequate  instruments  it 
184 S/RES/1718 (2006).
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possesses to control horizontal proliferation185. However, the experience 
of  successful  abandon  of  nuclear  weapons  by  the  ex-Soviet  states, 
Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and others occurred in compliance with 
the  NPT  and  the  factor  of  being  accepted  and  integrated  in  the 
international community served as an important motivation186.
 The Six-party talks have demonstrated differences in approaches to 
the  resolution  of  the  North Korean nuclear  issue  and the strategies  of 
dealing with the DPRK by the parties except  for  the common goal  of 
denuclearization  and  preventing  a  sudden  collapse  of  North  Korea 
(especially, the neighbouring states). The issue of discussion remains the 
question whether it is necessary to transform the regime in the DPRK and 
if it is possible. Different interests dictate various approaches, however, 
the North Korean state by itself is a unique entity and an able international 
player that has come close to possessing nuclear weapons and managed to 
bargain  economic  benefits  and  security  assurances  in  exchange  of  its 
decision to stop the nuclear weapons programme.
The  strategies  of  addressing  the  nuclear  issue  and  the  whole 
problem of North Korea can be summarized in two main streamlines – 
military  settlement  and  peaceful  resolution  –  with  particular  policy 
options chosen for each of them.
Military  settlement was  seriously  considered  by  the  USA in  the 
period of the first nuclear crisis and reconsidered in the variant of pre-
emptive attack during the second. Thus, it could not be neglected, since in 
spite  of obviously devastating consequences it  may cause,  this  type of 
solution might be potentially applied in case of a deadlock of a peaceful 
process. The experience of military campaigns lead by the USA in Iraq 
185 Regarding the NPT and policy option of addressing nuclear  proliferation see: Stephen Peter 
Rosen. After Proliferation // Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006, Vol. 85, Issue 5. pp. 9-14; 
George Perkovich. Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation //  Foreign 
Affairs, March/April 2003, Vol. 82, Issue 2. pp. 2-8.
186 Ashton B. Carter. How to Counter WMD // Foreign Affairs, September/October 2004, Vol. 83 Issue 
5, p. 75.
120
and Afghanistan  demonstrated  limitation  of  target  strikes,  but  they are 
able to seriously destruct, if not destroy the nuclear facilities of the North.
However,  the challenges of  implementing a  military solution are 
reciprocal measures that might be undertaken by the North Korean forces 
and  rival  the  territories  of  the  neighbouring  states  as  well  as  the  US 
military bases there. In this light it would be difficult to get consent for 
any military operation against the DPRK from the Republic of Korea and 
Japan (as well as China and Russia, which expressed against any coercive 
military measures).
In  course  of  both  nuclear  crises  on  the  Korean  peninsular  non-
military  approaches prevailed.  However,  these  approaches  also  imply 
serious difficulties for the parties involved as the matter has been in fact 
the actual acquisition of the DPRK of nuclear weapons and positioning 
itself as a de facto a nuclear power.
The peaceful  approach of  dealing with the DPRK presumes two 
main policy lines – engaging North Korea or containing it.
The engagement policy has been conducted by the South Korean 
government  since  2000 under  the  name  of  the  “Sunshine  policy”  and 
“Peace  and  prosperity  policy”.  The  strategic  calculation  bases  on  the 
premise that it is necessary to reassure the North Korean regime, since it 
lacks  security  guarantees  and  thus  has  adapted  a  hostile  policy  and 
produces  nuclear  weapons187.  Once  engaged  and  included  in  the 
international community and international economic exchanges (that have 
been considerably undercut after the collapse of the Soviet Union), the 
DPRK might return to the path of a peaceful coexistence with the outside 
world and the nuclear threat would be diminished.
Many American experts have examined the option of engagement 
combined with deterrence activities as the most adaptable to the North 
187 Robert  A.  Scalapino.  Inter-Korean  Rapprochement:  Issues  to  Be  Confronted  //  American 
Foreign Policy Interests, August 2001, Vol. 23, Issue 4. pp. 231-239.
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Korean case188. The “hawk engagement” implies a pragmatic engagement 
strategy  targeted  at  rewarding  a  regime  in  order  to  have  leverages  of 
influence over it,  simultaneously having the process  under control  and 
being able to react in another way if necessary. Victor D. Cha has pointed 
out at  certain advantages of such strategy: first,  “carrots” may become 
“sticks” and used against the regime (cutting economic incentives might 
be convincing): second, it is believed that foreign aid contributes to the 
process of the ruling political regime’s loosing public support; third, in 
case of policy failure it  would be easier  to create a coalition and take 
punitive measures189.
The hawk engagement approach gained support in the second term 
of the Bush administration190. This was a more balanced and moderated 
approach,  which  concerned also  the  interests  of  the USA allies  in  the 
region and sought for a broader international support. In fact,  applying 
this strategy proved to be successful and the process of gradual settlement 
of  the  North  Korean  nuclear  problem  was  launched  with  the  Joint 
Declaration of 2005 and the following “Initial steps” in February 2007. 
The tolerance that the USA demonstrated towards the DPRK throughout 
the year 2007 demonstrates a significant shift in policy approach in favour 
of a conditional engagement191.
Another  strategic  option  is  the  policy  of  containment,  aimed  at 
isolating and containing North Korea and the nuclear threat it poses until 
it  either  changes  its  policy  or  the  political  regime  in  the  DPRK  is 
collapsed (changes).  The instrument  of  this  strategy is  sanctions  to  be 
188 Victor  D.  Cha.  Hawk  Engagement  and  Preventive  Defense  on  the  Korean  Peninsula  // 
International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1. 2002. pp. 40-78.
189 Victor D. Cha, David C. Kang. The Debate over North Korea //  Political Science Quarterly, 
Volume 119, Number 2. 2004. p. 249.
190 Among those who advocated of the more pragmatic approach were Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, 
and Condoleezza Rice.
191 See Status of the Six-Party Talks for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Christopher 
R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Statement Before the Senate Foreign 
Relations  Committee,  Washington,  DC.  February  6,  2008.  - 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2008/02/100069.htm.
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imposed  on the  military  related  activities  of  the  North,  controlling  its 
external logistic flows. However, such strategic approach to be efficient 
would need to rest upon broad international consent to make sanctions 
irresistible.  South  Korea,  China  and  Russia  would  hardly  support  this 
course, targeted at dramatic transformations inside the DPRK, worsening 
its  economic  conditions  and  causing  flows  of  migrants  in  the 
neighbouring  countries.  In  fact,  the  first  term  Bush  administration 
conducted  a  policy  course  very  close  to  the  strategy  of  isolation  and 
containing Pyongyang, while the Republic of Korea put significant effort 
in engaging with the North. This policy contradiction resulted in surge of 
anti-American  feelings  in  the  South  and overcoming  the  discrepancies 
among allies was a challenge for the future of the alliance192.
A  hard-line  approach  towards  North  Korea  dominated  the  USA 
policy  in  the  period  of  the  Bush  administration’s  first  term in  power. 
There were numerous supporters of the strategy, including Vice President 
D. Cheney and the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld193. The scope 
of  applying  a  hard-line  policy  is  exercising  pressure  over  a  political 
regime in order to make it agree to a settlement. The hard-line approach, 
as  it  was  perceived  by  the  early  Bush  administration,  excluded  any 
engagement, but had to pressure the North Korean regime with sanctions 
in  order  to  contribute  to  its  collapse.  With  the  negotiation  process  in 
course and the gradual progress it has achieved, the advocates of a hard-
line  approach  still  maintain  their  logic  of  the  non-productivity  of 
engagement with the DPRK, since they have actually provided only an 
incomplete disabling of the nuclear facilities and Pyongyang has had the 
possibility to continue its weapons programme all over the negotiations, 
192 Juergen  Kleiner.  A  Fragile  Relationship:  The  United  States  and  the  Republic  of  Korea  // 
Diplomacy & Statecraft, June 2006, Vol. 17, Issue 2. pp. 215-235.
193 Michael J. Mazarr. The Long Road to Pyongyang // Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007, Vol. 
86 Issue 5, pp. 75-94.
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while the issue of its past nuclear activities had not been verified before 
making a deal194.
Whatever  strategy  towards  the  DPRK  chosen,  there  is  a  broad 
agreement  that  to  become  an  integrative  part  of  the  international 
community North Korea has to go through important transformation and 
change (considering that a collapse is an unfavourable option).
Another  existing  option  is  the  regime  change,  which  would 
seemingly lead to a definite resolution of the nuclear question. A regime 
change is  immediate  and presumes a  use  of  force;  while  the regime’s 
transformation  is  its  evolution,  which  is  indirect  and  gradual  without 
direct use of military force. Denying any contacts with the regime to be 
changed and the lack of  diplomatic  actions characterizes  policy  of  the 
states – advocates of regime change195.
However, this alternative also entails trouble, since the character of 
relationship  between  the  regime  change  and  proliferation  control  is 
complicated.  The study conducted by Robert  Litwak has demonstrated 
that  intentions  to  acquire  weapons  of  mass  destruction  by  a  political 
regime do not depend on the regime’s type: democratization might lead to 
a  greater  transparence,  but  is  not  able  to  guarantee  from proliferating 
WMD196.  The  regime  change  does  not  lead  to  abandoning  nuclear 
ambitions,  unless  the  causations  of  proliferation  (goals  to  be  achieved 
through it) are satisfied. In case of North Korea the main requirements are 
security guarantees and economic assistance. At the same time, the Iraqi 
experience has demonstrated  that  anticipating a regime change implies 
high degree of uncertainty and various domestic and international factors 
should be taken into account:  the prognoses  of  a soon collapse  of  the 
DPRK  in  the  first  half  of  the  1990  proved  to  be  inconsistent.  North 
194 A diplomatic charade (by Nicholas Eberstadt). USA Today, January 03, 2008.
195 See Richard N. Haass. Regime Change and Its Limits // Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005, Vol. 84, 
Issue 4. pp. 66-78.
196 Litwak Robert S. Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change //  Survival, Winter 
2003/2004, Vol. 45, Issue 4, pp. 7-32.
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Korean population  still  maintains  an  extremely  high  degree  of  loyalty 
towards the authorities even in the face of serious economic hardships and 
any forceful regime change might lead to protests and social unrest.
The ambiguity over the consequences of an enforced regime change 
makes rather prefer opting for a regime’s evolution (transformation). In 
fact, in the 1990s many analysts believed that North Korea was about to 
collapse  considering  its  international  isolation,  marginal  politics  and 
disastrous economic conditions, but the regime managed to survive and 
currently continues to.
Evolutionary  (transformative)  approach  seems  more  stable  and 
predictable,  but  being  gradual  might  imply  a  lot  of  time.  The  main 
instrument of fostering a regime’s change is promoting freedom of press, 
supporting economic reforms, assisting nongovernmental organizations – 
all  activities  aimed  at  encouraging  reform  and  openness,  increasing 
transparency197.
Examining  current  developments  inside  the  DPRK  has  made 
anticipating a certain transformation of the North Korean society, which 
should  not  be  underestimated.  Andrei  Lankov  has  suggested  several 
policy initiatives that might promote a deeper change in the DPRK and 
overcome the current status quo through the regime’s character change: 
realizing  that  important  changes  in  the  DPRK  have  already  occurred, 
delivering alternative information inside the DPRK, leveraging the North 
Korean  refugees  lobby  in  the  South  Korea,  promoting  cultural, 
educational exchanges of the DPRK people with the outside198. He argues 
197 “On a separate track, to address humanitarian assistance needs … We assisted U.S. NGOs in 
providing aid to fight  the outbreak of infectious diseases  following floods in North Korea last 
summer. The United States is also working with U.S. NGOs to carry out a plan to improve the 
supply of electricity at provincial hospitals in North Korea. We have also made clear to the DPRK 
how much  we  value  the  advancement  of  human  rights  in  all  societies  and  that  discussion  of 
important outstanding issues of concern, including the DPRK’s human rights record, would be part 
of the normalization process”.  – the statement by Christopher Hill enlightened a transformative 
approach of the USA towards the DPRK.
198 Andrei Lankov. How to Topple Kim Jong Il // Foreign Policy, March/April 2007 Issue 159, pp. 
70-74.
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that such measures, as it occurred in the Soviet Union, where the collapse 
came from within, may eventually bring down the North Korean political 
system.
In could be claimed that promoting regime transformation in North 
Korea  is  complementary  to  diplomatic  activities  and  deterrence.  As 
Richard  Haass  notes  “a  foreign  policy  that  chooses  to  integrate,  not 
isolate,  despotic  regimes  can  be  the Trojan  horse  that  moderates  their 
behavior in the short run and their nature in the long run”199.
With the Six-party process and the settlement of the North Korean 
nuclear  problem based  on the  2005 Joint  Declaration  the  issue  of  the 
DPRK’s denuclearization is being international monitored. North Korea 
and the USA maintain their commitment to the process; however, some 
inconsistence  with  the  previously  settled  terms  of  implementing  the 
agreement  and presenting  a  complete  declaration of  its  nuclear  related 
activities have emerged. However, in case of a failure of the diplomatic 
settlement – for instance, in case of a new North Korean nuclear test or 
other  provocative  actions  –  the  USA  might  increase  pressure  on  the 
DPRK and imply coercive measures for resolving the problem.
The diplomatic solution of the matter seems more constructive and 
advantageous, if combined with fostering gradual evolution of the North 
Korean regime, when it would eventually give up its nuclear ambitions 
and  receive  in  change  assistance  for  the  country’s  development. 
Alternative  options  might  include  adopting  an  UN  Security  Council 
resolution,  imposing  economic  sanctions  on  the  DPRK,  enforcing 
international control over North Korean proliferation activities, a military 
action by the USA and a coalition of states.
Other states engaged in the nuclear settlement stay for a peaceful 
resolution of North Korean nuclear issue, since a military option would 
199 Richard N. Haass, p. 78. 
126
cause unpredictability over the future of the North Korean state, question 
its  independence,  foreign  policy  priorities,  and  might  have  destructive 
consequences on the neighbouring states.
Conclusion
The dissertation has dwelled upon the North Korea nuclear problem 
in regional and global context, introducing a framework for analysis of 
the developments on the Korean peninsula. The inevitability of examining 
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the nuclearization of the DPRK with a multilevel approach is determines 
by the fact that the problem is complex in nature and to be adequately 
explained  requires  a  broad  analysis.  First  of  all,  the  subject  of  study 
should be the North Korean state with a focus on the geopolitical position 
it had found itself after the end of the Cold war.
The particular situation over the problem of analyzing the actual 
state and developments of the North Korean situation is, first of all, the 
lack of verifiable information, caused by the regime’s strict control over 
the informational flows. In these circumstances a qualitative analysis of 
the impact of its policies on domestic and international situation has been 
preferred to the quantitative.
The period after the end of the Cold war was marked by significant 
changes  in  the  geopolitical  situation  over  the  Korean  peninsula.  The 
collapse of the Soviet Union has had a major impact on the situation in 
East  Asia  –  with  the  USA becoming  the most  influential  actor  in  the 
region.  With  the  dissolution  of  the  Communist  bloc  the  DPRK found 
itself  in  diplomatic,  political  isolation,  while  its  economy  experienced 
deep crisis, but despite of pessimistic prognoses it managed to survive.
The State of  the North East  Asia,  similar  to other  countries,  are 
seriously influenced by the globalization processes, which foster them to a 
constant  “adjustment”  to  the  global  development  level  and  generally 
accepted standards, increasing their competitiveness and through this – 
their  own  sustainable  development.  The  imperative  of  globalization 
inevitably requires openness of political systems, thus regulative functions 
of the State have to be reassessed. In case of North Korea, such challenges 
actually  mean  a  kind  of  enforced  and  hardly  controlled  adaptation. 
Indeed,  almost  complete  isolation  from  global  processes  and  global 
economy obviously has negative consequences for the development of the 
North Korean State. However, no political organism is static – it exists 
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and develops under the influence of various factors. This statement can be 
applied to the DPRK as well, though it is seemingly immune to reforms, 
both external and internal.
Each system tends to reproduce itself  constantly, on the basis  of 
many interlocking structures that  guarantee self-preservation.  After  the 
end  of  the  Cold  war  North  Korea  had  to  employ  policy  resources 
available to meet the goal of regime’s survival and defending itself as a 
unique political entity. The goals of the DPRK were similar to those of all 
political regimes  primarily, sovereignty, national security and economic 
prosperity  with a variety of strategies depending on the greater context 
in which their regimes operate. A practical long-term goal of North Korea 
is the maintenance of the existing status-quo, since it permits to save the 
foundations for the existence of the dominating regime.
With the loss of the main trade partners the DPRK had to look for 
alternative ways of survival. A series of natural disasters contributed to 
the  fact,  that  the  government  could  no  longer  guarantee  a  level  of 
subsistent for the people. The end of the Cold war has posed the problem 
of new security allies and security guarantees: the new leadership had to 
take measures to assure both international and domestic security. After the 
death of Kim Il Sung, whose authority in the national army was strong, 
the new leader had to consolidate the government, the party and the army 
around himself to guarantee the preservation of the North Korean system. 
The amendments made to the Constitution of the DPRK of 1972 reflect 
noticeable  changes  in  the  leadership  structure  and  government 
organization.
 the  DPRK  has  shifted  from  being  a  presidential  republic  to 
parliamentary republic;
 The Party’s leading role has been taken over by the military;
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 The Constitution  (1998)  stipulates  that  the DPRK economy is  self-
sustaining; however, a new provision that guarantees private property 
has  been  added.  The  private  property  regards  the  property  for 
individual possession and consumption of the citizens.
In the defense realm North Korea continued to sustain the strategy 
against  external  threats  on  the  self-defense  basis.  Self-reliance  plays  a 
double role  it strengthens national pride and contributes to the regime’s 
legitimization.  Considerable  effort  to  develop the national  defence and 
especially, the costly nuclear programme, presume that the DPRK intends 
at  least  to  have  an  adequate  compensation  of  considerable  resources 
implied in developing nuclear weapons. Security deterrence with the use 
of nuclear weapons becomes highly attractive.
Obviously, any security deterrence based on conventional weapons 
against  stronger  adversarial  forces  for  North  Korea  was  definitely 
unfeasible.  The  possibility  that  North  Korea  has  acquired  nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons makes the prospect of a military attack 
more difficult to contemplate. Recent developments in Afghanistan and 
Iraq might have contributed to convincing the DPRK’s government that 
its policies of nuclear weapons’ development could be optimal. In the new 
circumstances  the  nuclear  programme  possibly  acquired  particular 
significance as it was seemingly able to provide additional guarantees for 
the  political  regime’s  survival.  At  the  same  time,  the  revelations  of 
unauthorized  nuclear  developments  in  the  DPRK  challenged  the 
effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime and the security of regional 
powers and thus could not be tolerated by the international community.
The  North  Korean  nuclear  problem  has  not  arisen,  as  it  often 
claimed by the media, exclusively as a result of personal interests of the 
country’s  elite,  whose  power  subjectivity,  which  is  the  foundation  of 
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legitimacy  of  the  existing  regime,  is  defined by  the  acting  totalitarian 
leader.  North  Korea lacks  significant  economic  and political  leverages 
and resources,  and thus,  can  not  project  an  adequate  influence  on  the 
unsatisfactory external conditions. So, it is likely to initiate a local conflict 
(with the direct or indirect involvement of great powers) in order to attract 
international  attention,  which  may  catalyze  foreign  investment.  The 
initiated  conflict  helps  to  create  a  “negative  publicity”  by  drawing  a 
formally negative image of a country at war, which in future may cause 
the positive change of attitude of the great powers. Another thing is that 
the role of the military factor is still  very high in the DPRK. Actually, 
with the come to power of Kim Jong Il, the role of the army has been 
emphasized  on  the  contrary  to  the  party,  whose  power  has  seriously 
diminished.
The  absence  of  genuine  intention  of  North  Korea  to  engage  in 
world  politics  can  possibly  be  attributed  to  the  result  of  existence  of 
totalitarian regime. However, we sustain that in case of North Korea, the 
situation of isolation is largely dependent on the strength and efficacy of 
the state and its political regime: the State acts as a managing lever of the 
conflict  potential,  and  in  case  of  its  weakening  or  failure  the  internal 
political processes become uncontrollable. Settling of political conflicts 
where  minor  powers  are  involved  is  determined  by  the  absence  of 
comparable power resources between the conflicting parts. Thus, minor 
states in this case seek to establish communication channels to announce 
their position. A practical long-term goal of DPRK is the maintenance of 
the existing status-quo, since it permits to save the foundations for the 
existence of the regime in power. The situation is preconditioned by the 
fact that sustaining the functional capacity of the existing regime in North 
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Korea in the situation of non-transparency appears to be advantageous for 
its international counteragents.
Another  important  conclusion  made  in  the  dissertation  is  the 
alteration of the main causation of crisis on the Korean peninsula. Despite 
of the continued existence of the two rivaling Korean states the issue of 
nuclearization has substituted the former problem of inter-Korea rivalry 
and potential unification.
Comparative  analysis  of  the  two  nuclear  crises  in  historical 
prospective permitted to outline the strategies of the main parties involved 
and examine the agreements concluded, evaluating their limitations and 
strong points.
The  first  nuclear  crisis  on  the  Korean  peninsula  occurred  in 
1993-1994  in  the  framework  of  a  changing  international  environment 
after the end of the Cold war. The latent phase of the conflict dates back 
to the beginning of the North Korean nuclear programme development, 
but especially – to the end of the 1980s, when the DPRK joined the NPT 
(1985) and the question of the IAEA inspections emerged. Formally, the 
first crisis broke out as a result of discrepancies between North Korea and 
the IAEA regarding the correspondence of the nuclear programme to the 
norms of the Treaty and data evidence provided for the IAEA.
Another  pillar  of  the  regional  normative  base  for  nuclear 
proliferation  control  in  the  1990s  was  the  Joint  Declaration  on  the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (20 January 1992), signed by 
the two Korean states. The parts reached agreement on mutual inspections 
to verify the denuclearization of the peninsula. However, it has never been 
put into practice.
The  crisis  of  1993-1994  was  characterized  by  escalation  of 
tensions, when the DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the 
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NPT  in  1993  and  the  USA  challenged  North  Korea  with  imposing 
sanctions  and  conducting  a  military  operation.  In  course  of  the  first 
nuclear  crisis  the  United  States  deliberately  took  the  role  of  the 
international nonproliferation regime guard and later on, due to domestic 
institutional constraints and international responsibilities could not refuse 
the  mission  of  defending  security  on  the  peninsula.  The  crisis  was 
resolved with signing of the bilateral Geneva Framework Agreement of 
1994 between the DPRK and the USA, which set up the basis for  the 
future regulation of the North Korean nuclear activities and prevented its 
unilateral withdrawal from the NPT.
However, the 1994 Agreement presumed a temporarily deal aimed 
at preventing North Korea from further advance in its nuclear weapons 
programme,  but  did  not  provide  for  the  overall  control  of  the  nuclear 
capabilities of the DPRK and had not introduced a permanent mechanism 
of addressing the issue being in its core an exchange bargain. The Agreed 
Framework  was  not  a  treaty  in  any  binding  sense  but  rather  a  set  of 
guidelines to regulate the behavior of the parties. 
The  second  nuclear  crisis  (2002)  was  marked  by  implying 
significant multilateral effort to settle the North Korean nuclear issue in 
the framework of the Six-party talks (DPRK, ROK, USA, China, Japan, 
Russia). The Joint statement (2005) introduced a path for the settlement 
and in February 2007 tangible measures  to arrive at  a  final  resolution 
were elaborated. However, the new deal is based on the same premises as 
the  Framework  Agreement  of  1994  –  the  DPRK  assures  closing  its 
suspected  nuclear  facilities  and  abandoning  its  nuclear  weapons 
programme,  in  exchange  receiving  energy  assistance  and  further 
normalization of relations with the USA.
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The resolution of the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis demonstrated that 
bargaining tactics of a minor state such as North Korea could be efficient 
and the country actually gained benefits from the resolution of the issue – 
through entering in a direct dialogue with the USA, creating a positive 
momentum,  attracting  international  attention  and  receiving  foreign 
assistance and aid – fostering contacts with South Korea (economic aid). 
In the second deal the DPRK again used the nuclear weapons program as 
a bargaining leverage to pressure the United States to involve in direct 
bilateral  negotiations  over  security  assurances  and  end  of  economic 
sanctions that were obstacle to the country’s economic development.
The North Korean nuclear problem has been argued to be better 
placed in the regional and global contest. In this light, it has been highly 
relevant to examine the policies of main powers involved and to outdraw 
their  consent  and /or  divergence  on settling  the  North  Korean nuclear 
problem.
Throughout the Bush administration in term the policy line versus 
North Korea uncovered divisions within the administration. The hard-line 
isolationist  approach towards North Korea has been revealed by senior 
officials in the US Defense department with the term “rogue state” was 
reintroduced into the political discourse regarding the DPRK after years it 
has not been used: the Clinton administration abandoned the expression in 
the middle of the 1990s. The anti-terror campaign led by the USA created 
concerns that Washington had chosen to limit its diplomatic activities and 
give priority to military power logic and advantages it possesses in this 
sphere.
In  the  second  term  the  policy  towards  North  Korea  changed 
substantially  due  to  multiple  factors,  such  as  changes  in  the  political 
context  (military  engagement  in  Iraq)  and  the  administration’s  stuff 
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reshuffle.  The  new policy  strategy  has  brought  some  visible  progress, 
such as preventing escalation of tensions,  concluding the deal with the 
DPRK  in  February  2007,  although,  the  final  outcome  is  still  to  be 
attended.
Despite of hesitations of the earlier period, the USA demonstrated 
preference  for  a  multilateral  diplomatic  solution  that  had,  however, 
presented its difficulties and structural constraints. The disagreement of 
the  contracting parties  over  the  means  of  settling  the  nuclear  problem 
hampered the negotiation process. 
The Japan’s policy towards North Korea has adopted a line in the 
middle  between  containment  and  engagement  towards  the  DPRK.  For 
Japan the threat posed by North Korea arises from the nuclear program as 
well as from the very nature of the political regime in the DPRK. Giving 
importance to the abduction issue of the Japanese citizens in the 1970s 
has made Japan’ reconciliation effort limited. The Japanese government 
insists on resolving abduction issue prior to any political normalization 
with the DPRK.
The  Republic  of  Korea  conducted  the  policy  of  engagement 
towards  the  DPRK from 2000.  South  Korea  has  never  considered  the 
option of  a  military  strike at  the DPRK,  since  it  might  have  dramatic 
consequences on its own national security and economic stability. In this 
light, provocative actions or even verbal accusations towards the DPRK 
by the USA have been perceived as needless and avoidable steps. The 
ROK has repeatedly emphasized the feasibility of the peaceful resolution 
and considers coercive options as unacceptable.
Strategic political-military alliances with the USA have had impact 
on  the  policies  of  South  Korea  and Japan  in  regard of  addressing  the 
North  Korean  problem.  However,  being  neighboring  countries  to  the 
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DPRK,  the  ROK  and  Japan  realize  the  consequences  of  an  enforced 
solution. By disregard to the interests of its allies the USA in effect had 
temporarily  lost  the  regional  consensus,  which  prevented  from 
coordinating  its  vision  with  the  allies  and  acting  together  in  order  to 
dissolve  the North Korean nuclear  issue.  The late  Bush administration 
seemed to have reconsidered its previous policy line and made an attempt 
to strengthen the confused alliances and address the resolution of the issue 
to  the  multilateral  regional  mechanism  of  the  Six-party  talks,  which 
includes also China and Russia.
China,  as  another  major  power  involved,  stands  for  the 
denuclearization of the DPRK, but has been reluctant to exert pressure on 
North Korea on the matter or to impose and support any sanctions against 
the DPRK adopting the policy of continues engagement of North Korea. 
China’s role in settlement of the second nuclear crisis has been that of an 
active mediator and host of the Six-party talks in Beijing. The Chinese 
self-perception  in  the  current  world  order  makes  it  improving  its  soft 
power and upgrading its moral image within the international community. 
Obviously, China alone does not possess an adequate influence leverage 
to persuade North Korea neither to dismantle its nuclear programme nor 
to engage in economic reforms and open itself to the outside world. China 
would  remain  committed  to  the  peaceful  settlement  of  the  nuclear 
problem and to  reforming the North Korea economy in the long term 
perspective.
A military  conflict  on the Korean peninsula  would be definitely 
injurious  for  Russia’s  national  interests.  The  maintenance  of  domestic 
stability  and  stability  of  the  surrounding  international  environment  is 
crucial for the country’s development.  Russian approach to settling the 
North Korean nuclear programme issue consists in advocating observance 
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of the NPT and resolving any disputes through negotiations. There is also 
an understanding that North Korea’s energy problems should be resolved. 
In this sense Russia is eager to foster negotiations, advocate a multilateral 
approach  and  to  act  as  a  mediator  if  needed  to  prevent  possible 
preemptive  military  strike  on North Korea.  On the other  hand,  Russia 
pursues a goal to promote the development the Russian Far East and the 
Siberian region with projects  of  transportation (a  joint  Korean railway 
connected  to  the  Trans-Siberian  railway)  and  joint  energy  projects 
pretending both economic benefits and an enhanced position among other 
regional powers.  Such soft-power policies dominate  the Russian vision 
towards the Korean peninsula.
Another research question set in the dissertation has been analysis 
of  possible  strategies  of  dealing  with  the  DPRK nuclear  issue  –  both 
already implied and hypothetically plausible. The relevance of this task is 
determined by the fact that the strategy of dealing with North Korea is 
strictly  connected  to  the  overall  vision  of  applying  an  adequate  and 
efficient  strategy  towards  the  states  that  proliferate  weapons  of  mass 
destruction. The Korean issue is even more complicated – the DPRK has 
been  included  in  the  list  of  the  states  sponsoring  terrorism,  violating 
human  rights  and  proliferating  nuclear  weapons.  The  strategies  of 
addressing the nuclear issue and the whole problem of North Korea can 
be summarized in two main streamlines – military settlement and peaceful 
resolution – with particular policy options chosen for each of them. The 
resolution  of  the  problem  of  nuclear  proliferation  could  be  based  at 
applying  principles  of  international  law,  corresponding  arms  control 
agreements, regimes and international control.
Military  settlement  was  seriously  considered  by the  USA in  the 
period of the first nuclear crisis and reconsidered in the variant of pre-
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emptive attack during the second. Thus, it could not be entirely neglected 
in spite of obviously devastating consequences, and might be potentially 
applied in case of a deadlock of a peaceful process. The experience of 
military  campaigns  lead  by  the  USA  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan 
demonstrated limitation of target  strikes,  but  they are able to seriously 
destruct, if not destroy the nuclear facilities of the North. The challenges 
of implementing a military solution are reciprocal measures that might be 
undertaken by the North Korean forces  and rival  the territories  of  the 
neighbouring states as well as the US military bases there. In this light it 
would be difficult  to get consent for any military operation against the 
DPRK from the  Republic  of  Korea  and  Japan  (as  well  as  China  and 
Russia, which expressed against any coercive military measures).
In  course  of  both  nuclear  crises  on  the  Korean  peninsular  non-
military approaches prevailed. The peaceful approach of dealing with the 
DPRK  presumes  two  main  policy  lines  –  engaging  North  Korea  or 
containing it.
With the Six-party process and the settlement of the North Korean 
nuclear  problem based  on the  2005 Joint  Declaration  the  issue  of  the 
DPRK’s  denuclearization  has  been  internationally  monitored.  North 
Korea and the USA maintain their commitment to the process; however, 
some inconsistence with the previously settled terms of implementing the 
agreement  and presenting  a  complete  declaration of  its  nuclear  related 
activities have emerged.
The diplomatic solution of the matter seems more constructive and 
advantageous, if combined with fostering gradual evolution of the North 
Korean regime, when it would eventually give up its nuclear ambitions 
and  receive  in  change  assistance  for  the  country’s  development. 
Alternative non-military options might include adopting an UN Security 
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Council resolution, imposing economic sanctions on the DPRK, enforcing 
international control over North Korean proliferation activities, a military 
action by the USA and a coalition of states.
Other states engaged in the nuclear settlement stay for a peaceful 
resolution of North Korean nuclear issue, since a military option would 
cause unpredictability over the future of the North Korean state, question 
its  independence,  foreign  policy  priorities,  and  might  have  destructive 
consequences on the neighbouring states.
The  most  challenging doubt  is,  however,  if  the  DPRK seriously 
intends to abandon its nuclear weapons programme. It has become evident 
that  a  strategy  of  a  simultaneous  abandon  in  change  of  economic 
incentives has failed (1994 Agreed Framework).  A gradual  progress is 
believed to be more efficient – accompanied by rigorous monitoring and 
verification followed.
To be committed to the negotiation process North Korea should be 
offered satisfactory guarantees of regime survival together with economic 
assistance.
Whatever  strategy  towards  the  DPRK  chosen,  to  become  an 
integrative part  of  the international  community  North Korea has  to  go 
through  important  transformation  or  change.  A  regime  change  is 
immediate and presumes a use of force; while the regime’s transformation 
is  its  evolution,  which  is  indirect  and  gradual  without  direct  use  of 
military force.
However, this alternative also entails trouble, since the character of 
relationship  between  the  regime  change  and  proliferation  control  is 
complicated. The study conducted by Robert Litwak has demonstrated the 
regime change does not lead to abandoning nuclear ambitions, unless the 
causations of proliferation are satisfied. In case of North Korea the main 
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requirements  are  security  guarantees  and  economic  assistance. 
Anticipating  a  regime  change  implies  high  degree  of  uncertainty  and 
various domestic and international factors should be taken into account: 
the prognoses of a soon collapse of the DPRK in the first half of the 1990 
proved  to  be  inconsistent.  North  Korean  population  still  maintains  an 
extremely high degree of loyalty towards the authorities even in the face 
of serious economic hardships and any forceful regime change might lead 
to protests and social unrest.
The ambiguity over the consequences of an enforced regime change 
makes rather prefer opting for a regime’s evolution (transformation). This 
approach  seems  more  stable  and  predictable,  but  being  gradual  might 
imply a lot of time. The main instrument of fostering a regime’s change is 
promoting  freedom  of  press,  supporting  economic  reforms,  assisting 
nongovernmental  organizations  –  all  activities  aimed  at  encouraging 
reform and openness, increasing transparency.
The international experience of settling the North Korean nuclear 
problem  demonstrated  that  the  mechanisms  of  the  cold  war  nuclear 
proliferation control turned out to be ineffective nowadays in the light of 
the  challenges  the  NPT currently  faces.  However,  international  efforts 
have contributed to accumulate an experience of working out means of 
dealing  with  the  NPT  regime  violators.  In  this  light,  the  multilateral 
experience of dealing with the North Korean case has been positive.
For conceptualizing foundations and causes of the nuclear crises on 
the  Korean  peninsular,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  dynamics  of 
domestic situation and international position changes in the DPRK. The 
refusal of the DPRK to reform its economy and to engage into wild scale 
international economic interactions dramatizes its position. Pyongyang is 
interested in receiving security guarantees and normalizing its relations, 
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first of all, with the USA. However, the matters of denuclearization of the 
Korean peninsular and of any shifts in the regional security balance are in 
the  realm  of  international  agreements,  not  in  the  bilateral  DPRK-US 
dialogue.
International  powers  concerned  have  to  solve  the  dilemma  of 
strategic  approaches  of  dealing  with  North  Korea.  In  the  history  of 
dealing with North Korea have been suggested (and approbated) methods 
of force (form ultimatums to economic sanctions), together with peaceful 
means  of  conflict  resolution  through  dialogue,  signing  agreements, 
establishing  cooperation.  The  most  rational  way  of  goal  achieving  in 
controlling  the  North  Korean  nuclear  programme  appears  to  be 
cooperation with the regime – the “engagement policy”.
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